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 Martin Heidegger exerted an immense influence over twentieth century thought by 
providing profound insights into the nature of Being as well as scathing social critiques, focused 
on the destructive force of late modern technological reductionism.  As part of Heidegger’s 
project, he elaborated upon a sophisticated history of Being in which two great monsters of 
Platonism and Humanism are cast as Antichrist and False Prophet.  Subsequently, however, his 
own student Ernesto Grassi argued that Renaissance Humanism was not a stepping stone towards 
subjectivism and technological thinking, but rather stood in conformity with the fundamental 
essence of Heidegger’s own project.   
This study seeks to perform the same service for the much maligned history of Platonic 
thinking.  After reviewing the important details of the positions held by Heidegger and Grassi in 
the Introduction and Chapter One, I move on to an examination of the history of the 
interpretation of Plato in Chapter Two.  Here I show that, when we approach Plato correctly, his 
thought conforms to insights later offered by Heidegger and Grassi.  In the remaining chapters of 
the study, I demonstrate that this misunderstanding afflicts not only Plato himself, but it has also 
affected the interpretation of the entire Neoplatonic tradition.  Thus, in Chapter Three, I show 
that Plotinus receives and expands upon the core insights which Plato possessed, and that 
Platonism’s role in the development of technological enframing has been gravely mistaken.  In 
Chapter Four, I show how the later integration of Neoplatonic thought into some of the greatest 
Christian Platonists did nothing to eliminate these core insights of the Platonic tradition.  Finally, 
in Chapter Five, I show that Marsilio Ficino, the Platonist painted by Grassi as the arch-villain 
who undermined the Heideggerian project of the Renaissance continued to maintain the 
fundamental insights of the Platonic tradition. 
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Ultimately, therefore, Platonism, far from being the foundation of technological 
enframing in the modern era, is able to offer great assistance to the Heideggerian-Grassian 
























The Danger of Technological Thinking and Its Alleged Platonic Roots 
 
 On April 3, 1996, officers of the Federal Bureau of Investigation descended upon the 
cabin of Theodore Kaczynski and uncovered 40,000 pages of handwritten journals, bomb 
components, a live explosive and the original typed manuscript of Kaczynski's manifesto, 
"Industrial Society and Its Future."  This event would mark the end of Kaczynski's seventeen 
year campaign of terror in which he killed three people and wounded twenty-three others with 
homemade bombs.  What could drive this man—brilliant mathematician, educated at Harvard 
and the University of Michigan, and the youngest ever appointed professor at the University of 
California at Berkeley—to retreat to the wilds of Montana and begin such a murderous 
rampage?1 
 According to Kaczynski's own words in "Industrial Society and Its Future,"2 the primary 
motivation for the bombing campaign was to initiate a revolution to bring about the collapse of 
the "industrial technological system" because it had caused a monumental reduction in the 
autonomy of persons by absorbing them into "leftish" collectivist ideologies.  In particular, as 
part of his extensive critique of modern, technological culture he claimed "[i]n the future, social 
systems will not be adjusted to suit the needs of human beings.  Instead, human beings will be 
adjusted to suit the needs of the system" (Kaczynski 85).  To avoid this calamity, Kaczynski 
argued that it was necessary to launch a full-scale revolution against the weaknesses of industrial 
technological society and utterly destroy it, because, in his view, no part of the system can be 
                                                 
1 This question is not meant to direct us towards the life events of Theodore Kaczynski that contributed to 
directing his mind towards the conclusions at which he arrived, but rather the reasons themselves which he 
expressed.  For more information on the biographical and psychological causes of Kaczynski's activity see 
Alston Chase, A Mind for Murder: The Education of the Unabomber and the Origins of Modern Terrorism. 
2 All citations from "Industrial Society and Its Future" are taken from the edition of Kaczynski's essays found in 
the volume Technological Slavery: The Collected Writings of Theodore J. Kaczysnki, a.k.a. "The Unabomber." 
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redeemed because all its components are interconnected (74).  As such, he sought for a band of 
revolutionaries with this singular cause in mind—the destruction of the technological world, by 
any means necessary (102). 
 Kaczynski, however, is hardly the only person to make an observation about the negative 
effects of industrial and technological society on humanity.  While he was on trial for his 
campaign of bombings, he was approached and befriended by the anarchist philosopher John 
Zerzan.  While Zerzan did not actively advocate physical violence to bring about this end, his 
intellectual opposition toward technological society was perhaps even more extreme than that of 
Kaczynski.  While Kaczynski famously stated, "[t]he Industrial Revolution and its consequences 
have been a disaster for the human race" (36), Zerzan traced the problem to a far earlier source, 
stating in his work Running on Emptiness: The Pathology of Civilization:  "[f]rom initial 
alienation to advanced civilization, the course is marked by more and more reification, 
dependence, bureaucratization, spiritual desolation, and barren technicization" (4-5).  Zerzan 
explicitly links this "initial alienation" to the development of an impulse towards the "mastery of 
nature" and the introduction of symbolic culture: 
  Culture is a fairly recent affair.  The oldest cave art, for example, is in the   
  neighborhood of 30,000 years old, and agriculture only got underway about  
  10,000 years ago.  The missing element during the vast interval between the time  
  when I.Q. was available to enable symbolizing, and its realization, was a shift in  
  our relationship to nature.  It seems plausible to see in this interval, on some level  
  that we will perhaps never fathom, a refusal to strive for mastery of nature.  It  
                        may be that only when this striving for mastery was introduced, probably non- 
  consciously, via a very gradual division of labor, did the symbolizing of   
  experiences begin to take hold. (5) 
 
Zerzan also argues, following the anthropological analysis of authors such as Marshall 
Sahlins3, that hunter-gatherer societies were not plagued by the burden of excessive work (50), 
                                                 
3 In particular as found in Marshall Sahlins, Stone Age Economics. 
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nor did they engage in systematic brutality.  Rather, he suggests, "[w]hile virtually every society 
that adopted a domesticated relationship to nature, all over the globe, became subject to 
organized violent practices, the non-agricultural knew no organized violence" (5). 
 Zerzan's thought is notably different from Kaczynski's, as presented in his manifesto, 
because while Kaczynski sees the emergence of an alienated society primarily as a result of the 
development of technology itself, Zerzan attributes the development of technology to a more 
basic domesticating impulse.  That is, while Zerzan does take a solidly negative stance towards 
technology, he asserts that it is essentially a symptom of a much more fundamental drive: the 
desire for mastery over nature. 
 While Zerzan's utopian vision of pre-agrarian society makes him distinct, his analysis of 
the basis of technological society is fundamentally shared by the eminent twentieth century 
German philosopher Martin Heidegger.  Heidegger is most famous, of course, for his 
contributions to the field of ontology; however, we should not overlook the fact that his careful 
analysis of the question of Being was intimately related to his concerns regarding modern 
technology and the scientific worldview.4  While the depraved mind of Kaczynski thought the 
solution could be found in the almost random bombing of individuals involved in professions 
associated with the modern “techno-industrial” complex, Zerzan proposes a more gradual and 
peaceful process of “re-wilding” in which we shed our “civilized” natures and return to an 
original unity with the natural world.  Heidegger's view, however, seems to provide the greatest 
practical possibility of moving forward because, while all three thinkers move to get behind the 
                                                 
4 There are, of course, many other thinkers who have recognized the danger of technological thinking.  For 
example Jacques Ellul provided a famous critique in his work The Technological Society.  More recently, Bill 
Joy, co-founder and then Chief Scientist of Sun Microsystems, in his essay “Why the Future Doesn't Need Us” in 
Wired likewise offered a harsh assessment of technological development.  However, these three thinkers to 
whom I refer above form a representative sample of differing approaches to the problem at hand. 
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impulse and principles of technology, only Heidegger appears to see the problem in the fullness 
of its ontological significance.  As such, Heidegger provides a superior pathway to overcoming 
the problem due to his greater understanding of the root of the problem itself.  Furthermore, as a 
result of his deeper ontological understanding of the issue, Heidegger’s path to overcoming 
technological thinking does not rely on a simplistic obliteration of art, culture and the humanities 
along with technology.   
However, while Heidegger's analysis does give insight into the ontological difficulties 
posed by the question of modern technology, I will argue during the course of this study that, 
with respect to the details of his ontological analysis, Heidegger made a number of errors in 
evaluation.  This will be true particularly of his assessments regarding the role of Platonism and 
that of Humanism in the developments which culminate in technological thinking.  In the 
following chapters I will set out to demonstrate the fundamental basis of Heidegger’s thought 
about the “forgetfulness of Being” wherein Western thought is dominated by successive 
historical paradigms by which beings as a whole appear and present themselves and, 
correspondingly, the paradigms become so totalizing that their nature as historically contingent 
paradigms fades into the background.  I shall also show how Heidgger’s student Ernesto Grassi 
fits into the framework of his thought, in particular by discussing his view of Renaissance 
Humanism as an exception to Heidegger’s general historical schema and how the intellectual 
tools and perspectives of the Humanists constitute this exception.   
Overall, however, my primary focus will be on responding to critiques leveled against 
Plato and the Platonists by both Grassi and Heidegger to demonstrate that the Platonic tradition 
from Plato to Marsilio Ficino is not subject to the “forgetfulness of Being” any more than 
Grassi’s Humanists.  Indeed, I shall demonstrate that the core features of Grassi’s Humanists are 
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present in the historical Platonic thinkers.  In doing so, I hope to establish Platonism, with aid 
from the intellectual tools of the Humanists according to Grassi’s model, as a fundamental way 
to overcome subjectivism and nihilism in our contemporary circumstances, particularly in the 
form of what Heidegger calls Ge-stell, or the tendency to view all of reality as manipulable 
resources for our exploitation, which I shall discuss in more detail below.   
 In his essay, “The Question Concerning Technology,”5 Heidegger points out that the 
normal assessments of technology as a means to an end and as human activity converge to 
establish the instrumental and anthropological definition of technology (312).    Heidegger goes 
on to point out that this instrumental attitude towards technology shapes the entire relationship 
that human beings have towards it.  Indeed, in words that we found echoed in Zerzan's own 
treatment, we find Heidegger saying:  “Everything depends on our manipulating technology in 
the proper manner as a means.  We will, as we say, 'get' technology 'intelligently in hand.'  We 
will master it.  The will to mastery becomes all the more urgent the more technology threatens to 
slip from human control” (313).   
 Heidegger refuses to end his analysis there, however.  Having come to the conclusion that 
the instrumental definition of science is fundamentally correct, he goes on to ask what the 
instrumental itself is.  Heidegger begins by exploring the traditional conception of causality in 
which one has the material, formal, final and efficient causes.  He concludes that, given these 
structures, the definition of causality must be found in the idea of that to which something is 
indebted.  “The four causes are the ways, all belonging at once to each other, of being 
responsible for something else” (314).  In particular, he holds that they are responsible for letting 
the object of which they are the cause come forth into presence (316).  From this, argues 
                                                 
5 All citations from "The Question Concerning Technology” are taken from the edition of Heidegger's essays 
found in the volume Basic Writings. 
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Heidegger, it becomes apparent that the fundamental nature of instrumentality is “revealing” or 
bringing things from concealment forth into unconcealment.  To this idea of revealing, Heidegger 
links the literal etymology of the Greek word aletheia, traditionally translated as “truth.”  Thus, 
ultimately, Heidegger concludes, the essence of technology lies within the realm of this 
revealing.  That is, that technology is a way in which a world of intelligibility comes forth into 
unconcealment. 
 However, for Heidegger, as with every mode of the unconcealing of Being, technology 
bears a reciprocal concealment.  What then is the distinct mode of revealing found within 
modern technology?  Heidegger refers to the particular form of unconcealment found in modern 
technology as “enframing” (Ge-stell).  Fundamentally, this enframing means that the world 
reveals itself as a constant challenging-forth.  In particular, the world reveals itself as a place to 
be unlocked, transformed, stored, distributed, and switched about.  That is, the world reveals 
itself as a “standing reserve” (Bestand) to be manipulated (321-322).  Heidegger's thought 
supports and illuminates Zerzan's idea that there is a flowering of a drive towards mastery and 
manipulation inherent in the thought of technology; however, Heidegger pushes the thought even 
further and argues that the origin of the drive towards manipulative mastery originates from the 
ontological reality of Being revealing beings as standing reserves to be manipulated.  However, 
the implications of this are immense.  Heidegger points out that “[o]nly to the extent that man for 
his part is already challenged to exploit the energies of nature can this revealing that orders 
happen.  If man is challenged, ordered, to do this, then does not man himself belong even more 
originally than nature within the standing-reserve” (323).  Man finds himself caught in the world 
of enframing, compelled by the very essence of technology to approach the world in a 
technological fashion.   
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 In his 1964 essay “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,”6 Heidegger 
characterizes the domination of enframing as the end of philosophy in the present age.  It is 
important to bear in mind that for Heidegger philosophy and metaphysics are interchangeable 
concepts—“philosophy is metaphysics” (432-434).  However, this does little to clarify the 
issue—what then is Heidegger's definition of metaphysics?  Furthermore, what does it mean for 
philosophy/metaphysics to be coming to an end? 
 First, for Heidegger, metaphysics is characterized particularly by the forgetfulness of the 
question of Being as such.  In his 1949 “Introduction to 'What is Metaphysics?'”7 he states 
“[b]ecause metaphysics interrogates beings as beings, it remains concerned with beings and does 
not turn itself to Being as Being” (278).  Heidegger argues that whenever metaphysics engages in 
the question regarding the nature of beings, it does so in light of the fact that beings are already 
exposed and illuminated by the light of Being; however, such an analysis is not able to go 
beyond itself to the question of the essence of Being itself.  Instead, Heidegger suggests that the 
entire history of metaphysics is dominated by a term which he borrows from the renowned 
Prussian philosopher Immanuel Kant:  onto-theology (1969: 58-59). 
 For Heidegger, “onto-theology” is taken to refer to the union of the two dimensions of 
traditional Western metaphysics, which he refers to as “ontology” and “theology.”  Ontology is 
taken to be the mode of approaching beings which seeks to explore their commonality.  That is, 
ontology seeks to explore the nature of the shared unity of all the various different entities 
encountered in the world, under a single definition which is valid for all entities at all times.  In 
                                                 
6 All citations from "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking” are taken from the edition of Heidegger's 
essays found in the volume Basic Writings. 
7 All citations from "Introduction to 'What is Metaphysics?'” are taken from the edition of Heidegger's essays 
found in the volume Pathmarks. 
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his 1957 lecture “On the Onto-theological Constitution of Metaphysics,”8 Heidegger describes 
this as “the ground-giving unity of what is most general, what is indifferently valid everywhere” 
(58).  Theology, on other hand, is the highest and supreme instantiation of that common 
principle.  Theology is the totality of the being of beings thought of as the ground of all entities.  
Thus, Heidegger says:  “all metaphysics is at bottom, and from the ground up, what grounds, 
what gives account of the ground, what is called to account by the ground, and finally what calls 
the ground to account” (58).  Therefore, we see that for Heidegger, the essence of metaphysics is 
the double search for a grounding of entities by securing the Being of beings, both in the sense of 
the commonality of being in which all entities share and by discovering the highest entity from 
which all entities receive their efficient causality. 
 Now that we have discovered what Heidegger means when he speaks of metaphysics, we 
are able to move on to our second question.  Why does he speak of metaphysics coming to an 
end?  To answer this question, it is first necessary to understand that Heidegger does not mean by 
this claim that metaphysics has reached some kind of telos, some perfection or fulfillment, of its 
nature.  Indeed, he denies that different forms of metaphysical thinking are commensurable at all, 
stating in “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking”:  “Not only do we lack any criterion 
that would permit us to evaluate the perfection of an epoch of metaphysics as compared with any 
other epoch; the right to this kind of evaluation does not exist.  Plato's thinking is no more 
perfect than Parmenides'.  Hegel's philosophy is no more perfect than Kant's.  Each epoch of 
philosophy has its own necessity” (433).  Rather, when Heidegger discusses the end of 
metaphysics, he means it in the sense of arriving at the utmost borders of metaphysical thinking, 
the gathering-in of all the possibilities of metaphysics.  For this reason it is unsurprising to find 
                                                 
8 All citations from "The Onto-theological Constitution of Metaphysics” are taken from the edition of Heidegger's 
essays found in the volume Identity and Difference. 
9 
 
that Heidegger considers technological thinking to be the conclusion and end of the history of 
metaphysics—metaphysics has come to regard everything as a standing reserve which is only the 
final expression of the field which metaphysics opened to itself by trying to think towards 
grounds.  Why might we say this?  Iain Thomson points out that the understanding of 
metaphysics in this sense of double grounding seeks to allow us to give an account and 
explanation of both common being and also, in its theological mode, the efficient causality of 
being as a whole (2000: 302).  Giving an account is already the beginning of the manifestation of 
being, not as a mysterious and ineffable presencing, but rather as a graspable and manipulable 
concept—a concept that can be used to explain the structure of entities.  The ultimate expression 
of this impulse, of course, is technological enframing.  However, if technological enframing is 
the extreme end of the possibilities of metaphysics, whence lays their beginning?  Once again, 
Heidegger tells us in no uncertain terms:  “Metaphysics is Platonism” (“The End of Philosophy” 
433).  
In opposition to metaphysical thinking, Heidegger holds out hope for a deeper, more 
original form of thinking.  However, this thinking should not be considered as a new, superior 
form of metaphysics; rather Heidegger seeks the meaning of Being itself which has been 
obscured by every instance of metaphysics forgetting Being as such in favor of reducing being to 
a being or the beingness of beings.  Heidegger seeks after the non-identical “Same” which 
underlies all the various, incommensurable metaphysical epochs, as indicated in his lectures on 
Nietzsche.  However, he does not seek this Same in its presence, as in the case of metaphysics, 
but rather in the interplay between concealing and unconcealing, in the sheer act of presencing.  
For, as he mentions in that same lecture, “this 'same' is so essential and so rich that no single 
thinker exhausts it; each commits all the others to it all the more strictly” (Heidegger 1979: 36).  
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Heidegger wishes to bypass these metaphysical ontologies entirely and seek a fundamental 
ontology in order to find a new beginning for thinking.  For what reason is Heidegger so 
concerned with overcoming metaphysics?  Due to the fact that the furthest limits of metaphysics 
are inherently nihilistic—a nihilism that Heidegger ultimately traces back to Plato (Glazebrook 
164).  Heidegger does this despite the fact that he suggests that the inauguration of the 
forgetfulness of Being in Platonic philosophy was not a purely human failing, but rather a result 
of Being concealing itself.  Therefore, Harman states about the culmination of this forgetfulness 
in technological enframing: “Strangely enough, Heidegger does not believe that humans are to 
blame for this horrible predicament—instead, being itself is to blame!  For it is being that passes 
itself off as mere presence, and thereby invites us to convert things into a stockpile of 
manipulable slag” (136). 
 Heidegger has a chosen method for recovering a more originary understanding of the 
meaning of Being, a method laid out in Being and Time, namely Destruktion.  According to 
Thomson this Destruktion first manifests itself as a progressive diachronic analysis of western 
metaphysics as onto-theology, leading back to the beginnings of Greek thought among the Pre-
Socratics.  At this point, rather than step back into an even more primordial point in time, 
Heidegger takes a synchronic step by examining the way in which different early Greek 
philosophers approached the question of Being.  In particular, Thomson maintains, he finds in 
Parmenides and Heraclitus the conception of Being, not as “permanent presence,” but rather as 
“emergence and disclosure.”  Due to this historical claim, Thomson points out that even though 
for Heidegger the development of a metaphysics of presence is linked to Being's self-
manifestation in certain ways, it cannot be necessary because these other forms of thinking 
presented themselves at the beginning of Greek philosophy (317-318). 
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 Earlier in this introduction I mentioned that I shall show in the course of this study that 
Heidegger is in error regarding his evaluation of Platonic philosophy (p. 4).  Thomson’s insight 
is essential to the task because it is this precise divergence between the thinking of Being and its 
forgetfulness in metaphysics that constitutes the basic source of the critique.  In particular, I shall 
demonstrate that an almost exact reversal of Heidegger’s history of philosophy (at least until 
approximately the time of Descartes) is in order—that, in fact, the vast majority of the history of 
philosophy is characterized, not by the forgetfulness of the question of Being, but precisely by 
the thinking of this problem, and that Plato himself should be viewed as the great shepherd who 
serves as the mentor of this movement.  This should come as no surprise.  After all, the two 
figures among the Pre-Socratics whom Heidegger considers to be the most aware of the meaning 
of Being are precisely the two generally considered to have exerted the most influence on the 
development of Plato’s thought.  Alfred North Whitehead was more or less correct when he 
commented that the “safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is 
that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato” (39) and Heidegger was indeed clinging to this 
same insight when he commented, as we have seen, that “metaphysics is Platonism;” however, 
since the history of metaphysics (if we wish to maintain Heidegger’s name for Plato’s activity) 
is, in fact, radically divergent from Heidegger’s understanding, what this claim means will be 
something much different than Heidegger intended.  Furthermore, I will demonstrate that this re-
evaluation of the Platonic tradition is of vital importance to the pursuit of a robust education in 
the humanities, particularly rhetoric and literature, in the wake of the dominance of 
mathematical, scientific and technological thinking which has risen in the modern period. 
 In Chapter One, I shall examine Heidegger’s thoughts on poetry and their relationship to 
thinking as elucidated in the thought of his student Ernesto Grassi.  In particular, I shall explain 
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how Grassi believed he had discovered in Renaissance Humanism, not the metaphysical and 
anthropocentric thought which Heidegger believed dwelt there, but rather an originary grappling 
with the poetic-rhetorical word and its relationship to the question of Being as the clearing in 
which beings are able to come forward.  Grassi’s examination of the nature of Humanism is 
particularly important because it marks the last period of resistance before the capitulation to 
metaphysics (understood according to Heidegger’s negative connotation) with the advent of 
modernity.  I shall also point out how Grassi continues Heidegger’s critique of Platonism and 
wishes to drive a wedge between the Humanist endeavor in this period and the Platonic one, 
which he associates with aiding the fall into the forgetfulness of being and rise of Cartesianism.  
While accepting Grassi’s positive evaluation of Humanism, I shall, naturally, reject his 
characterization of Platonism.  Indeed, I will draw upon the four primary criteria of Grassi’s 
philosophy which he finds manifest in the Humanist tradition and use them as the standards by 
which to evaluate the history of Platonism for the remainder of the study. 
 In Chapter Two, I shall turn to the evaluation of Plato himself.  Despite the generally 
negative evaluation of Plato by Heidegger and Grassi, a number of scholars have risen up to 
challenge the idea that Plato actually fits into the history of metaphysics in the way which 
Heidegger lays out in his later works.  Indeed, even Heidegger and Grassi equivocate on the 
issue of Plato’s conformity to their own history of philosophy.  Chief among these commentators 
are Francisco Gonzalez in his Plato and Heidegger: A Question of Dialogue and Mark 
Ralkowski in Heidegger’s Platonism.  The former work is a careful analysis of all the times in 
his career when Heidegger engaged directly with Plato’s thought and speculates on the missed 
opportunities for dialogue between the two philosophers on the basis of Heidegger's own 
resistance to Plato's particular philosophical method of attempting to approach the clearing of 
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Being through logoi.  This work does a great deal to elucidate the unspoken commonality 
between the two philosophers.  Ralkowski's book offers an insightful glance into the history of 
the interpretation of Plato in the modern period and then presents a compelling case that 
Heidegger’s own conception of Being and truth as unconcealment was largely influenced by his 
interpretation of the Allegory of the Cave found in the seventh book of Plato's Republic, 
particularly as developed in Heidegger's 1931-32 lecture series On the Essence of Truth.  This 
lecture course demonstrates a marked difference from Heidegger's later characterization of Plato 
in his much more famous work on Plato's Doctrine of Truth, which generally serves as the 
guiding light to characterizations of the relationship between the two philosophers.  Ralkowski 
describes this early relationship between Heidegger and Plato in the following manner: 
  Heidegger's encounter with Plato's philosophy is so profound, in fact, he worries  
  that “the little that is my own becomes more and more hazy to me in this keen air” 
  (Heidegger to Jaspers, December 8, 1932, HJC 143).  When we look at the work  
  that Heidegger produced on Plato's cave allegory at this time, it's clear that he  
  means what he says in his letters.  Between 1931 and 1934, for example,   
  Heidegger argued that Plato's cave allegory could help us “more clearly to grasp  
  the essence of aletheia as unhiddenness” (ET 85) because it gives expression to a  
  “fundamental experience, an experience which tells us something about the  
  fundamental stance of man in his philosophical comportment to beings”--namely,  
  Dasein's comportment towards “gradations” of simultaneously revealing and  
  concealing disclosure.  During this time Heidegger's attitude towards Plato is  
  mostly positive.  He both confirms elements of the Dasein analytic of Being and  
  Time and discovers the most important ingredients of his later thought—namely,  
  the distinction between Being as such and the Being of entities—in his positive  
  appropriation of Plato's cave allegory. (62-63) 
 
 In her work Postmodern Platos, Catherine Zuckert devotes a chapter to summarizing 
Heidegger’s interpretation of Plato.  Although by necessity of subject her focus is primarily on 
the standard model of Heidegger's characterization of Plato as the founder of metaphysics, she 
confirms the enduring importance of Plato to Heidegger by demonstrating that over the years of 
his intellectual activity, Heidegger’s attitude towards Plato was constantly shifting as he 
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reappraised and re-evaluated his own philosophical project.  Indeed, she points out that whenever 
Heidegger wished to clarify, expound, modify or enhance his own theories, he turned back to the 
works of Plato as the place to begin (33).  
 Despite the positive appraisal of the importance of Plato to Heidegger's thought, even 
those scholars who are sympathetic to overturning the negative appraisal of Plato found in the 
later Heidegger very often go about their task by drawing a distinction between Plato and 
“Platonism.”  Sometimes, the idea of Platonism seems to manifest itself as a false image of Plato 
constructed out of a misinterpretation of Plato himself.  Gonzalez, for instance, states that 
Heidegger closed off the possibility for a genuine confrontation between himself and Plato “by 
paying little attention to Plato's dialogues and dialectic, by turning Plato into something called 
'Platonism' by means of extremely broad and simplistic interpretative strokes, and by ultimately 
making the name 'Plato' a label for the extreme other of his own thought” (343).  However, at 
times, writers within the Continental tradition have been more explicit that this merger involves 
attributing to Plato ideas found in later forms of the Platonic tradition.  In Questioning 
Platonism, Drew Hyland states: 
  I want to be clear that my critique here is limited to their [continental   
  philosophers']  claim, in effect, that Plato is a Platonist in the metaphysical sense  
  that they wish to criticize, that the positions of Platonism are actually Plato's  
  positions that are espoused in the dialogues.  A second, very different issue that I  
  will not address, is the question of the development of Platonism as a movement,  
  a dominant movement, in the history of philosophy after Plato.  I am often quite  
  sympathetic to their critiques of Platonism, as opposed to their claims, explicit or  
  implict, that Platonism is actually espoused in the dialogues as Plato's intent.  A  
  fascinating and worthwhile study could be made of the history of Platonism, of  
  how the dialogues came to be (mis)interpreted by subsequent philosophers as  
  espousing Platonism. (14-15) 
 
 It is this final aim that I shall take up beginning in Chapter Three but in a way quite 
distinct from what Hyland may have intended.  I shall seek to show that the Neoplatonists are 
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authentic interpreters of Plato's dialogues and not a divergence from his thought.  However, 
rather than this resulting in a fall into onto-theology, I shall demonstrate that the authentic 
thinking of Being present in Plato's own writings was not lost to the Western tradition by a 
subsequent forgetfulness, but was rather retained and cultivated by those who considered 
themselves disciples of Plato.  This stance has methodological implications for this study as one 
primarily concerned with examining Plato within the context of the tradition which bears his 
name.  As such, I shall treat as authentic those works of Plato which the Platonists traditionally 
considered authentic, even if modern scholarship reckons the ascription dubious.  This is 
particularly significant with respect to works over which a significant amount of disagreement 
abounds, such as the Seventh Letter.  Thus, while modern scholars are divided on the issue, for 
the sake of this methodology, the question of the letter's authenticity can be safely ignored since 
the Platonic tradition has historically held the letter to be authentic and therefore part of the 
overall view of the nature of Platonic philosophy. 
 It should further be noted that while many of the scholars in the Continental tradition 
either join Plato to the Platonists in a negative, metaphysical fashion or separate them precisely 
to liberate Plato individually from that particular morass, there are a few exceptions.  Sara 
Rappe, in her groundbreaking work Reading Neoplatonism, turns her attention to the paradox of 
the Neoplatonists’ tradition of textuality and exegesis with respect to their emphasis on non-
discursive thinking and the ineffability of the realities which they are attempting to explore.  
Rappe specifically attributes to Plotinus’s philosophical revolution in the Enneads a means to 
overstepping speculative metaphysics (2-3).  Likewise, Eric Perl in his essay “Signifying 
Nothing: Being as Sign in Neoplatonism and Derrida” has performed an invaluable service by 
inspiring a deeper inquiry into the meaning of the general structure of Plotinus’s thinking, as well 
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as how that thinking relates to the prevailing trends of postmodernity.  Catherine Pickstock has 
also made significant contributions in her After Writing: The Liturgical Consummation of 
Philosophy by an interpretation of Plato which shows him opposed to the so-called “metaphysics 
of presence” while at the same time keeping him in direct continuity with his later Neoplatonic 
interpreters.  
 Wayne Hankey has further indicated that precisely on the basis of Heidegger's history of 
metaphysics, there has been a renewed interest in Neoplatonism.  This interest manifests itself in 
several ways, the first being the rather obvious attempt to highlight the supposed onto-
theological structure of the movement, in direct conformity to Heidegger's story.  However, it has 
also shown itself in attempts to emphasize the Neoplatonic rather than Aristotelian elements in 
Thomistic thought, particularly by emphasizing Thomas’s rejection of onto-theology through the 
appropriation of the writings of the Christian Neoplatonist commonly known as Pseudo-
Dionysius the Areopagite (Hankey 2004: 3).  In Chapter four, I shall take up the challenge of 
examining syntheses between Neoplatonic and Christian thought stemming from the writings of 
the Areopagite.  In addition to the Areopagite himself, I shall pay special attention to Thomas 
Aquinas, due to his immense influence on the subsequent history of Western thought, and to 
Gregory Palamas as a major inheritor of the Neoplatonism of Dionysius within the thought-
tradition of Eastern Europe.  Fran O’Rourke took up the challenge of demonstrating the 
influences of Dionysius on Thomas in his book Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of 
Aquinas as well as examining the relationship between the thought of Aquinas and Heidegger in 
numerous articles and book chapters, making him a preeminent example of the second 
movement described by Hankey.  The French philosopher-theologian Jean-Luc Marion 
represents an important figure in the analysis of Aquinas, in particular, having maintained in his 
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original French edition of Dieu sans l’etre that Aquinas was indeed an onto-theologian as 
identified by Heidegger.  However, Marion came to change his mind, arguing against that 
original judgment in a forward added to the English edition of the work.  Furthermore, he 
subsequently argued forcefully against the idea of onto-theology in Aquinas in an article 
originally published in the The Thomist.  However, notable Heidegger scholars have responded 
to these attempts to defend Aquinas, including John D. Caputo in his Heidegger and Aquinas: An 
Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics.  Likewise, Ernesto Grassi himself responds to a defense of 
the Areopagite in his Heidegger and the Question of Renaissance Humanism, attempting to 
elucidate what he saw as key differences between the thought of Heidegger and Dionysius. 
 Finally, in Chapter Five, I bring the analysis of the Platonic tradition to a close by looking 
at the thinker whom Grassi blames for rejuvenating traditional metaphysics and thereby 
overturning the project of authentic Humanism, Marsilio Ficino.  Ficino is notable insofar as, to 
my knowledge, with the exception of stray mentions and Grassi’s own critique, he has been 
almost entirely ignored within the question of Platonic onto-theology.  However, due to Grassi's 
scathing criticism of him from the perspective of Heidegger’s own history of metaphysics and 
his contemporaneous existence with the exact figures that Grassi finds to represent most fully his 
own vision of a more original, poetico-rhetorical philosophy, Ficino demands careful attention 
and analysis.  Furthermore, he is without a doubt the most prominent member of the Platonic 
school in the Renaissance and set the tone for the interpretation of Plato’s texts up until the 
modern overturning of Neoplatonism by Stephanus and Serranus in the sixteenth century 
(Ralkowski 7).  His importance to this study is only increased due to the fact that he stands as a 
two-fold reflection of the Platonic heritage, having carefully read and translated Plato and his 
ancient commentators directly and also having studied extensively the reception of those writings 
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by way of the Thomistic tradition, as demonstrated by Ardis B. Collins in The Secular is Sacred:  
Platonism and Thomism in Marsilio Ficino’s Platonic Theology. 
 A final note is necessary about the nature of this study.  While the review of secondary 
literature found in this introduction has concentrated on the question of the presence of 
Heidegger’s definition of onto-theological thinking in the Platonic tradition, the ontological 
difference between Being and beings is only one dimension of Grassi’s thought to be explored in 
the following chapters.  Given this fact, an explanation of this particular concentration regarding 
the secondary literature is necessary.  The first reason is theoretical, insofar as the ontological 
difference is fundamental for the other central aspects of Grassi’s thought which shall be 
elaborated upon in Chapter One.  As such, it possesses a form of primacy as the sine qua non of 
the entire project.  If the Platonists are, in fact, onto-theologians, none of Grassi’s other criteria 
could possibly be met.  The second reason is simply that Grassi is less well known and 
appreciated in philosophical circles than, in my view, he should be.  As such, the secondary 
literature exploring his concept of poetico-rhetorical philosophy as developed in his examination 
of the Humanists in relation to the Platonic tradition is virtually non-existent.  Where it is 
explicitly mentioned at all, it is generally in passing and in a context in which Grassi’s critique of 
the Platonists is taken as simply being a point of fact.  Indeed, an examination of this question 














Humanism and Its Interpreters 
 
 Humanism is perhaps the most significant intellectual movement to arise out of the 
Renaissance.  There is, however, a great amount of debate about what exactly constitutes the 
essence of Humanism and therefore who can accurately be called a Humanist.  In this chapter, I 
shall present a number of competing theses regarding the nature and dimensions of the 
movement, beginning with mainstream scholarship on the Italian Renaissance and culminating in 
the philosophical visions of Humanism in the writings of Martin Heidegger and Ernesto Grassi.  
While the examination of the various interpretations of Renaissance Humanism in this chapter 
will remain relatively broad, I shall revisit and expand upon them in Chapter Five for their 
specific relationships to the appropriation of the philosophy of Marsilio Ficino. 
 Before proceeding to the attempts at forming a critical definition of Humanism, it 
behooves us to look briefly at the thought of Petrarch, the father of Humanism, to see what he 
considered to be the most quintessential elements of the newly developing movement.  One of 
the key elements of Petrarch’s defense and definition of the new Humanist endeavor (though the 
word “Humanism” was still many centuries away) was the critique of current scholastic culture.  
In this he was especially critical of certain supposed Averroists (Hankins 2007: 40).  However, 
his fundamental attack does not seem to have anything to do with any particular doctrines of 
Averroes, but rather with the (he claimed) uncritical appropriation of Aristotelian philosophy 
prevalent among the scholastics (40).  By contrast, Petrarch pointed out that the Church Fathers 
generally seemed to have considered Plato to be the superior philosopher, although he was not, 
per se, advocating the promotion of Platonism so much as indicating the limitations of any 
human teacher (41).  All these critiques, however, are prolegomena to a general stance against 
scientific philosophizing—the Christian should be secure in his theological position and while he 
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might find edification and aid in the thought of the philosophers, he should never allow it to be 
idolized because it would inevitably lead to error (41-42).  More than anything else, this general 
critique of philosophy was based upon the principle that the scientific pursuit of knowledge for 
its own sake lacked a firm moral dimension.  This, for Petrarch, is the fundamental 
differentiation between the scholastic and Humanist worldview—the scholastics were concerned 
with offering a scientific account of reality; the Humanists were interested in promoting the lived 
experience of the good life within human communities (42-43).  The study of the pagan classics 
would be promoted as a way of studying that level of knowledge appropriate to human beings—
how to live, the nuances of human history and political life, manners and eloquence (44).  
Philosophy was favored more for its eloquence and persuasive power as a mean of leading one to 
a proper way of life than for rigorous exactitude while Petrarch and the Humanists regarded as an 
engagement with triviality.  Logic was surpassed by rhetoric in education and philosophy (45).  
These general elements constituted the insider view of Humanism, as expressed by Petrarch. 
 The first scholarly position I would like to examine is that put forward by Paul Oskar 
Kristeller.  Kristeller, a preeminent figure in the study of Renaissance Humanism and philosophy, 
first states that the meaning of the term Humanism is as ambiguous as the meaning of the 
Renaissance itself.  This does not, however, prevent him from attempting to formulate a 
definition for the term which encompasses the various factors which he sees manifested in the 
pursuits of the Humanists (Kristeller 1990: 3).  In particular, methodologically, Kristeller wishs 
to be very careful not to adapt Renaissance Humanism to any of the conceptions of Humanism 
which existed at the time of his writing.  As such, his definition primarily centers on those 
pursuits which gave the Humanists their name, specifically the studia humanitatis.  These he 
named as grammar, rhetoric, history, poetry, and moral philosophy, all shaped by a careful 
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attention to the writers of classical antiquity (Kristeller 1961: 9-10).  These areas of expertise are 
applied both to the Humanists' own original literary pursuits and to their contributions to the 
study of existing texts. 
 Kristeller points out that the primary scholarly contributions of the Humanists consist in 
their development of literary and textual criticism.  With respect to literary criticism, the 
Humanists prided themselves on their careful attention to classical philology and style and then 
turned these developing skills towards a deeper understanding of the intentions of the authors of 
the classical texts.  In the field of textual criticism, Kristeller draws attention to the fact that the 
Humanists performed systematic analyses of various manuscript traditions in order to produce 
emended critical editions of the texts which were purified of scribal errors and interpolations 
(1990: 6).  Furthermore, they were able to employ their skills as classical philologists in order to 
engage in historical criticism of texts.  This skill was prominently on display in works such as 
Lorenzo Valla's critical evaluation of the Donation of Constantine, which exposed the work as a 
forgery and hoax (Kristeller 1990: 11). 
 From the Humanists’ scholarly work, Kristeller also draws attention to their own original 
literary endeavors.  In particular, these were activities which drew upon their knowledge of 
classical style, but generally were employed to address contemporary situations, often social and 
political.  This was brought into their literary use of speeches and letters, which were often 
published means of communicating the contemporary concerns of their communities in high 
classical style (Kristeller 1990: 8-9).  Curiously, this often included their historiographical 
writings.  Where one might have expected them to pay careful attention to ancient 
historiography, often their attention was instead turned to matters of contemporary relevance, 
while also drawing upon the model which the classical authors provided (Kristeller 1990: 10).  It 
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should be clear from what has already been said about these literary endeavors that, while the 
Humanists were trained in Classical philology and had a great concern for classical traditions, 
their primary aim was not necessarily a scientific understanding of that tradition for its own sake, 
but rather for the advancement of the field of literature in a contemporary context which used the 
Classical tradition in order to animate its practice.  In this way, Kristeller holds that Humanists 
are distinct from modern Classical scholars (Kristeller 1961: 10).  Furthermore, while he does 
maintain that the Humanists can be considered contributors to the field of moral philosophy, he is 
careful to emphasize that they did not predominantly write systematic treatises on the topic and 
seemed to be more concerned with opening up several different fields of inquiry by which to 
come to a greater understanding of the questions involved in moral science (Kristeller 1990: 15). 
 Kristeller is quite clear, however, that the reason that moral philosophy was a field of 
inquiry for the Humanist is that it deals with the concrete problems of human existence in 
contrast to the highly technical discussion of more esoteric disciplines amongst the scholastic 
philosophers (1990: 16).  On the other hand, for Kristeller, the pursuits of the Humanists 
excluded examination of logic, natural philosophy, metaphysics, mathematics, astronomy, 
medicine, law and theology, that is, all those fields which were systematized in the established 
curricula of the scholastics and medieval universities (1961: 10).  Speaking of the Humanists' 
activities, which led to the reintroduction of Platonism, Stoicism, Epicureanism, Scepticism and 
even new interpretations of Aristotelianism by their concern for ancient sources, Kristeller holds 
that these developments constituted aspects of Renaissance philosophy, but he does not 
characterize them as being part of Humanism itself.  Rather, they represent a distinct branch of 
intellectual inquiry which was only made possible by the distinct contributions of Humanist 
philological and literary methodology (Kristeller 1990: 11).  Kristeller specifically denies the 
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idea that the Humanists constituted a class of professional philosophers, arguing that they 
possess no consistent philosophical position and that, rather, their shared concerns were all 
deeply integrated with the rhetorical rather than philosophical tradition (Rabil xi-xii).  Kristeller 
sums up his conceptual divisions as follows: 
  Thus Renaissance Humanism was not as such a philosophical tendency or system, 
  but rather a cultural and educational program which emphasized and developed an 
  important but limited area of studies.  This area had for its center a group of  
  subjects that was concerned essentially neither with the classics nor with   
  philosophy, but might be roughly described as literature (1961: 10). 
 
Therefore it should be clear that a significant aspect of Kristeller's interpretation of Renaissance 
Humanism is the stringent divide between what he sees as the scholastic and philosophical 
strains of Renaissance thought and the literary and rhetorical contributions of the Humanists. 
 As previously mentioned, Kristeller has a particularly compelling concern to differentiate 
Humanism in the Renaissance from the modern movements bearing the same name, which is 
likely a strong factor in his rejection of a philosophical definition of Humanism.  Although 
Kristeller's interpretation of Humanism is now undoubtedly the most widely accepted, it should 
be noted that his impulse in this respect stands in opposition to the other major school of 
mainstream interpretation of Renaissance Humanism in the twentieth century, most prominently 
exemplified in the work of Eugenio Garin (Rabil xii).  In contrast to Kristeller, Garin wishes to 
place a more significant emphasis on the relationship and continuity of modern humanisms and 
the tradition which flourished in Italy on the eve of modernity (Hankins 2003: 576).  Garin’s 
project is more in tune with the standard interpretation of Humanism prevalent in Italy which 
views Humanism as an intrinsically philosophical movement, lying between medieval 
scholasticism and the advent of modern philosophical schools.  Indeed, the nineteenth century 
Italian school, to which Garin was originally indebted, was characterized in particular by the 
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view that Humanism formed the link between the font of philosophy in ancient Greece and its 
modern culmination in German idealism, particularly Hegelianism and Neo-Kantianism 
(Hankins 2003: 576-577).  
 Following World War II and the strong association of German idealism with the previous 
fascist regime, Garin is instrumental in detaching the history of Italian philosophy from the 
idealist tradition—championed by such pro-fascist thinkers as Gentile—and taking research in 
Renaissance Humanism in a neo-historicist direction; however, he still remains devoted to 
maintaining the connection between historical Humanism and modern philosophical movements, 
while simultaneously emphasizing discontinuity from the medieval scholastic tradition (Hankins 
2003: 579).  That is to say, while Kristeller emphasizes the continuity between the Classical and 
Medieval rhetorical traditions in the rising Humanist movement, while also paying attention to 
the continuing endurance of scholasticism in philosophy as well as the rising work of Platonic 
philosophers, he always maintains the distinction between these various strains of Renaissance 
thought.  On the other hand, Garin's endeavor sees Renaissance Humanism as incorporating all 
these various intellectual strains in the Renaissance into a unified whole.  Furthermore, this 
vision is also influenced by the viewpoint of Hans Baron, another famous scholar of the 
Renaissance in the second half of the twentieth century, who argues for a distinctive break 
between the thought of the fourteenth and fifteenth century Humanists (Hankins 1995: 312).  The 
confluence of these two strains of thought tended to lead to the reduction of emphasis on the 
continuity between Medieval and Renaissance culture while likewise emphasizing the 
philosophical importance of the Humanist movement. 
 Amos Edelheit has contributed to this discussion by pointing out that Kristeller's 
characterization of the intellectual strains of the Renaissance contains a certain artificiality.  
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Edelheit shows that there are notable figures whom everyone recognizes as Humanists, such as 
Erasmus and Valla, who expressed deep interest in philosophy and theology.  Furthermore, he 
draws attention to the fact that, for instance, Pico della Mirandola wrote a speech, De hominis 
dignitate, which is almost a manifesto of the Humanist view of mankind and was considered a 
member of the same intellectual circle by contemporary Humanists.  Inexplicably, however, 
under Kristeller's definition, Pico's scholastic and philosophical aspirations completely exclude 
him from membership as a Humanist (Edelheit 2008: 10-11). 
 Primarily, Edelheit's critique of Kristeller rests upon the fact that Kristeller engages in 
extreme compartmentalization in a way which is not native to the Humanist movement in its 
historical context—an ironic criticism given Kristeller's own claim to be strongly opposed to 
contemporary Humanist movements reimagining the historical meaning of Humanism to suit 
their own devices.  As a result of this compartmentalization, Kristeller is unable to recognize the 
strong interconnectedness of the Humanists' interest in rhetoric and Cicero, critiques of 
scholasticism, and their development of philosophy (Edelheit 2008: 11-12).  Due to these 
concerns, Edelheit is sympathetic to Garin’s methodology for approaching Renaissance 
intellectual history.  Garin's approach is to avoid the artificial compartmentalization advocated by 
Kristeller and to allow the internal, historical dynamics of the culture of the period under 
examination to be manifest in the theoretical constructions regarding those times.  Theoretical 
simplicity must give way to historical truth (Edelheit 2008: 15). 
 Martin Heidegger, likewise, agrees with Garin and Edelheit that Humanism is inseparable 
from its philosophical elements.  The conclusions which he reaches, however, regarding the 
nature of those elements are quite distinct to his own philosophical agenda.  Heidegger deals 
with this issue of the philosophical relevance of the history of Humanism primarily in his “Letter 
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on Humanism,” written in 1946 and prepared for publication in 1947, in response to Jean 
Beaufret’s letter regarding Jean-Paul Satre's lecture “Existentialism is a Humanism.”  In the 
“Letter,” Heidegger has scathing comments to make about Humanism, making the general claim, 
as Soffer puts it, that “Humanism lies at the root of the reification, technologization, and 
secularization characteristic of the modern world” (547).  How and why might Heidegger come 
to such a far-reaching indictment of Humanism?  The most significant problem with Humanism, 
as far as Heidegger is concerned, is that “[e]very Humanism is either grounded in a metaphysics 
or is itself made to be the ground of one” (“Letter on Humanism” 245).9 
 What does this mean?  Heidegger takes it to be the case that every historical instance of 
“Humanism” already assumes a particular essence of mankind.  However, this essence is 
determined by the relationships which hold between particular beings and not the relationship 
between human beings and Being as such.  As a result, historical humanisms close off the 
uncovering of the true essence of humanity by supplying a metaphysical definition that leads to 
forgetfulness of Being:  “[h]umanism is opposed because it does not set the humanitas of the 
human being high enough” (“Letter” 251).  In order to support his claim, Heidegger follows his 
standard methodology of attempting to reach back and locate the historical essence of the 
development of the nature of Humanism as it appears in the history of metaphysics. 
 Heidegger locates the development of the notion of Humanism first of all in a standard 
Heideggerian trope of the Roman appropriation of Greek terminology.  For Heidegger, the 
Roman practice of translating Greek terms into their own language without possessing the 
corresponding original Greek experience which those terms describe is responsible for much of 
the rootlessness of western thought (Soffer 557).  This surfaces in the case of Humanism by 
                                                 




Heidegger's claim that the Romans translated the Greek paidea into the Latin humanitas.  For 
Heidegger, Roman humanitas represents the attempt among the Romans to differentiate 
themselves as homo humanus against homo barbarus through their encounter with Hellenistic 
Greek culture.  However, because the Romans were appropriating Greek culture without Greek 
experience, the primary concern of humanitas became eruditio et institutio in bonas artes.  That 
is, Roman humanitas came to reflect specific training in language, literature, art, and so forth.  
Humanitas is grounded in the idea of the knowledgeable and cultured man over and against the 
uneducated barbarian (“Letter” 244).   
 Why should the above characterization of Humanism present a problem?  Answering this 
question hinges on what Heidegger envisioned to be the defining characteristic of the Greek 
conception of paideia.  For Heidegger, the Greek conception of paideia focuses on the personal 
journey of experience.  It means to free ourselves from our everyday experience and then to 
reappropriate the world in a more reflexive, phenomenologically informed fashion.  As Thomson 
puts it, “[g]enuine education leads us back to ourselves, to the place we are (the Da of our Sein), 
teaches us 'to dwell' (wohnen) 'there' and transforms us in the process” (2005: 159).  By contrast, 
the Roman attitude betrays an understanding of education as a process of the acquisition of data, 
specifically about elements of Greek culture objectified and isolated from the very experiences 
which are essential to genuine paideia.  That is, for Heidegger, the Roman attitude towards 
education is a symptom of a developing subjectivism which culminates in the modern 
interpretation of education in the age of technological enframing in which ultimately education is 
manifest in the systematized and bureaucratized transfer of data into information receptacles, 
resources to be optimized (Thomson 2005: 152-153).   In this disposition towards education, 
Heidegger finds that Roman Humanism has already taken the essence of humanity to be given 
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from the outset as a rational animal, animal rationale.  That is, that animal who is capable of 
distinguishing himself from among other animals by virtue of his reason, including his ability to 
cultivate himself by a system of education which shall render him homo humanus.  However, he 
points out that such conceptions do not think “the difference of beings and Being,” and in it “we 
abandon the human being to the essential realm of animalitas even if we do not equate him with 
beasts but attribute a specific difference to him.”  In so doing, we fail to think the proper essence 
of humanity (“Letter” 245-246). 
 This issue does not end with the decline of the Roman Empire.  Heidegger reflects 
likewise on the instantiation of Humanism in the Renaissance, stating that the “so-called 
Renaissance” is a “renascentia romanitatis” with the identification of romanitas with humanitas 
with the scholastic predecessors of the Humanists now identified in the role of the necessary 
opposition in the form of homo barbarus (“Letter” 244).  Thus, Renaissance Humanism is a 
continuation of the Roman project of the reinterpretation of Greek paideia apart from the Greek 
experience which informed the term and is characterized by the objectified and scientific study 
of history and philology as the basis for the formation of mankind through the acquisition of 
knowledge.  Thus we see that Heidegger's critique of Humanism, from its foundations in the 
Roman translation of Greek terminology down to its cultural resuscitation among the Italian 
Humanists, is fundamentally founded on the problem of the objectification of nature and culture 
as resources to be created and exploited by a human subject.  As a result, Soffer is quite correct 
to point out that “Humanism in its philosophically archetypical form turns out to be found... in 
the cogito of Descartes, the transcendental idealism of Kant, and the value-thinking of Nietzsche, 
each of which posits the subject as the ultimate ground of being” (Soffer 550).  Although this 
seems to make the natural object of Heidegger's critique the subjectivity of early modernity (and 
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its culmination in late modern technological enframing)—which it certainly is—it seems natural, 
given the circumstances of his response to Sartre's claim that existentialism itself constitutes a 
Humanism, that he should provide an historical analysis linking the development of such 
subjectivity to its roots in Humanism.  It has been suggested, therefore, that Heidegger's 
identification of Humanism with a certain anthropocentrism is to be found in the movement's 
emphasis on the dignity of man in the idea that man is a “god-like creator and shaper of the 
universe” culminating in Giambattista Vico's principle of verum et factum convertuntur (the true 
and the made are converted), suggesting that “the object of knowledge is the creation of the 
subject.”  Such a conception of Renaissance Humanism is then held to a draw a natural 
progression to Kant's transcendental idealism (Soffer 553). 
 The Italian school, which we first saw earlier in our discussion of the origins of the 
interpretation of Humanism as found in the works of Eugenio Garin, thus seems to have exerted 
considerable influence over the development of the thought of Martin Heidegger regarding the 
nature of Humanism, since Heidegger held fast to the idea that modern subjectivism was firmly 
rooted in the project of Renaissance Humanism.  Indeed, his student Ernesto Grassi made much 
of the influence of standard interpretations of Renaissance Humanism on the thought of 
Heidegger regarding the nature of the movement: 
  Heidegger's evaluation of Humanism reveals that he held to a very traditional  
  interpretation of that movement.  When we speak here of traditional    
                        interpretation,  two noted scholars come to mind as representatives of such a view.       
                        Ernst Cassirer began with the misleading assumption that Humanism exhibits    
signs of the beginning of modern epistemology.  With this in mind, he examined it 
in terms of epistemological problems, and offered his evaluation on that basis.  
Paul Oskar Kristeller, on the other hand, sees the philosophical significance of 
Humanism primarily in its Platonic and Neo-Platonic systems (1983: 31). 
 
Grassi here makes a reference to Ernst Cassirer—a Renaissance scholar from the 
generation before Kristeller and Garin—as the primary representative of what has been called the 
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Italian school, in all likelihood due to the famous debate between Cassirer and Heidegger in 
Davos, but the continuity with Garin's ideology is quite clear: Ernst Cassirer, a Neo-Kantian, 
attempted to link Humanism as a movement with the development of modern epistemology, and 
Garin, likewise strongly links Renaissance Humanism with the pre-history of modern 
Enlightenment thinking (Hankins 2011: 489).  This marks the link between traditional 
Renaissance scholarship and Heidegger's view of Humanism as forming part of the philosophical 
basis for modern subjectivity.  
 The more unusual remark in the above quoted passage is, in fact, the idea that Kristeller 
saw the philosophical significance of Humanism in Platonism.  While it is true that Kristeller 
took his interpretation of Platonic-Kantian philosophy to be an objectively true philosophia 
perennis (Hankins 2011: 490-491) he introduced a strong division between Renaissance 
philosophy and Renaissance Humanism.  The significance of Grassi linking these two elements 
in Kristeller’s thought is, however, not entirely lost for two reasons.  First, Heidegger clearly 
seems to bear the influence of Kristeller's division in his regard for Humanism as a purely 
scholarly and educational movement, dedicated to the cultivation of training in arts and letters, 
on the imitation of the Roman interpretation of Greek paideia.  Furthermore, as we have seen in 
the introductory chapter, Heidegger strongly links all metaphysical thinking with Platonism and 
thus considers the historical instantiations of Humanism to be metaphysical.  As he says, “every 
humanism is either grounded in metaphysics or is itself made to be the ground of one” (“Letter” 
245) and “the essence of Humanism is metaphysical” (“Letter” 262).  It seems safe to say, 
therefore, that for Heidegger both sides of Kristeller's thesis obtain.  Heidegger considers 
Humanism to be grounded in metaphysics insofar as it appears as Roman humanitas which 
preconceives human being in the form of a proto-subjectivism, which corresponds to Kristeller's 
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own assertion regarding the nature of the Humanist movement as grounded in the studia 
humanitatis.  Additionally, Heidegger also considers Humanism to be the ground of a 
metaphysics insofar as it actively and philosophically advances metaphysical thinking, as in the 
case of the endorsement of an explicit tradition of Platonic philosophy within certain elements of 
the Humanist movement during the Renaissance. 
 Having established Heidegger's basic stance towards Renaissance Humanism, we may 
now turn our attention to his student Ernesto Grassi.  It is relevant first of all to give a brief 
overview of some of Grassi's own intellectual foundations as a means to unveiling his distinctive 
approach to the problem of Humanism, as well as his analysis of his master's teaching on the 
matter.  Grassi says in the prologue to his Renaissance Humanism that in his early career he was 
trained in the idealistic philosophy of Hegel, promoted by Croce and Gentile (XII), standard 
training in Italian philosophy at the time as a result of the thesis of Bertrando Spaventa that 
“Spinoza, Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel are the true disciples of Bruno, Campanella and 
Vico” (X).   
 While Grassi was originally trained in the idealist philosophy of Hegel, he eventually 
came under the influence of phenomenology, first under Edmund Husserl and then ultimately 
under Heidegger himself.  Indeed, he was first responsible for the publication of Heidegger's 
“Letter on Humanism” in 1947 (Grassi 1983: 49) and it was Heidegger to whom Grassi 
dedicated his first scholarly work, which had also been written under his supervision (Grassi 
1988: IX).  However, in 1938, Grassi was commissioned to establish the institute Studia 
Humanitatis under the Royal Italian Academy in Berlin, which finally opened at the end of 1942 
(Grassi 1988: XVII).  Ultimately, at the close of his career, he found himself retiring as Professor 
Emeritus at the University of Munich having occupied the chair for “Philosophy and Intellectual 
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History of Humanism” (Grassi 1988: XIX).  This broad history of Grassi's career makes it 
apparent that Grassi stood in a particularly privileged position to judge the issue of the 
interpretation of Humanism.  He was trained in the Hegelianism of the Italian school, inspired by 
Spaventa, which held Renaissance Humanism to be a precursor to modern philosophy; he studied 
extensively under Heidegger, providing him with a keen insight into the thinking of his master; 
and, finally, he spent the better part of his career intensely studying the primary works of the 
Italian Humanists from a philosophical perspective.  It is as a result of these various converging 
areas of study that Grassi was to formulate his own interpretation of Humanism in the 
Renaissance.  W. David Hall in “The Primacy of Rhetoric: Ernesto Grassi's Recovery of 
Humanism and the Possibilities for Philosophy and Religious Studies” has extracted from 
Grassi's works four major themes which predominate in his vision of the philosophical 
importance of Humanism: (1) the ontological difference, (2) the relationship between res and 
verba, (3) the importance of the imagination and the need for topical philosophy and (4) the 
centrality of metaphor for conceptuality (4).  In the remainder of the chapter I shall outline the 
meaning of these characteristics, and then they will form the basic framework for examining the 
relationship between Grassi's humanistic philosophy and the Platonic tradition throughout the 
remainder of this study. 
 Grassi's pursuit of an authentic interpretation of Renaissance Humanism arose partly 
from his early engagement with the philosophy of Giambattista Vico.  Vico has already been 
mentioned above as an example of someone who lent credence to the idea that Humanism was a 
precursor for the development of modern philosophical movements.  This was manifest 
particularly with respect to Vico's verum-factum principle as an example of the development of 
the modern idea of the sovereign subject.  Grassi himself was originally under the influence of 
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Giovanni Gentile in attempting to find in Vico the basis of modern idealistic philosophy.  While 
Grassi was to remain concerned with the philosophy of Vico for the rest of his career, he 
progressively began to distance himself from the idea that Vico served as the basis of modern 
idealism (Moore 443) and instead began to see him as the philosopher representing the fullness 
of humanistic thought (Grassi 1980: 5).  Indeed, in perhaps his most famous work, Rhetoric and 
Philosophy, Grassi explicitly denies the premise that the identity of verum and factum should be 
taken as the exclusive or primary element of Vico's thought (6). 
 Indeed, ironically for those who attempt to place Vico at the forefront of the development 
of modern philosophy, he displays an extremely critical attitude towards the thinking of 
Descartes, the founder of full-fledged modern subjectivity (Miner 13).  While Cartesian 
subjectivity claims to establish the ego with an indubitable foundation from which other truths 
may be then logically concluded, thus establishing the subject as the basis from which the 
external world hangs, Vico strenuously objected to this conclusion.  Rather, Vico suggested that 
Cartesian subjectivism was not a sufficient response to the claims made by skeptics because the 
cogito did not, in fact, produce indubitable knowledge of the thinking subject.  Instead, Vico 
suggested, the cogito produces mere apprehension of thought (Miner 14).  Indeed, in his work 
On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians, Vico draws upon the tradition of Latin literature to 
demonstrate that the cogito is not an amazing philosophical insight, but rather a relatively normal 
apprehension attainable by even the simple Sosia in Plautus's Amphitryon when, with Mercury 
appearing in his likeness, he says: 
  Certe aedepol quom illum contemplo et formam agnosco meam 
  Quemadmodum ego saepe in speculum inspexi, nimis similis est mei 
  Itidem habet petasum, ac vstitum, tam consimile est atque ego 
  Sura, pes, statura, tonsus, oculi, nasum, dens, labra, 
  Malae, mentum, barba, collum: totus, quid verbis opus est. 
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Si tergum cicatricosum, nihil hoc simili est similius. 
  Sed quom cogito, equidem certo sum, ac semper fui. 
 
  By God, when I look upon him, I recognize my own figure, 
  the one I often spy in the mirror, the one resembling me. 
  He's got the same hat and clothes.  We're completely similar: 
  his legs, feet, build, hairstyle, eyes, nose, teeth, lips, 
  cheeks, chin, beard, neck—all the same.  What more can I say? 
  If his back is scarred from whippings, there’s no likeness more like me. 
And yet, when I think, I am equally certain that I am and that I always was. (Qtd 
in Vico 2010: 32-33)  
 
This simple man's apprehension does not satisfy the place of indubitable knowledge from 
which to construct an unassailable vision of reality by critical art alone.  It does not even succeed 
in satisfying the skeptic, for the skeptic does not doubt his own thoughts and apprehensions nor 
his own being.  What the skeptic doubts is knowledge of these things, not consciousness of them.  
Vico states that knowledge includes “possessing the genus, or form, by which something comes 
to be” (32-33).  Therefore, according to Vico, in order for the cogito to offer true knowledge of 
the self, one would have to contain the causes of his own existence, which Vico denies (Miner 
15).  As opposed to the radical claims of modern subjectivity, Vico clearly acknowledges the 
temporal thrownness and finitude of mankind in his recognition of humanity’s inability to give 
an account of its own existence (Miner 6).  We find ourselves already in a time and place and 
limited to certain perspectives on knowledge and, therefore, do not have access to the certain and 
indubitable knowledge towards which Descartes aspires. 
 Given Vico's clearly negative assessment of Cartesian critical philosophy, the question 
then opens as to what precisely is his—and, with him, Humanism's—philosophical significance.  
Grassi provides a compelling answer that brings together his knowledge of the Humanist 
tradition with the existential phenomenology of Heidegger.  Grassi points out that Vico's true 
insight was to free philosophy from logical formalism and a priori metaphysical deductions 
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(1980: 6).  Since the time of Descartes, critical method had been received as the only valid basis 
for philosophical thinking.  From Descartes himself to the time of Hegel, poetic, metaphorical 
and rhetorical thought had been denigrated as extraneous to philosophical thinking and, indeed, a 
factor in obscuring the facts derived by rational thought.  This critique of rhetorical thought was 
likewise linked to the limitations of representatives of the Latin tradition, such as Cicero, as not 
really possessing philosophical significance—representatives of the Latin tradition who were, of 
course, extremely significant for the Humanists (Grassi 1988: 1-3).  Grassi even identifies this 
opposition between rational and rhetorical thought—and thus, Greek and Latin thought—as 
present in the writings of Plato, particularly in the Gorgias (1987: 68).   
 By contrast, Vico launches a critique against the mainstream of the philosophical tradition 
for concerning itself primarily with speculation about nature rather than speculation about human 
history and human concerns, precisely on the basis of the principles involved in the critique of 
Descartes seen above.  Since men have not made the world, and therefore do not contain the 
principles of the world within themselves, they cannot come to full and proper knowledge of it.  
By contrast, the human world is the creation of man and therefore knowable by him (Grassi 
1980: 5-6).  The concern for the study of nature over human affairs is particularly troubling to 
Vico due to the introduction of Descartes’ geometrical method into its analysis.  Through this 
method, Vico sees an impulse towards domination comparable to what is found among political 
tyrants, a desire for the mastery of nature which does not obey natural limits established by 
prudence (Miner 5-7).  
 Here we see echoes of Heidegger's concerns about technological enframing.  Indeed, the 
predominance of the critical art is grounded strongly in the belief that one can come to a rational 
definition of beings which remains valid abstracted from all time and place.  This brings us to the 
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first characteristic of Grassi's humanistic philosophy—the ontological difference.  For Heidegger, 
the Cartesian project against which Vico objected is a characteristic form of onto-theology in 
which the subject is taken to be the highest being and subjectivity is taken to characterize the 
common essence of beings—that is, the world is constituted as an objective presence for a 
subject.  Like all onto-theology, Cartesianism confuses Being with a being, in this case the 
subject.  In the introduction I described the negative issues which Heidegger believed arise from 
the forgetfulness of Being, particularly the end of metaphysics in technological enframing.  Now, 
I would like to attempt to give a positive account of the ontological difference, as viewed by 
Grassi. 
 Heidegger, Grassi points out, was intrigued by the fundamentally contradictory nature of 
the term “Being,” underlining, among several other arguments, that Being is both what is most 
understandable because it is the basis for understanding all beings and “that which is most 
hidden” because it eludes all definition, as every attempt to secure it causes us to speak in terms 
of beings instead of Being as such.  Likewise, Being is what is most “universal” because it can 
be said of all beings that they are, but at the same time Being is also that which is most 
“particular” because Being coheres in every individual being.  Grassi points out that the natural 
conclusion of the fact that Being eludes all rational determination is that individual beings, who 
are only intelligible by knowledge of Being (since, as Grassi says, “beings are a 'participle' of 
Be), are likewise rendered incapable of being securely captured by rational language (Grassi 
1987: 69-70).  Although it is certainly the case that Vico does not specifically articulate this 
distinction, it appears to lie implicit in the Vichian critique of the cogito.  Descartes attempts to 




that we lack rational knowledge of Being.  We merely possess consciousness of it.  Being is held 
out as a question. 
 In his article, “The Rehabilitation of Rhetorical Humanism: Regarding Heidegger's Anti-
Humanism,” Grassi provides an insightful analogy to help illustrate the ontological difference.  
Grassi suggests that we contemplate what comes together in playing a game—there are the rules 
of the game and the instruments with which the game is played.  Suppose someone were to lay 
before you a deck of cards and asked you to scrutinize the entire deck intimately, to become 
familiar with its every detail—the look, feel, shape, etc. of every individual card.  Now further 
imagine that, after having devoted a considerable amount of time to this task, your interlocutor 
were then to inquire of you the rules of the game.  The task now being demanded of you is, of 
course, absurd.  As Grassi states:  “[e]ven the most attentive analysis of the instruments of the 
game (dice, cards, balls) does not by itself make it possible to identify the game in question since 
the same instruments can be used for different games.”  Individual beings can only be understood 
by virtue of a prevailing code, an historically instantiated epoch of Being (142).  This is why 
every onto-theology must ultimately be overcome because it attempts to define Being by an 
examination of beings, but all such determinations remain radically contingent.  To return to the 
analogy of the deck of cards, this would be akin to attempting to define the nature of the game to 
be played by holding up the Queen of Hearts and, based on her qualities, defining the other cards 
of the deck in reference to her.  Furthermore, we become so engrossed in this theory about the 
nature of the deck that we start to believe that this understanding is in fact necessary and 
atemporally true. 
 This brings us to the second facet of Grassi's analysis of the philosophical importance of 
Renaissance Humanism, the relationship between res and verba.  Traditional metaphysical 
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thinking is characterized by precisely the emphasis on ars critica that seeks to establish a rational 
definition of beings which holds in all places and all times without exception.  Beings, therefore, 
become properly identified with their definitions—essence is known through definition and 
definitions are the underlying concept of the thing apart from all circumstances.  Grassi quotes  
from Dante's De Monarchia in order to demonstrate this traditional conception of the relationship 
between things and words: 
  Since every non-original truth is always revealed on the basis of a first guiding  
  truth, it is inevitable that every investigation should arrive at the cognition of this  
  first truth and should refer to it analytically, in order to attain certainty about all  
  the assertions that have their roots in it (qtd in Grassi 1988: 5). 
 
In this passage, according to Grassi, Dante suggests an idea strikingly reminiscent of 
Descartes’ own project to establish a point of indubitable truth from which all other truths might 
be derived according to the rules of logic.  Traditional philosophy, it is argued, is concerned with 
attaining the logical truth of beings as grounded in an irrefutable truth of a first being, whether 
that being is Plato's Form, God, or Descartes’s Subject.10  The task of philosophy then becomes 
the rational clarification of the substance of beings.  In order to achieve this end, only what is 
essential to the beings under discussion can be maintained—a concept and definition must be 
formulated that stands outside the various shifting circumstances of lived experience.  Thus, 
according to Grassi, in traditional philosophy, rational language is the only legitimate kind of 
language available (1988: 6). 
                                                 
10 The purpose of this study is not to perform an in depth critique of Grassi’s own use of specific texts; however, it 
should be noted that his appropriation of De Monarchia in this instance is curious.  Dante here does not, in fact, 
seek out some being as a first principle as his concern is with ethics and not with any form of (meta)physics.  As 
such we find for Dante that “pax universalis… pro principio rationum… supponatur//universal peace… is to be 
taken as the first principle” (I.IV.5).  Such a principle is hardly the ground of indubitable facts.  Indeed, Dante 
himself states “erat necessarium… velut signum prefixum, in quod quicquid probandum est resolvatur tanquam 
in manifestissimam veritatem//it was necessary to have such a principle to serve as an agreed point of reference 
to which anything which had to be proved might be referred back, as if to a self-evident truth” (I.IV.6).  Dante 
here is using an historically contingent ethical principle, universal peace, as the target of an analogy to a first 
principle of metaphysics.  It is this metaphysical analogue at which Grassi’s critique actually aims. 
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 For Heidegger, as we have seen, traditional Humanism likewise falls within this 
metaphysical mentality because it prioritizes the question of the human being, making it the 
ground for the understanding of all beings.  Thus conceiving of beings as having their meaning 
in relation to the human person constitutes a preliminary contribution to modern subjectivity.  If 
Humanism does not make the sovereign subject the ground of all beings, it holds the essence of 
humanity to be already predetermined on the basis of some other form of metaphysics—say, 
determining mankind in relation to divinity, and so forth—as a being whose essence is rationally 
derived from some other first being.  However, Grassi strenuously denies that this supposedly 
traditional problem of the definition of beings continues to be the prevailing concern of the 
Humanists.  Grassi holds the inversion of the normal relationship of res and verba to be one of 
the major philosophical innovations of the movement. 
 Although Grassi found the beginning of the departure from the traditional, metaphysical 
view of language in Dante's work De Vulgari Eloquentia (1988: 7), particularly in its stress on 
the need for an historical language and its emphasis on the here and now, Dante still hovered on 
the borderline between what Grassi considered the scholastic and Humanist views of the 
relationship between res and verba (having espoused the alleged scholastic view in other 
works).11  The full transition to a Humanist manner of approaching the problem, however, was, 
according to Grassi, accomplished in the insights of the philologist Leonardo Bruni (c. 1370-
1444).  Grassi attributes to Bruni the explication of the idea that words derive different meanings 
depending on the context in which those words appear, rather than an atemporally framed logical 
derivation.  It is also important to note that the idea of words gaining meaning based on context 
                                                 
11 According to Grassi, the scholastic view consists of the pre-determined rational and atemporal nature of beings 
(res) which words (verba), as neutral tools, then tries to explain using logical language.  By contrast, the 
Humanist view is that words (verba) are the ecstatic response to different existential contexts and it is through 
the words that we encounter the historically conditioned and variable nature of beings (res). 
40 
 
is not based on a foundation of anthropology or subjectivity, as might be the case in modern 
metaphysics.  It is not that a sovereign human subject creates the new meanings of the words and 
thrusts them upon the world.  They arise not from the subject, but from the existential 
circumstances in which they appear (1998: 21-22).   
 For Grassi, traditional theories of language are based firmly on an ontology.  
Furthermore, that ontology is static, determined and atemporal.  In this understanding, language 
is reduced to simply a neutral medium, a tool by which the philosopher attempts to explicate the 
meaning of the thing by producing logical definitions which grasp the essence (ousia/substantia) 
of the thing (to on/res) (1998: 6).  Bruni gives profound philosophical importance to the 
observance of the variability of the meaning of words based upon the context in which they 
appear—the proper use of a word is not, in fact, reliant on its correspondence to an objectively 
existing, stable thing, but rather the word itself, in its variability, establishes the thing for a 
particular time and place.  Ontology is now dependent on the word.  The word reveals an 
interpretation of being.  Furthermore, while in traditional philosophy everything that could not be 
seen to hold irrespective of temporality was judged to be an accidental quality of the thing; with 
Bruni's innovation it becomes apparent that historicity is an essential characteristic, inseparable 
from a properly conceived ontology (Grassi 1998: 22-23). 
 In describing the inversion of the primacy of res and verba in the thought of the 
Renaissance Humanists, I have pointed out that the Humanist view should not be equated with 
the view of the subjectivists in which the human subject merely constructs the world of meaning 
and then projects and objectifies it.  Rather, I have stated that the meaning of words arise from 
particular existential contexts, reflecting that res are historically constituted.  However, if these 
meanings are not created by the subject, but arise from circumstances, then how do human 
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beings gain access to them?  It cannot be through the use of pure rationality due to the limitation 
of rational language to only operate within already established systems.  This brings us to the 
third primary characteristic of Grassi's account of Renaissance Humanism, namely the primacy 
of rhetorical language and the need for a topical philosophy. 
 Grassi finds this element of his thought, once again, expressed most clearly by 
Giambattista Vico.  While Descartes attempts to degrade all forms of rhetorical and poetic speech 
as superfluous to philosophy, which was to focus purely on the critical art, Vico instead presents 
the historical reality of education in the liberal arts.  In particular, Vico calls upon the fact that the 
art of topics precedes the art of criticism, logic and dialectic.  In his De nostri temporis 
studiorum ratione, he states: 
  In our days, instead, philosophical criticism alone is honored.  The art of “topics,” 
  far from being given first place in the curriculum, is utterly disregarded.  Again I  
  say, this is harmful, since the invention of arguments is by nature prior to the  
  judgment of their validity, so that, in teaching, that invention should be given  
  priority over philosophical criticism (14). 
 
  Traditionally, the topical art had first been explored by Aristotle in his treatises, Rhetoric 
and Topics.  It must be said that the meaning which Aristotle wishes to establish for the term 
topos in this context is far from clear.12  Some scholars have found in Aristotle’s term two 
divergent meanings borrowed from the standard usage of the word.  The first is derived from 
military terminology of the fourth century BCE in which topos refers to “a position out of which 
one can effectively build an attack.”  The second usage is derived from mnemonics in which one 
has a variety of common premises immediately at hand.  Out of this developed the dual nature of  
                                                 
12 It is likely that for Aristotle himself this dilemma was never thematized.  He likely intuited a topos as merely 
being a “place.”  However, the later tradition was forced to struggle with the background implications implicit in 
Aristotle’s own understanding of what “place” means.  Therefore, this discussion does not so much reflect 
Aristotle’s own explicit thinking on the issue of topos so much as the necessity for drawing out the unspoken 
meanings in order to advance our own understanding thereof. 
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the topoi as being both actively used for the refutation of an opponent’s arguments and passively 
as a means of organizing one’s own theses (Drehe 131-132).   
 These two divisions come down through the oratorical and philosophical traditions of 
antiquity to comprise two basic approaches to topoi.  Mortensen traces this development into 
topoi (or loci) as described by Cicero from whose work he divines five different types of loci: 
taxonomic, ideal, affective, mnemonic, and logical.  The first four types, broadly speaking, are 
closely interrelated and derive their origin from the oratorical tradition proper and the last type 
derives from the traditional philosophical appropriation (52).  The primary difference between 
the two types lies in their basic function.  The logical loci are focused on the establishment of 
“the relationship of premises in syllogistic arguments” and “are designed to generate premises 
for a given line of argument.”  By contrast, the broadly rhetorical loci serve to help an orator 
“determine which arguments would be appropriate” (52-53).   
The logical loci deal with issues such as cause-and-effect, contradiction, genus, etc. (53) 
and more closely align with Aristotle’s conception of a topoi of the second type in which the 
“place” signifies a rule of inference from which archai (first principles) are derived (38-39).  The 
rhetorical loci are more precisely focused on perceiving the associative connection between 
different kinds of facts which present themselves in any concrete situation which is to be subject 
to rhetorical speech.  By first observing the likenesses between various aspects of the case, the 
orator is then able to construct specific arguments about those topics, in which task he would be 
aided by logical topoi or, more simply, the rational process (37-38). 
 Based on the insights of rhetoric, Grassi indicates that the Humanists have produced a 
major revolution in philosophical thinking.  Whereas Aristotle had already observed that the 
principles of logical discourse were not self-grounding and, indeed, did not possess a scientific 
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character, he had failed to realize that this fact rightly unseats logical thought from its primacy in 
philosophical discourse.  Since all rational discourse is based on a deduction from presupposed 
premises, it might have logical validity, but be fundamentally detached from the concrete reality 
of the phenomena (Grassi 1980: 44).  Topical philosophy, on the other hand, operates on the 
principle not of ratio but rather of ingenium.  Ingenium is a faculty of the human person which 
allows one to see and gather together things into categories of similarity.  It is that characteristic 
of man which allows him to see beyond what is immediately presented to his senses and rather to 
gather up various things according to likenesses. 
 According to Grassi, this principle of ingenium is first revealed in mankind’s work.  In 
particular, it originates when mankind encounters the world as something which provides for 
mankind’s needs. Thus, in the concrete circumstances of human activity, the world and its 
objects are encountered in the immediacy of meaning provided by the context of the experience 
accessed through man’s imaginative and inventive faculties.  As Grassi says, “[t]he fact is that 
the circumstances in which particular urgent needs arise are new and will not be repeated and, to 
use Vive’s13 metaphor, ‘beseige us,’ they sharpen our inventive capacity” (1980: 14).  Therefore, 
in the face of necessity, ingenium allows the discovery of meaning which can be as simple as 
providing for basic and instinctual needs or as complex as the foundations of all human social 
order:  
Grassi discussed ingenium as the effort that life exerts in its efforts to perpetuate 
itself amid the exigencies of existence.  Ingenium is the animal response to 
necessity.  In the human being, this ingenious response takes the form of labor by 
which the human world, i.e., life in human institutions—language, economics, 
law, etc.—is constituted (Hall 18). 
 
                                                 
13 Juan Louis Vives is cited by Grassi for the purpose of demonstrating the widespread recognition among the 
Humanists of some of the central theoretical problems explored by Vico to the point where they were proposing 
similar questions totally independently. 
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With these words it is not difficult to see the specter of subjectivism hovering over the 
entire enterprise.  After all, this seems to suggest straightforwardly that the human world is 
constituted by human labor, which is precisely what arises from the ingenium.  This brings us to 
the final of the four characteristics of Grassi’s thought—the centrality of metaphor in 
conceptuality. 
 For Grassi, the historical meanings of words—which in turn determine the historical 
meaning of their referents—are not determined by the imposition of human will and 
interpretation upon those circumstances.  From the perspective of Heidegger and Grassi such an 
imposition would be to offer a privileging of the modern interpretations of Being, namely 
subjectivity, by holding to the idea that our primordial state is a subject over and against a world 
of objects.  However, on the contrary, as Heidegger had argued in Being and Time, the 
presupposition of this subject-object dichotomy was not the originary ground of human 
experience of the world—an issue which he would expand into his history of Being in 
subsequent works throughout the rest of his career.  For Grassi the metaphor played a primordial 
role in this determination of meaning. 
 For Grassi rational language which is concerned with division and critique relies on a 
more primordial insight into the similarities between things in the world named topical 
philosophy, made possible by the faculty of the ingenium, which has the purpose of finding, 
joining and aggregating (Grassi 1980: 45).  The normal understanding of the metaphor in its 
literary character has to do with the “transposition of words.”  However, this literary form of the 
metaphor must be based on a prior recognition of a similarity between the things under 




Empirical observation itself takes place through the “reduction of sensory 
phenomena to types of meanings existing in the living being; and this “reduction” 
consist in the “transferring” of a meaning to sensory phenomena.  It is only 
through this “transference” that phenomena can be recognized as similar or 
dissimilar, useful or useless, for our human realization.  In order to make 
“sensory” observations we are forced to “reach back” for a transposition, for a 
metaphor.  Man can manifest himself only through his “transpositions,” and this is 
the essence of his work in every field of human activity (1980: 33). 
 
 Thus, for Grassi, Being is metaphorically transferred to beings in various historical 
circumstances which arise in conjunction with human labor, which forms the basis of the 
historical world.  Thus historically determined meanings arise from the call of Being and 
mankind’s passionate response (Grassi 1994: 10).  When Grassi says that the context determines 
the meaning of beings, he is referring to the call of Being through the historical development of 
linguistic meanings, human necessity and the primordial metaphorical transference and 
interconnection between beings.  In turn, mankind responds to this call through the functioning 
of the ingenium, philological analysis and through the pre-reflective judgment of entire peoples 
(sensus communis) (Hall 19). 
 These insights from Grassi into the operation and preeminence of poetic and rhetorical 
language help to clarify and expand upon issues which Heidegger himself raised regarding the 
meaning and nature of the work of art throughout his philosophical career.  Accordingly, I wish 
to examine some of the primary issues of Heidegger’s conception of artwork and how they are 
clarified and expanded upon by Grassi’s own insight.  In particular this will be important because 
Grassi, as we shall see, opposes precisely the artistic impulses of the Humanists against the 
Platonic understanding of art.  Therefore, by examining the Grassian-Heideggerian conception of 
art—particularly in the context of its philosophical roots in Being, topical philosophy and 
primordial metaphorization—we can establish a ground from which to judge the allegedly onto-
theological character of Platonic conceptions of artwork.  
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According to Heidegger, our contemporary experience of the work of art is hopelessly 
mired by the ontological presuppositions of modernity, which he identifies as aesthetics.  From 
the Heideggerian perspective, the aesthetic idea of the work of art is grounded in the subject-
object dichotomy in which art is primarily viewed as an object which draws the viewer out of his 
enclosed subjectivity and allows him to have a profound life experience.  Given the particular 
onto-theological character of modern subjectivity, it is impossible for Heidegger to consider such 
an account of how we ordinarily experience art as cutting to the primordial essence of the work 
of art (Thomson 2011: 48).  Indeed, Heidegger makes the bold claim that art in the modern 
period is altogether dead.  However, while it is true for Heidegger that a great amount of modern 
art is, indeed, completely trivial or even a manifestation of the objectification of everything as 
standing reserve, in reality he does believe that there are certain examples of modern art that 
transcend this inherent deficiency (Young 120-121).  However, we shall see that for Heidegger 
the role of great modern art is of an entirely different kind from his normal view of what 
constitutes great art—that is to say, Heidegger maintains two quite distinct ideas of what makes 
artwork great. 
 In order to understand either of Heidegger’s two conceptions of great art, it is necessary 
to return to elements of Heidegger’s understanding of Being because, unsurprisingly, for 
Heidegger the question of what constitutes great art is intimately connected to the understanding 
of the ontological difference.  A number of the key concepts which inform Heidegger’s 
understanding of the history of Being appear with different terminology in his essay “The Origin 
of the Work of Art.”  While normal studies in the philosophy of art focus on the artist or the 
effect of art on its viewers, Heidegger views such approaches to art as grounded fundamentally 
in onto-theological approaches to “aesthetics.”  By contrast, Heidegger is concerned with 
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approaching the essence of art through artwork itself, which is precisely where he begins his 
inquiry into the topic in “The Origin.” 
 Heidegger insists that such a pursuit must begin with an examination of the “thingly” 
character of the work of art.  He sets out, therefore, to divest the reader of all his or her prior 
metaphysical notions of what constitutes a “thing,” in turn attacking the idea that thing is a 
substance to which properties adhere, a bundle of sensations, and matter-form composites.  
According to Heidegger, all these explanations for the thingly character of a thing are grounded 
in the “Greek experience of the Being of beings in the sense of presence” which comes to its 
fruition in the translation of this conceptions into Latin in medieval thought where “Roman 
thought takes over the Greek words without a corresponding equally authentic experience of 
what they say, without the Greek word” (“The Origin” 23), a theme which he continues to 
expound in his later “Letter on Humanism.”  In contrast to this thinking of being as presence, 
Heidegger proposes an alternate reading which associates the thingly character of things with 
their nature as what he called “equipment.”  The equipmental understanding of the thing is 
characterized by its usefulness.  The thing must be thought of within the context of its practical 
use in the world and not in an abstracted fashion (“The Origin” 32).  Here we see echoes of 
Heidegger’s conception of Zuhandenheit developed at length in Being and Time. 
 However, Heidegger points out that the equipmental character of the thing does not 
normally present itself as apparent to us.  It is a pre-reflective judgment on the nature of the 
thing, given security by the reliability of the equipment in its availability to lived experience.  
The example given by Heidegger here is of a peasant woman’s shoes: 
The equipmental quality of equipment consists in its usefulness.  What about this 
usefulness itself?  In conceiving it, do we already conceive along with it the 
equipmental character of equipment?  In order to succeed in doing this, must we 
not look out for useful equipment in use?  The peasant woman wears her shoes in 
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the field.  Only here are they what they are.  They are all the more genuinely so, 
the less the peasant woman thinks about the shoes while she is at work, or looks at 
them at all, or is even aware of them.  She stands and walks in them.  That is how 
shoes actually serve.  It is in this process of the use of equipment that we must 
actually encounter the character of equipment. (“The Origin” 32) 
 
 Heidegger suggests here that the equipmental character of the pairs of shoes can only be 
encountered within the context of their usefulness.  Indeed, he begins to protest that the shoes 
thought of as objects present for analysis or a pair of isolated peasant shoes depicted in van 
Gogh’s painting of shoes, standing isolated without a context, cannot reveal their equipmental 
character.  However, as he says this, Heidegger suddenly presents a dramatic reversal and offers 
an analysis precisely of van Gogh’s painting of the pair of shoes with profound philosophical 
importance.  I shall quote the relevant passage in full: 
A pair of peasant shoes and nothing more.  And yet—From the dark opening of 
the worn insides of the shoes the toilsome tread of the worker stares forth.  In the 
stiffly rugged heaviness of the shoes there is the accumulated tenacity of her slow 
trudge through the far-spreading and ever-uniform furrows of the field swept by 
raw wind.  On the leather lie the dampness and richness of the soil.  Under the 
soils slides the loneliness of the field-path as evening falls.  In the shoes vibrates 
the silent call of the earth, its quiet gift of the ripening grain and its unexplained 
self-refusal in the fallow desolation of the wintry field.  This equipment is 
pervaded by uncomplaining anxiety as to the certainty of bread, the wordless joy 
of having once more withstood want, and trembling before the impending 
childbed and shivering at the surrounding menace of death.  This equipment 
belongs to the earth, and it is protected in the world of the peasant woman.  From 
out of this protected belonging the equipment itself rises to its resting-within-
itself. 
   
At this point, Heidegger pronounces something of a reversal of his previous position.  He 
now argues that “perhaps it is only in the picture that we notice all this about the shoes.  The 
peasant woman, on the other hand, simply wears them… she knows all this without noticing or 
reflecting” (“The Origin” 33).   
 Heidegger goes on to state that “[t]he art work lets us know what shoes are in truth… Van 
Gogh’s painting is the disclosure of what the equipment, the pair of peasant shoes, is in truth.  
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The entity emerges into the unconcealedness of its being” (“The Origin” 35).  Thus we see that 
the fundamental character of the work of art becomes the fact that it is a happening of truth.  In 
particular, Iain Thomson has captured precisely what it is about this painting of van Gogh that 
caused Heidegger to reach this conclusion.  He notes the careful phrase by which Heidegger 
introduces his sudden reversal on the topic, “a pair of peasant shoes and nothing more.”  This is 
an important detail because Heidegger himself has a notorious history of “nothing” constituting a 
much greater concept than simple absence (Thomson 2011:84).  In order to explain what is 
implied by Heidegger’s use of the term we must therefore look further into the work. 
 In his exposition of van Gogh’s painting, Heidegger draws attention to two particular 
terms—“earth” and “world.”  These two terms would take on great significance in the rest of the 
work and would continue to be a major theme throughout all of Heidegger’s future work, 
although under different names.  If we recall, for Heidegger, history is composed of various 
historical epochs in which beings have taken on a certain meaningfulness, with our own late 
modern period being characterized by the view of beings as standing reserve.  It was further 
pointed out that that these different, incommensurable historical epochs are not determined by 
the projection of meaning by a sovereign subject, but rather by Being itself, revealing and 
concealing.  This, then, forms the basis of Heidegger’s conception of truth as concealment—
Being has revealed the truth of beings in a particular historical epoch, while concealing other 
meanings.  With this in mind, we are able to approach properly what Heidegger means by “earth” 
and “world” in the current work. 
 Later in the “Origin,” Heidegger speaks of “earth” as “the spontaneous forthcoming of 
that which is continually self-secluding and to that extent sheltering and concealing.”  On the 
other hand, “[t]he world is the self-disclosing openness of the broad paths of the simple and 
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essential decisions in the destiny of an historical people” (47).  The parallels to what has 
previously been stated should become immediately apparent.  Heidegger, in this essay, is 
beginning to meditate upon the ontological significance of the work of art.  In doing so, he has 
identified his conception of “Being itself” (Sein selbst) with “earth” and “the being-of-beings” 
(Seinendheit) with “world.”  Heidegger speaks about the relationship between the two concepts 
in this way: 
That into which the work sets itself back and which it causes to come forth in this 
setting back of itself we called the earth.  Earth is that which comes forth and 
shelters.  Earth, self-dependent, is effortless and untiring.  Upon the earth and in it, 
historical man grounds his dwelling in the world.  In setting up a world, the work 
sets forth the earth.  This setting forth must be thought here in the strict sense of 
the world.  The work moves the earth itself into the Open of a world and keeps it 
there.  The work lets the earth be an earth. (“Origin” 45) 
 
 Here we see reflected Heidegger’s entire ontological schema.  Earth comes forth and it is 
upon it that man sets forth his “dwelling in the world.”  However, as we have seen, earth is “self-
secluding” and “concealing.”  Earth is seen precisely insofar as it grounds a world through work, 
which pertains to the “destiny of an historical people.”  Earth corresponds exactly to that self-
concealing presencing of frameworks of intelligibility in different historical epochs.  World, in 
the general sense, stands in for that horizon of intelligibility or, more specifically, as a particular 
historical manifestation of the total sum of significations available to an historical people. 
 Having brought the ontological structure of the essay into view, let us return to the role of 
the work of art itself in this schema.  Recall that the work is said to be what brings the earth forth 
as a world.  Elsewhere in the essay Heidegger states: “[t]owering up within itself, the work opens 
up a world and keeps it abiding in force” (43).  However, he also says the “setting forth of the 
earth is achieved by the work as it sets itself back into the earth” and “world grounds itself on the 
earth, and earth juts through world” (46-47).  This is vital, as we have already seen Heidegger 
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explain in the case of the pair of peasant shoes that it is the work of art that has placed this 
dynamic of earth and world before our eyes.  The work thematizes the emergence of world from, 
through and on the earth whereas previously Heidegger’s peasant woman neither noticed nor 
reflected on this dynamic.  In Being and Time the earth was thematized as the Abgrund, abyss, 
beyond our worlds of meaning which was revealed in Angst’s calling into question the totality of 
beings (147).  The abyss to which Heidegger also gave the name nichts, nothing, in his 1929 
essay “What is Metaphysics?” when he stated:  “Only on the ground of the original manifestness 
of the nothing can human Dasein approach and penetrate beings” (“What is Metaphysics?” 91).14 
 This is the same nothing which introduced Heidegger’s meditation on van Gogh’s 
painting: “A pair of peasant shoes and nothing more//Ein Paar Bauernschuhe und nichts weiter.”  
However, as Young notes, there is a distinct shift in the understanding of the nothing since it was 
first introduced as the abyss which calls beings into question in Being and Time: 
Late Heidegger, no less than early, insists that the ‘beyond’ of beings is ‘nothing.’  
Having liberated himself from metaphysics, however, the character of this nothing 
undergoes a radical reassessment.  No longer is it to be thought of as the 
‘abysmal’, ‘empty’ or ‘negative’ nothing.  Rather, it is to be understood 
‘positively’ as the nothing of ‘plenitude’, the nothing that is, to be sure, 
‘something completely and utterly Other (Anderes) than beings’, but, for all that, 
undoubtedly ‘something (etwas)’ (GA 15, p 363).  Overcoming metaphysics is 
understanding, as Schopenhauer succinctly put it, that the ‘Other’ of beings is not 
an ‘absolute’ but only a ‘relative’ nothingness.  Otherwise put, it is understanding 
that it is not an ontological but rather an epistemological nothing, ‘nothing’ in, but 
only in, the sense of being beyond our ultimate standards of intelligibility; 
‘nothing (comprehensible) to us’, the mystical. (Young 2001: 132) 
 
 A work of great art for Heidegger is said to bring forth a world precisely as a holy place 
because the earth “juts through world,” this inexhaustible plenitude beyond the horizon of 
intelligibility is made manifest precisely in the work of art simultaneously bringing world into  
 
                                                 
14 Heidegger continues to use “nothing” in this sense repeatedly in “What is Metaphysics?”   
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visibility and exposing it as world.  This is the meaning of Heidegger’s statement about van 
Gogh’s painting: “perhaps it is only in the picture that we notice all this about the shoes.” 
 However, there is something unclear in Heidegger’s account of art.  In “The Origin,” he 
suggests that in order for a work of art to be great, it must be linked to an act of preservation.  A 
private or unknown work of art cannot have the quality of greatness.  A great work of art is 
firmly entrenched in its unfolding of the historical understanding of a group of people, hence 
why the definition of world which he provided included “the destiny of an historical people.”  It 
is for this reason that major examples of great works of art for Heidegger are the ancient Greek 
temple or the medieval cathedral.  These are works of art that help form and concretize an entire 
way of being-in-the-world for a people.  Great works of art are world-historical.  He states: 
Art is historical, and as historical it is the creative preserving of truth in the work.  
Art happens as poetry.  Poetry is founding in the triple sense of bestowing, 
grounding and beginning.  Art, as founding, is essentially historical…. Art is 
history in the essential sense that it grounds history.… The origin of the work of 
art—that is, the origin of both the creators and the preservers, which is to say of a 
people’s historical existence, is art.  This is so because art is by nature an origin: a 
distinctive way in which truth comes into being, that is, becomes historical. 
(“Origin” 75) 
 
 With this great pre-eminence given to the work of art, it is easy to see how some 
interpreters have given what Young identified as a “Promethean” reading of Heidegger’s 
conception of artwork, that the artist creates a world (29).  This would, of course, suggest some 
form of subjectivism in which a particular human artist projects his view of reality onto the 
world.  Young, however, demonstrates that this reading is incompatible with both Heidegger’s 
own examples of great artwork (surely the Greek temple already presupposes the existence of the 
Greek way of being-in-the-world?) as well as with the insights which he had already discovered 
in writing Being and Time.  In that work, human beings are said to be in a state of thrownness, 
always already immersed in a world (122-123).  Likewise, human cultures also find themselves 
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in this state of inauthenticity in which their world is received as a background which has faded 
out of view as surely as the shoes had faded into the background for the peasant woman.  Rather 
than being the Promethean work of a great artist, world first emerges—though not yet thematized 
through a great work of art—through “language.”  It is important to remember that, for 
Heidegger, language takes on a radically new meaning from its conventional (or metaphysical) 
definition as a means of communication.  In Being and Time, Heidegger has already stated: 
All discourse about… which communicates in what it says has at the same time 
the character of expressing itself.  In talking, Dasein expresses itself not because it 
has been initially cut off as “something internal” from something outside, but 
because as being-in-the-world it is already “outside” when it understands.  What is 
expressed is precisely this being outside, that is, the actual mode of attunement (of 
mood) which we showed to pertain to the full disclosedness of being-in.  Being-in 
and its attunement are made known in discourse and indicated in language by 
intonation, modulation, in tempo of talk, “in the way of speaking.”  The 
communication of existential possibilities of attunement, that is, the disclosing of 
existence, can become the true aim of “poetic” speech. (157) 
 
 Here we can see that Heidegger does not consider language to be a tool by which to refer 
to external objects encountered as such, but rather it is the mode of Dasein’s expression in being-
in-the-world.  Fundamentally then, language refers to the entire way of life for a people which 
has appeared organically.  It is not something that arises from human impulse, but rather is a 
response on the part of human beings to the existential circumstances sent by Being. 
 All of this should remind us of what we have already seen present in the work of Grassi, 
particularly in his interpretation of Vico.  Language as the pre-reflective way of life of human 
beings is the equivalent to Vico’s sensus communis: “judgment without reflection, shared by an 
entire class, an entire people, and entire nation, or the entire human race.”15  However, while 
Heidegger is content to speak of the effects of great works of art, Grassi provides an account 
from within the rhetorical theory of Renaissance Humanism which shows how the work of art 
                                                 
15 Giambattista Vico, New Science, quoted in Schaeffer, 83. 
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arises in and through topical philosophy in man’s passionate response to the call of Being.  The 
work of art, as we saw, is fundamentally “poetry” and likewise topical philosophy is an 
expression of the meaning formation of poetic and rhetoric language and thought.  Thus, Grassi 
is able to clarify Heidegger’s thought by drawing upon the concepts of topical philosophy and in 
particular the gathering and inventive power of the ingenium to explain the way in which the 
work of art grounds and preserves the emergence of historical worlds. 
 There is one last issue that must be clarified regarding the nature of the work of art as 
expressed by Heidegger.  Earlier it was noted that for Heidegger there are two forms of great art.  
Thus far I have focused primarily on the first type, that world historical art which thematizes a 
particular historical era, which makes the entire un-thought ethos of a people appear precisely as 
a world which emerges from the earth and, therefore, as a holy place.  However, this type of art 
may appear in the idea of a Greek temple or a medieval cathedral, but it scarcely explains the 
image which first introduced the entire discourse—van Gogh’s painting of a pair of shoes.  
Indeed, I previously drew attention to the fact that Heidegger possesses a general disdain for 
modern art, thinking that modern artistic expression is hopelessly mired with subjectivism in the 
form of aesthetics.  Should not this criticism, by all right, exclude this painting of van Gogh as 
well? 
 In point of fact, Heidegger actually maintains an affection for a number of modern artists. 
Heidegger had a deep obsession with Holderlin; however, he also held in esteem a number of 
modern painters in addition to van Gogh, particularly Klee and Cezanne (Young 121).  None of 
these figures possess the sort of world-historical importance of a medieval cathedral.  None of 
them produced art which is so integrated with the consciousness of an entire people that it 
defines and thematizes their historical dwelling.  How then can Heidegger possibly entertain the 
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idea that their artwork qualifies as great?  The answer lies in the current historical conditions of 
our times.  Nietzsche had already observed that the, “death of God,” in the fact that the 
metaphysical objectification of the universe in modernity had destroyed the relevance of 
religious life to the experience of mankind.  Indeed, this was symptomatic of a general nihilism 
that characterizes modernity.  In short, the modern era is a time in which the sense of wonder has 
been completely eviscerated from the experience of man.   
Heidegger’s consciousness of this fact and its relevance for the essence of art is on full 
display in his essay “What Are Poets For?”  The central question of the essay arises from a poem 
of Holderlin: “… and what are poets for in a destitute time?”  The destitute time for Heidegger is 
modernity in which “the divine radiance has become extinguished in world history” (89).  It does 
not take much effort to connect this issue of divine radiance with Heidegger’s phenomenology of 
the holy which has already been linked to the recognition, in a period defined by a great work of 
art, of earth jutting through world, hence allowing a world epoch to retain a numinous quality.  
This numinous quality or divine radiance is precisely what is absent in our times.  Indeed, the 
problem is deeper than even a general absence of the experience of the holy:  
At this night’s midnight, the destitution of the time is greatest.  Then the destitute 
time is no longer able even to experience its own destitution.  That inability, by 
which even the destitution of the destitute state is obscured, is the time’s 
absolutely destitute character…. Perhaps the world’s night is now approaching its 
midnight.  Perhaps the world’s time is now becoming the completely destitute 
time. (90-91) 
 
 In this time of absolute destitution the world is characterized by Gestell, technological 
enframing, which prevents anything from coming forth as holy.  Any attempt at world historical-
art would be reduced to a standing reserve for manipulation and therefore fail to achieve its 
purpose.  Artists in such a time period cannot produce works like the Greek temple.  This is why 
Heidegger has, following Holderlin, asked the question, “what are poets for in a destitute time?”  
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In response to this question, Julian Young has extracted that purpose which Heidegger 
envisions—the artist of modernity is to lay the foundations of the holy.  He cannot yet establish 
world-historical art which founds a world while retaining the numinous presence of earth 
precisely because the interplay of presence and absence between world and earth has been 
devastated by technological enframing.  Thus, the modern poet must attempt to pull forth that 
very interplay and make it present in order that future poets might once again attempt great 
works of art.  The great modern poet seeks to keep alive the memory of the holy (98-99). 
 This brings us back to Heidegger’s discussion of van Gogh’s painting of the pair of boots.  
If we recall, Heidegger specifically identified the painting as depicting a pair of boots and 
“nothing more.”  In particular, he stated, “from the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes 
the toilsome tread of the worker stares forth.”  In the wake of criticisms that Heidegger has 
merely projected his own subjective impressions onto the van Gogh’s painting by claiming that it 
depicts that shoes of a peasant woman rather than van Gogh’s own shoes (as seems to be the 
reality), Iain Thomson has offered an argument that Heidegger’s analysis arises from the work of 
art itself.  He claims that precisely what is distinctive about van Gogh’s 1886 painting of a 
farmer’s shoes is that in “the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes” one is able to 
discern the emerging image of a woman holding a hoe, the woman farmer to whom Heidegger 
refers.  Thomson argues that Heidegger himself discerned this inchoate figure and it formed the 
basis of his phenomenological analysis of the painting (2011: 114).  Furthermore, Thomson 
points out that in other attempts by van Gogh at painting pairs of shoes, one is able to see further 
figures emerging from the indistinct background (2011: 87).  While I remain somewhat skeptical 
of Thomson’s analysis of the 1886 version as depicting a woman farmer, the idea that the 
indistinct background of other versions of van Gogh’s treatment of pairs of shoes, such as that of 
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early 1887, give forth phantom images, such as faces and the crucifixion of Christ, seems far less 
contestable.  As such, it scarcely matters whether Thomson’s analysis of the particular painting 
under discussion is accurate, because van Gogh’s treatment of pairs of the shoes, in general, 
seem to contain a characteristic which, for Heidegger, also marked the genius of Cezanne and 
Klee: semi-abstraction. 
 In order to penetrate fully what this focus on semi-abstraction in art means, we must turn 
our attention to the forms of art most disdained by Heidegger: symbolic and representational art.  
For Heidegger the issue with both these art forms is that they remain fundamentally locked 
within the metaphysical paradigm.  Heidegger characterizes symbolic art as that art which seeks, 
by the use of sensuous images, to represent indirectly something beyond itself which is not itself 
sensuous or rather the supersensuous (Young 135-136).  This type of art qualifies as 
metaphysical for Heidegger due to his critique of onto-theology.  According to Heidegger, in the 
historical effort to symbolize the supernatural through the sensuous, what has occurred is that 
objectification of being by the thinking of being as a particular being, an objectified presence.  
As such, symbolic art destroys the holy and therefore fails to satisfy the earth condition which 
characterizes great art.  As we shall see going forward, Heidegger considers this attempt to 
concretize the supersensuous in the sensible a primary characteristic of the Platonic conception 
of the work of art (Young 138-139).  On the other hand, there is the problem of naturalistic 
representation, simple mimetic art.  This art is locked into metaphysics because it, like simple 
onto-theology, remains locked within the framework of beings.  Naturalistic art seeks to offer 
representations of natural and sensuous phenomena, but in doing so neglects that which is other 
than beings.  Once again, we see that naturalistic representation fails to honor the earth condition 
which characterizes great works of art (Young 140-142).  Since both these forms of artistic 
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expression neglect the truly numinous and holy, they cannot do the work of the artist in this time 
of destitution.  Likewise, Heidegger does not hold that purely abstract art can perform the 
function of bringing forth the world as a holy place for quite the opposite reason—abstract art 
does not present the world at all and so therefore cannot bring it to presence as a holy place 
(Young 168).   
 Given the preceding critique of mimetic art (of both the symbolic and naturalistic form) 
as well as purely abstract art, one can now see more clearly the value that Heidegger sees in art 
of a semi-abstract variety.16  Beginning with van Gogh’s painting, Heidegger sees the indistinct 
backgrounds and negative spaces of the work as giving forth hints at emerging beings.  This 
same thing persists in a more pronounced fashion in the painting of Cezanne, where the central 
figures depicted seem to shake and blur, constantly threatening to fade into the background.  
Finally, semi-abstraction becomes a most thoroughly pronounced artistic technique in the 
paintings of Klee.  In Klee, the chaos at first threatens to turn the paintings entirely into abstract 
art; however, upon closer examination, one can see the figures and images arising from the chaos 
into presence.  This, for Heidegger, is the quintessential role of modern art.  The work of Klee 
shows distinctly that other beyond being from whence beings arise into presence.  It seeks to 
remind the world of the holy which has grown indistinct by the force of modern enframing.  It 
seeks out to found the holy upon which future artists can generate again great works of art 
comparable to the ancient Greek temple or the medieval cathedral.   
For Grassi, the world of the Humanists must necessarily lie somewhere between the two 
poles of Heidegger’s great artistic endeavor—the poets, for Grassi, still bring beings to presence 
                                                 
16 For an in depth discussion of Heidegger’s relationship to various modern artists, see Julian Young, Heidegger’s 
Philosophy of Art, Chapter 4, “Modern Art,” pp. 120-174. 
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and thematize the historical world, but they stand at the climax of the nihilistic17 inclinations of 
late medieval Scholasticism, heading towards the dawn of modernity.  Indeed, one might say 
that, from Grassi’s perspective, the Humanists were a final heroic stand to preserve the holy 
against the growing tide of nihilism and subjectivism, but that ultimately their efforts were 
undercut by the resuscitation of Platonism which occurred through the appearance of Ficino.  
Going forward, I shall examine this question of the supposed opposition between Platonism and 
Humanism and we shall see how closely the Platonist view of the world and that of the 


















                                                 
17 The decline towards “nihilism” in late medieval thinkers is often ascribed to an “ontological flattening” associated 
with the development of the concept of the univocity of being in Duns Scotus.  The subsequent growth of 
nominalism and voluntarism are likewise often invoked in this designation.  For a more extensive treatment of 





The Humanist Plato 
 
 The interpretation of Plato has historically always presented extreme difficulties.  Even in 
antiquity various schools existed which attempted to lay claim to the essential element of Plato’s 
philosophical impulse, be they so-called “Middle Platonic” dogmatists who worked under the 
influence of the Stoic philosophers or the “Academic Skeptics” who viewed Platonic philosophy 
as primarily based in the art of refutation and aporia, which they considered a purely Socratic 
model.  Of course, by far the most influential of the ancient interpretations was that school which 
developed out of the thinking of the third century Egyptian philosopher Plotinus, commonly 
known to modern scholarship as “Neoplatonism.”  
 As noted at the outset of this study, a large amount of time will be spent analyzing 
various Neoplatonic presentations of Plato throughout history; however, this form of analysis is 
not without controversy regarding whether Plato himself should be included in the study and 
regarded as authentically interpreted by these sources.  First and foremost, this difficulty is 
grounded in the fact that the Neoplatonic interpretation of Plato has been virtually completely 
dismissed as a misreading by modern Platonic scholarship.  Therefore, in order to establish the 
plausibility of the analysis which I am to undertake, it is necessary to review the various 
approaches to Plato that have gained currency in the modern period and offer them up to critical 
analysis.   
It should be stated at the outset that the impulse for doing such an analysis of the status 
quaestionis is not to reject wholesale modern contributions to the analysis of Plato as wanting 
when compared to Neoplatonic interpretations.  Modern scholarship has, however, generally 
attempted to drive a wedge between the thought of Plato himself and his Neoplatonic 
commentators.  This becomes particularly important to our present study when Heidegger and 
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Grassi speak negatively about Plato, insofar as they assimilate him to “Platonism” (with 
Neoplatonism explicitly in mind, particularly in Grassi's case), while sometimes offering positive 
accounts of his work only when this modern separation between Plato and Platonism is observed.  
As such, I wish to offer an analysis of the various positions of modern scholarship in order to 
present the idea that, in fact, the most plausible contemporary examinations of Plato lend 
themselves to a continuity with authentically understood Neoplatonism.  Thus I hope to show 
through the rest of this study that when Heidegger and Grassi assimilate Plato to Platonism, they 
are correct regarding their impulse not to separate these thinkers, but incorrect in their 
conception of the content of the shared thought of the Platonists because they identify 
(Neo)platonism with a position held neither by Plato nor the Neoplatonists. 
I will return to the relationship between a correct interpretation of Plato himself and the 
work of his Neoplatonic successors in the next chapter; however, at the present time it is 
necessary to review the history and state of Platonic scholarships in the modern period.  Once an 
authentic methodology for the interpretation of Plato is established, it will then be possible to see 
how well this vision of Plato coheres with Grassi’s philosophical project by examining how the 
four characteristics of Grassian philosophy outlined in the previous chapter appear within the 
body of Plato's own works. 
The Neoplatonic interpretation of Plato held dominance for over a thousand years from 
the time of Plotinus in the third century to its last major commentator, Marsilio Ficino, in the 
fifteenth century (Tigerstedt 1974: 7).  The sixteenth century, however, saw a definitive shift in 
the structure of Platonic studies.  The influence of modern impulses against received tradition 
entered into the interpretative task with the attempts of Stephanus and Serranus to develop a 
fundamentally new approach to Plato (Ralkowski 7).  They viewed Plato as a systematic 
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philosopher and tried to derive their system from a completely new examination of the Platonic 
dialogues.  This impulse would reach its full height in the work of Fredrich Schleiermacher in the 
early nineteenth century.  Schleiermacher would argue that there are two essential characteristics 
of Platonic philosophy.  First, Plato must be regarded as a systematic philosopher.  Second, there 
is a unity between form and content in Plato's writings.  That is, the dialogue form is of 
philosophical relevance.  The way in which Schleiermacher himself combined these two 
elements was to propose that Platonism comprised a definite system of doctrines that were 
pedagogically unfolded through successive discussions in the dialogues (Gonzalez 1998: 3).    
While this impulse has been maintained by some interpreters, in general Schleiermacher's 
vision of Platonic philosophy suffered under the burden of what modern interpreters took to be 
inherent contradictions in the content of various dialogues.  How can Plato's thought be a single, 
unified system of doctrines if his writings are self-contradictory?  The nineteenth century 
solution to this issue was to combine the impulse of Plato as a dogmatic and systematic 
philosopher with the theory that his views of that system remained in development during the 
productive period of his writings.  That is, Plato was attempting to convey doctrines in his 
dialogues, but he himself was in the process of revising these doctrines visibly within the 
dialogues themselves.  This position on the interpretation is generally known as the 
“developmentalist” interpretation and has maintained a strong position as the scholarly 
consensus in Platonic studies.  However, the developmentalist hypothesis is not without its own 
difficulties. 
In general, the starting point for the developmentalist approach to Platonic studies has 
been to adopt Aristotle's statement that the Laws was a later composition among Plato’s 
dialogues and work backwards.  The first tool used in this sense is stylometric analysis which 
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allows scholars to map out verbal and stylistic similarities between the Laws and other Platonic 
dialogues.  As such, there developed a rough consensus of what were to be considered Plato's 
“late dialogues” (Brandwood 90).  Likewise, following Aristotle's claim that the historical 
Socrates focused exclusively on questions of ethics and not broader philosophical speculation 
into areas such as epistemology and ontology, scholars have tended to separate out Plato's 
dialogues dealing with questions of virtue which end in aporia as being “early,” in imitation of 
his master (Penner 121).  Finally, the remaining dialogues in which Plato seems to move away 
from questions regarding human virtues and towards more diverse issues, such as ontology, and 
appears to these interpreters to no longer focus on simple refutations, but to be proposing 
doctrines of his own, are classified as “middle dialogues” (Kraut 3-4). 
The greatest difficulty with the developmentalist interpretation of the Platonic dialogues 
is that it relies heavily on two primary presuppositions.  First is the idea that we can accurately 
establish a chronology of Platonic thought.  While the developmentalist model claims to have 
established a rough chronology of Plato's works using stylometry, there is still a great amount of 
debate about the development of Plato's thought within the different periods of his composition 
(Kraut 14).  This problem is only exacerbated by questions regarding the validity of stylometric 
analysis in establishing chronology at all.  Does a similarity of style and vocabulary necessarily 
demonstrate chronological proximity or does it merely indicate artistic or thematic 
correspondence?  This question is especially apropriate of an author of such well recognized 
artistic power and precision as Plato.  In reality, the only firmly attested external evidence 
regarding Platonic chronology which we possess is the aforementioned fact that the Laws were 
Plato's final composition, unpublished at the time of his death (Kraut 15).  Since any attempt to 
understand Plato's philosophical system on a developmentalist account presupposes the necessity 
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of tracing this development temporally, this chronological aporia seems to render the task of the 
developmentalist futile and potentially fundamentally incorrect.   
This chronological difficulty is only compounded by the examinations done of the 
structure and nature of the dialogues by recent scholarship.  The separation of the “early 
dialogues” relies on the presupposition that in his early career Plato produced dialogues that were 
merely imitative of Socrates's distinct style of questioning, terminating in aporia, and that only 
in the so-called Middle period does Plato begins to present positive hypotheses.  However, J. B. 
Kennedy claims to have found distinct elements of Pythagorean-influenced structure not only in 
the later dialogues, but also those regarded as early by the developmentalists, including both the 
Euthyphro and even the Apology, despite developmentalist arguments that such developed 
doctrinal content is a later accretion within Plato’s philosophical career (8-9).  If this is so, the 
general structure of these dialogues no longer appears as a legitimate indicator of their 
chronological position within the Platonic corpus. 
The second presupposition is the very idea that Plato intended to formulate a systematic 
philosophy at all, a presupposition inherited in modern scholarship primarily from the position of 
Schleiermacher.  In effect, this presupposition causes the developmentalist to mine the dialogues 
for arguments supporting particular “Platonic positions,” bearing in mind the idea that these 
positions may be revised or even abandoned over time.  A major example of this is the idea that, 
in the so-called Middle Dialogues (particularly the Republic), Plato formulated a theory of the 
Forms which he is then sometimes held to have abandoned after subjecting it to a damning 
critique in the Parmenides only for the theory (supposedly) to disappear or be greatly reduced in 
importance during the so-called Late Dialogues.18  However, this presupposition causes the 
                                                 
18 Although, if Plato is attempting to propose a “theory of the Forms” then this seems to be clearly untrue, since the 
Timaeus, agreed among developmentalists to be a “Late Dialogue,” clearly depicts the existence of separated 
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developmentalist to embrace, by necessity, an unlikely interpretative strategy: the rejection of the 
dialogue form of Plato's writings as fundamentally irrelevant.  In order to allow this doctrinaire 
interpretation of the dialogues, the developmentalist has found it largely necessary to posit the 
primary speaker of any dialogue—whether it is Socrates, Timaeus or the Eleatic and Athenian 
Strangers—as simply representing the mouth-piece of Plato (quite arbitrarily, it should be noted).  
The dramatic form, the give-and-take of dialectic, the frequent aporia—all are rendered 
irrelevant in this interpretation which converts the dialogues into merely disguised treatises.  
That is, the developmentalist approach, in its attempt to explain the apparent contradictions in the 
positive content of the dialogues, sacrifices Schleiermacher's second criteria, the unity of the 
form and content in Plato's philosophy. 
 Due to the apparent absurdity that Plato should write in a style so opposed to the purpose 
of explicating a systematic philosophy, as the dialogue form seems to be, new interpretive 
approaches to the dialogues have arisen.  In particular, some modern scholars have proposed a 
non-doctrinal reading of Plato.  The suggestion is once again that Schleiermacher is wrong 
regarding his two principles; however, in this interpretation it is the first and not the second 
principle which must be forfeited.  While there is a unity of form and content in the works of 
Plato that entails that one reject the idea that Plato intended to be a systematic philosopher at all.  
However, this interpretation has its own flaws.  As Lloyd Gerson has pointed out, there are 
certain positions19 that the dialogues seems to engage in a universally critical fashion and, if 
Plato were secretly to hold these positions or to think these positions just as valid as any other, it 
                                                 
Forms.  This represents one of the many difficulties which render developmentalist accounts of “Plato's 
doctrines” inherently vacuous. 
19 Gerson here specifically mentions Plato’s general support for the philosophical life and philosophy’s superiority 
to all forms of sophism.  Elsewhere in the same work (10ff) he presents his view that the core impulses of all 
Platonic philosophy are antimaterialism, antimechanism, antinominalism, antirelativism, and antiskepticism, 
without these impulses implying a fixed doctrinal content in any particular Platonic philosopher. 
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would seem to make Plato the worst kind of sophist (2013: 37).  Furthermore, even if one goes 
so far as to say that the dialogue form refuses to yield any insight whatsoever into Plato’s own 
thought—including these apparent principles of Gerson—the results appear quite dismal.  What 
we are then left with is an empty form of eristic.  Since eristic is the art of the sophist, we are 
once again left with the conclusion that under the model of absolutely no positions, Plato would 
again be reduced from a philosopher to a sophist.  Since this seems like a fundamentally 
unappealing position, the approach of the non-doctrinal interpreters of Plato seems to be as 
fundamentally flawed as the doctrinal approach, in either its unitarian or developmentalist form. 
 A third approach to Platonic interpretation developed from the roots laid by Dietrich 
Tiedemann and Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann and more fully developed by Hans Joachim 
Kramer and Konrad Gaiser (Nikulin 2).  This school of interpretation centers on the idea that 
Plato was indeed a systematic philosopher, but the dialogues do not contain our only or even 
most complete access to his doctrines.  Basing themselves on the doxographic testimony of 
Aristotle in particular, these scholars, generally known as the Tubingen school, claim that the 
essence of Platonism is contained rather in the unwritten doctrines which Plato commended to 
his pupils in the Academy.  Furthermore, from the perspective of the Tubingen school, the 
dialogues are seen as being products and introductions to intra-Academic discussions.  As such, 
the Tubingen school constitutes a branch of Platonic research which views Platonism from a 
primarily esoteric perspective.  Besides the fact that the doxological testimony appears to give 
credence to the idea that Plato held and taught ideas not found—at least not obviously—within 
the scope of the dialogues20, members of the Tubingen school also argue that the writings of the 
                                                 
20 See Mitchell Miller, “The Choice Between the Dialogues and the "Unwritten Teachings: A Scylla and Charybdis 




Platonists themselves support this position by speaking of the Platonic life as a form of askesis.  
Indeed, in every instantiation of Plato's academy, the personal discourse between master and 
student is upheld as an ideal of philosophy.   
 Furthermore, the Tubingen school calls on Plato's own authority in his written works to 
support their claim that the transmission of Plato's ideas was primarily oral, specifically by 
drawing upon the philosophical digression found within the Seventh Letter: 
  Indeed, there neither is now nor ever will be a written work by me on [what I  
  seriously study].  The reason is that this subject matter cannot at all be expressed  
  in words as other studies can, but instead, from living with the subject itself in  
  frequent dialogue, suddenly, as a light kindled from a leaping flame, [knowledge]  
  comes to be in the soul where it presently nourishes itself.21 
 
 This passage from the Seventh Letter, combined with Plato's apparently critical comments 
towards writing as found in the Phaedrus lend credence, for the Tubingen school, to their idea 
that Plato's philosophy is primarily to be found in the doctrines reported among the doxographers 
as having been transmitted orally from master to pupil, rather than recorded in the written texts 
of the dialogues. 
 However, ultimately this appeal to the Seventh Letter does more to undermine the truth of 
the esotericists claim than to support it.  It is certainly true that this letter suggests that Plato does 
not think that writing could convey what he considers to be the most important topic, but what is 
the reason for this fact?  While the esotericists focus on Plato's reticence to record that which he 
considers to be most worthy of study in writing, they ignore that the reason for this hesitation, 
given by Plato, is that the subject matter cannot, in principle, be expressed in words.  The 
Tubingen school, while seeing with the non-doctrinal interpreters the inherently ambiguous and 
non-dogmatic nature of the dialogues, embraces the idea of philosophy as a systematic science 
                                                 
21 Gonzalez’s translation is used for the Seventh Letter.  Unless otherwise noted, all other translations from Plato’s 
Greek are my own. 
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held by the dogmatic interpreters of Plato, whether their stance be developmentalist or unitarian.  
As such, despite the initial attraction the Tubingen school may possesses, there seem to be 
aspects of Plato's own stated stance towards philosophy that belie their attempt to penetrate 
Plato's thought. 
 Is every angle for the interpretation of Plato therefore defeated?  On the basis of the 
Seventh Letter, it does not seem possible that Plato was proposing that philosophy consists of a 
systematic formulation of doctrines about reality—whether written or oral—but likewise the 
dialogues do seem to reveal an inclination to divide the sophist from the philosopher and eristic 
from dialectic, thus rendering any idea that Plato envisioned philosophy as idle chatter highly 
dubious. 
 Francisco Gonzalez offers a “third way” between these various dogmatic and skeptical 
approaches.  Since Gonzalez's approach most closely parallels the understanding in this study of 
the best way to interpret the Platonic dialogues, I shall spend some amount of time summarizing 
and demonstrating the legitimacy of his interpretation and method.22  The core of Gonzalez's 
interpretation rests on a two-fold understanding: the dialogues are indeed aiming for a form of 
knowledge (contra the skeptical approach), but that that knowledge is fundamentally not a 
knowledge of propositions.  The knowledge found in the dialogues is closer to non-propositional, 
practical knowledge—knowledge how rather than knowledge that.  Furthermore, the reason for 
its non-propositional nature is because it cannot be objectified as a result separable from the 
method which is employed to attain it.  For Plato, the truths of philosophical inquiry are most 
certainly not merely relativistic or subjective—Lloyd Gerson in particular has spent considerable 
effort demonstrating that anti-relativism is one of the key components of Platonism which 
                                                 
22 For a more complete analysis see Francisco Gonzalez, Dialectic and Dialogue: Plato's Practice of Philosophical 
Inquiry (Evanston: Northwestern University Press), 1998. 
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appears consistently throughout the dialogues and throughout the tradition of those who claim 
Plato as their master (Gerson 2013: 13).  Nevertheless, Plato also does not hold the position that 
philosophical truths are separable, objective “facts” which can be taught and handed on as 
propositions.  Instead, Plato’s idea of philosophical knowledge is found in the form of a self-
knowledge which exists inseparably from the knower and the dialectical process of inquiry.  
This, indeed, is the reason for the suitability of the dialogue form to Plato’s philosophical 
endeavor.  Gonzalez states:  “the subject and the object become one in the method which 
mediates between them.  This view makes philosophical method everything.  The method is not 
simply a tool by means of which we arrive at some objectifiable results which themselves 
constitutes philosophical knowledge; instead the method is philosophical knowledge” (1995: 
160-61). 
 That Plato has something like this in mind is most explicitly on display in the Seventh 
Letter, for whereas Plato clearly states that philosophical knowledge cannot be expressed in 
words, he does not for that reason indicate that philosophical knowledge is inherently 
inaccessible, as the skeptics might hold.  Instead he states that: 
  In relation to each being there are three things that are necessary means of   
  attaining knowledge, and this knowledge must itself be placed beside them as a  
  fourth thing: the first is the name, the second is the definition, the third is the  
  image, and the fourth is knowledge.  To these we should add as a fifth thing, the  
  being that is known and that is truly being. (342a-b) 
 
 Plato begins with a conception of knowledge that cannot be expressed in definitions, but 
which is rather attainable through the knower entering into the mystery of the known.  That is 
because, as Plato indicates, there is a distinction between knowledge by which something is 
qualified and that which it is.  In describing an object as in scientific discourse, we are 
fundamentally addressing the issue of how that thing is qualified.  However, in Plato's view, 
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dialectic is precisely what reveals to us what a thing is.  As Gonzalez puts it, philosophy is “a 
method that shows rather than proves, that manifests rather than describes.  It is primarily neither 
deductive nor analytic, but rather exhibitive” (1995: 162).  However, Plato is quite clear that the 
means by which this exhibition is made manifest is through the mediation of these things which 
are not the thing itself, in dialectic: 
  Yet the process dealing with all four, moving up and down to each other, barely  
  gives birth to knowledge of the ideal nature.... Only barely, when the [three], that  
  is, names, propositions, as well as appearances and perceptions, are rubbed  
  against each other, each of them being refuted through well-meaning refutations  
  in a process of questioning and answering without envy, will wisdom along with  
  insight commence to cast its light in an effort at the very limits of human   
  possibility. (343e, 344b) 
 
 Thus, we can expect to find in Plato indications of truths, hints and suggestions about the 
fundamental nature of reality, but not dogmatic, systematic formulations.  Plato does not share 
the modern sensibility that anything that can justifiably be called philosophy must be reducible to 
a systematic exposition of doctrines.  Rather, he belongs to the ancient and venerable tradition in 
which philosophy was primarily a way of life, an orientation towards reality. 
 The conception of philosophy which Gonzalez has mapped out as fundamental to the 
correct interpretation of Plato is deeply at odds with the critique of the Platonic tradition found 
within much of Ernesto Grassi's oeuvre.  In his work Renaissance Humanism, after referring to 
the authentic Humanist appreciation of the power of the metaphorical word and poetic 
expression, Grassi says the following:  
  The Platonic Humanist tradition distances itself radically from these problems. It  
  proceeds from the problem of the rational definition of being, in accord with  
  which knowledge endeavors to attain “surety” or “certainty” by anchoring these  
  in abstraction, as universals, in the non-historical. Everything which is revealed  
  through the senses appears as a reflection of “ideas,” of the rational concepts  
  which constitute the eternal cause of the appearance. The meaning of words is  
  located in the logical transcendence of what the senses reveal; so man is raised  
  through this rational process to a vision of the eternal, to being by and for itself.   
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  Philosophical Platonism… will scarcely add anything new from a philosophy  
  standpoint to this traditional schema of metaphysical thought. (115)  
 
 Furthermore, lest it be objected that Grassi here refers to Platonism and not to Plato, it 
should be pointed out that in Heidegger and the Question of Renaissance Humanism, Grassi 
unequivocally states that “for the general structure of Plato's metaphysics, it is essential that the 
ideas... form a well-ordered system.  And from this the definitions of beings are rationally 
inferred by means of logical, dialectical investigation” (16).  It is evident from these statements 
that Grassi's own interpretation of Plato is to collapse Plato into Platonism while accepting 
Heidegger's critical assessment of Platonism as a form of proto-Cartesian rationalism heading 
headlong into its culmination in modern technological thinking and nihilism.  It should be noted 
that a significant element of Grassi's conception of Platonism includes the assertion that Plato's 
ideas are reducible to “rational concepts.”  This assertion, of course, runs completely at odds 
with Plato's own statement that concepts or definitions are precisely what is not sought by the 
philosopher.  Rather the rational account constitutes a statement qualifying the thing itself, which 
must be continually challenged in the activity of dialectic.   
 The remainder of this chapter will concern itself with the demonstration that Plato is not 
enamored by the ability of reason to produce universally applicable, a-temporal definitions 
which constitute the fundamental nature of reality.  First I shall show that, even by Heidegger 
and Grassi's own admission, Plato does not fall into the onto-theological act of identifying Being 
as such with beings, and only by ignoring their own original insights into the Platonic texts and 
progressively distorting the meaning of those texts does that idea emerge.  Next, I shall explore 
the question of the “ancient quarrel” between philosophy and poetry.  In doing so, I shall show 
that Plato’s critiques of the poets are primarily focused on their mimetic function, a reality that 
Heidegger himself subjected to significant critique.  Furthermore, in examining the differences 
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between the poets and philosophers, I shall also highlight similarities which will draw a closer 
association between Plato’s conception of the philosopher and Grassi’s conception of the 
Humanist.  Ultimately we shall see, contrary to Grassi’s assertion, that Plato’s aim is not to attain 
any kind of rational certainty, but rather to encounter the world continually anew through the 
ongoing process of dialectic, which lacks the inferential character which Grassi assigns it.  
Rather, I shall show that Platonic dialectic has an indicative character more similar to the 
topological philosophy of the Humanists than it does to logical deduction.23  
 Regarding the question of the ontological difference, it is surprising to find that, despite 
the prevailing insistence in Heidegger and Grassi regarding the forgetfulness of Being in 
traditional metaphysics—and the particular identification of Plato as the original author of this 
forgetfulness—Heidegger's own early works indicate that he was quite sensitive to the fact that 
Plato did not suffer from this confusion.  It was only gradually over the course of the 1930s, 
culminating in his definitive work on the subject, his 1940 Plato's Doctrine of Truth, that 
Heidegger began to see Plato as the founder of onto-theology.  As such, the natural place to begin 
a defense of Plato on this account would be to show that Heidegger's own analysis of Plato in his 
                                                 
23 During the course of this chapter, I shall not treat Plato’s Timaeus.  This may seem an odd omission, given that 
Proclus and Ficino both wrote commentaries upon this dialogue and, in its account of the Receptacle, it treats the 
relationship between the beingness and entities.  There reasons for this omissions are several.  First, the dialogue 
is not given any significance by Heidegger, Grassi or Gonzalez.  Indeed, in his entire volume dedicated to 
treating the relationship between Heidegger and Plato, both actual and hypothetical, Gonzalez mentions the 
Timaeus only twice, both times merely in passing.  Second, while it was the only partially available dialogue in 
the West during the medieval period, Dutton has pointed out that its interpretation was obscured by a failure to 
differentiate Plato himself and Calcidius’s comments, including by my principle representative of that period, 
Thomas Aquinas (193).  Third, while Ficino did compose a commentary on the work, it treats extensively of a 
variety of issues pertaining to mathematical magic and Renaissance proto-science which are not immediately 
interesting for our topic (Allen 2003: 238-239).  Furthermore, he treats topics of more interest to this project in 
his Platonic Theology and commentary on the Parmenides.  Fourth and finally, the structure and arguments of 
the Timaeus itself, particularly regarding the Receptacle, which would be of the most interest to this project, are 
often confusing and contradictory to the point of incoherence, a fact acknowledged by the speakers within the 
dialogue itself and explicated extensively by Kenneth Sayre in his “The Multilayered Incoherence of Timaeus’ 
Receptacle” (60-79).  In short, to treat the Timaeus justly would involve such extensive exegesis that it surpasses 
the scope of this study. 
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earlier work was closer to the proper interpretation of Plato and how his subsequent 
interpretation failed to account adequately for the content of the Platonic text. 
 The early work which provides the greatest insight in this respect is Heidegger's 1932 
lecture series on The Essence of Truth.  In this lecture series Heidegger focuses his effort 
primarily on a discussion of two major images in Plato's Republic: the Allegory of the Cave and 
the Allegory of the Sun (though he treats them singularly, drawing upon the latter to clarify the 
former).  It is not necessary to recount in detail the primary allegory to which Heidegger directs 
our attention in this lecture due to its deserved fame; however, I shall do so nevertheless in order 
that the reader may not overlook any of its details.   
 The Allegory of the Cave is an extended metaphor found in the seventh book of the 
Republic.  Socrates asks his interlocutor Glaucon to envision a cave with a long entrance open to 
light, and that within this cave people live, but in the peculiar state of being chained up at their 
legs and necks so that they can only see what is directly in front of them.  Behind them stands a 
wall behind which men are carrying various different figurines and objects peeking out over the 
top.  Still farther behind the prisoners and the wall, there burns a fire whose light reaches down 
into the depths of the cave, casting the shadows of the objects above the wall onto the cave wall 
in front of the prisoners.  Socrates then proceeds to imagine a prisoner being ripped from their 
previous place and turned towards the light.  Ultimately he imagines one of these prisoners being 
pulled out into the upper world of sunlight, at first suffering blindness, but then being able to see 
real objects more clearly than he originally saw the shadows on the cave wall and recognizing 
the source of their illumination in the sun.  Finally, he imagines the same prisoner, now freed, 
descending back into the cave in order to aid his fellow prisoners in their own liberation.  
Unfortunately, Socrates envisions such a person, having been dazzled by the light of day, being 
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rendered blind by his descent back into the darkness of the cave, thought a fool by his fellows, 
and ultimately killed for trying to pull others from the cave into the light. 
 Heidegger considers the primary message of the Analogy of the Cave to center on the 
question of aletheia, un-concealment.  This is vitally important because for Heidegger the 
emergence of a conception of aletheia as “truth” (that is, the correspondence between assertion 
and object), rather than unconcealment, is a principle necessary for the emergence of onto-
theology.  Indeed, by the time of his 1942 essay, Plato has become the founder of onto-theology 
for Heidegger precisely because he then finds in this portion of the Republic the forgetting of the 
traditional Greek idea of unconcealment and the emergence of truth as correctness of vision, that 
is, correspondence.  Yet this alteration in Heidegger's thought over the course of the 1930s does 
not seem to cohere particularly well with Plato's own text and as such his later revisions should 
be rejected for an interpretation more closely matching his original assessment as given in 1932. 
 Before delving into Heidegger's own interpretation of the allegory, it is necessary to 
speak first about more common interpretations of the points which Plato is trying to make.  The 
general trend in Platonic interpretation—following the standard doctrinaire or dogmatic 
approach—is to read the allegory as an early exposition of Plato's “theory of the Forms.”  Upon 
this interpretation, we are meant to view Plato as presenting a view of reality with multiple 
levels.  The prisoners inside the cave are taken to represent everyday people, living in a world 
directed towards sensible objects from which they draw their understanding and ideas about 
truth.  Plato, by contrast, wants to indicate that, because of the shifting nature of the world of 
sense, it is impossible to come to true knowledge through it.  It is a world of becoming, not of 
being.  The best one could hope for, in such a situation, would be “true opinion.”  However, Plato 
fails to be content with the idea that our thought must terminate in this way.  As such, he posits 
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another world, above the world of sensible particulars.  This secondary world is a purely spiritual 
world, distinct from the vicissitudes of lived, historical existence.  Here is the stable world of 
being rather than the ever-shifting world of becoming.  In the allegory, this secondary world is 
meant to correspond to the world outside the cave.  The objects in this world are eternal, timeless 
and unchanging, and, as such, it is possible to come to true, well-founded knowledge of them.  
Furthermore, the Forms which occupy this second world are taken to be the models for all those 
things in the first world.  All sensible trees are by virtue of their participation in the true tree in 
the world of the Forms; all sensible circles are by virtue of the Form of circle and so on.  That is, 
the Form is what all sensible objects share as the common nature of their being.  Additionally, 
the Form is envisioned as being something of an object in its own right; indeed, it is the perfect 
paradigm of the things which exist in the world of sensible particulars and time.  For instance, 
every circle in the sensible world possesses imperfections which do not allow it to correspond 
perfectly to the idea of a circle; however, the Form of the circle in the second world lacks those 
imperfections.  Thus, the Forms come to represent both the common nature shared by all sensible 
particulars and their perfection and model.   
 It should be apparent that this common description parallels exactly Heidegger's idea of 
onto-theology.  In order to explain the world of lived experience, Plato has sought to define 
being, but in doing so, he has given it a concrete instantiation as a being which fulfills the role of 
both ontology (common nature) and theology (perfect paradigm).  As such, Plato is taken to 
forget the question of Being as such and initiate the history of metaphysics characterized by the 
task of logically determining being as the ground of beings. 
 In 1932, however, Heidegger offers an interpretation of the allegory which is 
substantially at odds with the conventional doctrinal interpretation.  In the first stage, Heidegger 
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discusses the condition of the prisoners in the cave.  In describing their situation, he makes note 
of that fact that Plato refers to the shadows projected on the cave wall as τὸ ἀληθὲς, the 
unconcealed.  However, he observes that the distinctive position of the prisoners trapped within 
the context of the cave is characterized precisely by their inability to see the shadows as that 
which is unhidden.  Rather, for the prisoners, the shadows are simply that which is self-evidently 
at hand (Heidegger 2013: 24).  In Plato’s accounts, Glaucon remarks:  “ἄτοπον λέγεις εἰκόνα καὶ 
δεσμώτας ἀτόπους//You are speaking of an out-of-place image and out-of-place prisoners.”  
However, Socrates simply replies “ὁμοίους ἡμῖν//(they are) similar to us” and moves forward 
(Republic 515a).  It is not difficult to see why Heidegger, given this statement by Socrates, came 
quickly to associate the prisoners of the Cave Analogy with human beings in their everydayness.  
In Being and Time, Heidegger would call this condition “inauthentic Dasein.”  Human beings in 
their normal engagement with the world do not encounter that world thematized as the 
unconcealedness of being, but rather they mistake their everyday encounter with beings as being 
simply what is given.  We saw this same reality in the last chapter in the discussion of the 
peasant woman referenced in Heidegger’s description of the van Gogh’s pair of shoes—the 
shoes do not appear to her in their being in her everyday experience; they disappear into the 
background. 
 This brings us to the second stage of Plato’s analogy.  At this point, one of the prisoners is 
depicted as being loosed from his bonds.  He turns back and witnesses the objects carried behind 
the wall and the fire which casts their shadows into the cave.  At first such a prisoner is presumed 
to be blinded by the light of the fire and shocked by the objects he sees.  As such, according to 
Socrates and Glaucon, he would turn back, taking the shadows he previously observed as being 
“more unconcealed” (ἀληθέστερα) that what is now brought before his eyes.  For Heidegger, the 
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introduction of this comparative terminology takes on a special significance for understanding 
Plato’s conception of truth.  Onto-theological conceptions rely on the meaning of beings being 
taken as established, and, therefore, the primary conception of beings as coming forth into their 
unconcealment is lost.  In such a circumstance, “truth” is reduced to the form of a 
correspondence between thought and beings, particularly in the form which can be articulated as 
a proposition.  Heidegger observes, quite rightly, that truth—unconcealment—appears to admit 
of degrees, based on the comparative form employed.  However, propositions are either true or 
false and so such terminology does not easily assimilate to a view of truth as correspondence.  
Heidegger also notes that Socrates characterizes those objects which cast the shadows as μᾶλλον 
ὄντα, more beingful, thereby seeing that being also admits of degrees and, in fact, there is an 
intimate relationship in the analogy between being and truth (2013: 28-29). 
 Heidegger’s account then immediately moves forward to a discussion of the liberation of 
the prisoners from the cave into the “world of light.”  However, in doing so, he passes over 
offering an adequate interpretation of the fire within the cave.  Ralkowski notes this omission, 
but presents the argument that there is an implicit assumption in Heidegger’s text that the fire 
represents the particular historical world of Dasein.  He has several reasons for making this 
assertion.  First, he notes that for Heidegger the light of the fire is what allows the shadows (i.e.: 
beings in their everydayness) to appear.  However, as we shall see shortly, for Heidegger it is the 
world of light beyond the cave which constitutes the Being of beings.  That is, the world of light 
stands in for the general horizon of all intelligibility.  However, since the light of the fire is 
parasitic upon the light of the sun above, it seems appropriate that the broader horizon of all the 
possibilities of intelligibility be distinguished from a particular historical world or epoch in 
which beings in their everydayness appear (66).  Ralkowski points out that this confrontation 
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with the fire allows the historical world of Dasein to present itself precisely as world; it allows 
Dasein to encounter beings as beings, rather than as lost in the world of their everyday 
significations.  The turn towards the fire presents the opportunity to view one’s own historical 
world as fundamentally unnecessary (67).  We have already seen this movement in the previous 
chapter.  The turn towards the fire is precisely that thematization of beings which can occur in 
the great work of art.   
For Plato this moment seems to be parallel the aporia experienced by Platonic 
interlocutors in many of the dialogues.  Often, the interlocutors appear as though they possess 
knowledge of a topic under discussion at the opening of dialogues (Euthyphro 4e-5a, Laches 
188e-189a, Ion 530d) only eventually to be shown to have no true knowledge at all by the 
conclusion (Euthyphro 15c-e, Laches 200c, Ion 541e-542b).  This concluding aporia often 
depicts them becoming frustrated and simply exiting the discussion to continue along the path 
they had chosen for themselves before the dialogue took place.  This precisely parallels the 
analogy’s vision of a prisoner who is freed from his shackles, but, in looking back towards the 
fire, is dazzled and so turns himself again and regards the shadows as more unconcealed than the 
objects he saw beyond the wall.  They see that their knowledge is unstable and contingent on 
their own world of experience, but refuse to accept the conclusion.  This, likewise, coheres with 
Ralkowski’s view that Heidegger implicitly associates the fire with a particular instantiation of 
an historical world. 
This movement, however, does not take a high priority in Heidegger’s discussion of the 
analogy of the cave, presumably because he does not feel that Plato himself gives it a high 
degree of emphasis in the Republic.  The quick abandonment of the issue is only further 
reinforced by the fact that Heidegger does not regard this initial turn towards the fire as being a 
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liberation into the philosophical life at all (2013: 35), an understandable conclusion given the 
Platonic parallel.  Rather, Heidegger, as mentioned, is quick to move on to a discussion of the 
ultimate liberation from the cave into the world of the forms.  Heidegger notes that Plato refers to 
the world of light as being the foundation for the unconcealment of beings: 
The ideas are the most unhidden, the essentially unhidden, the primordially 
unhidden, because the unhiddenness of beings originates in them.  In the first, and 
especially in the second stage, we already encountered a necessary ordering 
between alethes and on, alethestera and mallon onta.  What is unhidden in the 
first stage, although shadow-like, is already in a certain sense on, something of 
which the prisoners quite spontaneously say that it is.  Correspondingly, in the 
second stage, ta alethestera, to which comparative there corresponds more-being, 
mallon onta.  Thus too in the third stage there must correspond to what is ‘now 
unhidden’ a being which is most beingful [das Seiendste].  Both (more- being and 
most-being) are asserted of what is revealed in and for seeing, the eidos; (what-
being, ti estin): the genuinely unhidden must also be what genuinely is.  What has 
most being is the most unhidden.  In fact, in precisely the most decisive passages 
Plato uses a characteristic expression.  He calls the ideas to ontos on, the being 
which has being [das seiendlich Seiende] — the being which is in the way that 
only beings can be: being.  To this ontos on there corresponds alethinon. (2013: 
54) 
 
 This characterization of the world of light being the most beingful which originates 
unhiddenness for our everyday experience corresponds to Heidegger’s understanding of 
metaphysics.  It can therefore be said that Heidegger interprets Plato’s forms as corresponding to 
his own conception of the Being of beings, the “historically fluctuating metaphysical paradigms” 
which allows beings to come into the open (Ralkowski 71).  However, is it not possible to 
imagine the forms not as historically fluctuating paradigms, but rather as higher objects upon 
which those objects of our everyday experience are based?  That is, after all, the standard 
dualistic interpretation of Plato.  Is it not the interpretation that Heidegger himself later comes to 
embrace in depicting Plato as the author of metaphysics?  Is it not possible that Plato, rather than 
grasping an insight into man’s historical thrownness has rather embraced a supernaturalism 
which we have seen previously condemned by Heidegger?  
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 At this point in his analysis of Plato, Heidegger does not seem to observe the problem of 
supernaturalistic onto-theology in Plato’s writings.  In discussing the nature of the forms he 
states: 
At the origin of the unhiddenness of beings, i.e. at being’s letting-through of 
beings, the perceiving is no less involved than what is perceived in perceiving—
the ideas.  Together these constitute unhiddenness, meaning they are nothing ‘in 
themselves,’ they are never objects.  The ideas, as what is sighted, are (if we can 
speak in this way at all) only in this perceiving seeing; they have an essential 
connection with perceiving.  The ideas, therefore, are not present but somehow 
hidden objects which one could lure out through a kind of hocus-pocus.  Just as 
little do they carry around subjects, i.e. are they something subjective in the sense 
of being constituted and thought-up by subjects (humans, as we know them).  
They are neither things, objective, nor are they thought-up, subjective. (2013: 58) 
 
 In these earlier lectures, Heidegger did not consider the characterization of being as eidos 
to imply the reduction of Plato’s conception of being to onto-theology.  By the late 1930s, in his 
lecture series on Nietzsche, concurrent with his ongoing revisions of his lectures on truth which 
would culminate in “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth,” Heidegger still considered Plato to have an 
ontological conception of truth (1979: 182-183).  That is, truth was still regarded fundamentally 
as pertaining to beings and not to propositions.  However, Heidegger had come to view Plato’s 
eidos as a crystalized “outward look,” present at hand to the mind (172).  As such, the Nietzsche 
lectures represent an intermediate stage between Heidegger’s early writings on Plato’s 
conception of truth and being and the culmination of his depiction of Plato as an onto-theologian.  
It was only a matter of time until the conception of the ideas as stable presence rather than 
paradigms of intelligibility would lead to give way to truth being reduced to a mere 
correspondence between propositions as facts rather than its deeper significance as aletheia, the 
emergence of entities into meaningful presence, available for comportment (Wrathall 13) 
Francisco Gonzalez, however, has noted that this move is completely unjustified by a 
reading of Plato’s texts.  This later onto-theological analysis is grounded primarily in a simplistic 
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etymological analysis of the words eidos and idea employed by Plato.  Since these words are 
related to sight, Heidegger goes on to reduce his earlier, careful reading of Plato’s ideas see 
above to this much more simplistic concept—if the eidos is something to be seen, it means it 
must be a presence available to sight (2009: 113).  As we have seen, however, Heidegger rejected 
this claim because he recognized that the ideas were not present as objects, rather they constitute 
the power of unhiddenness. 
The ideas are not, however, grounded fundamentally in the sense of presence, but rather 
in the sense of dynamis, power.  The ideas are the power for beings to be what they are.  
Gonzalez points out that Heidegger, even in his 1920s lectures on the Sophist recognizes the 
centrality of the fact that the forms are defined in terms of power rather than presence (88-89).  It 
is important to note, however, that this definition of the ideas as power is, itself, not taken to be a 
definitive and secure concept of the ideas.  Rather, the ideas are left as a perennial aporia (93). 
 This characterization of the ideas as power which is subject to a further destabilizing as 
aporia lends credence to Ralkowski’s assertion that the ideas can be adequately read as shifting 
metaphysical paradigms.  The world of the ideas are precisely what allow beings to come forth as 
beings.  This is what is most commonly known in Heideggerian terminology as the Being of 
beings or the horizon of all possible manifestation of intelligibility.  In the terminology of “The 
Origin of the Work of Art” this would be the equivalent of “world,” in the broad sense of a 
general term referring to all the possible actual manifestations of historical worlds.  Each of these 
particular historical worlds, we have seen, would be the equivalent of the fire in Plato’s analogy. 
 The final element of Plato’s cave analogy is the Good.  Plato describes the Good as “οὐκ 
οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλʼ ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας//not that the Good is being, but yet 
beyond being” (509b).  He likewise discusses the relationship between truth (unconcealment) 
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and the Good in the following manner:  “φῶς τε καὶ ὄψιν ἡλιοειδῆ μὲν νομίζειν ὀρθόν, ἥλιον δʼ 
ἡγεῖσθαι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἔχει, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἀγαθοειδῆ μὲν νομίζειν ταῦτʼ ἀμφότερα ὀρθόν, 
ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἡγεῖσθαι ὁπότερον αὐτῶν οὐκ ὀρθόν//To think of light and sight as sun-like is correct, 
but it is not correct to consider them the sun, so also here to think them both [knowledge and 
truth] good-like is correct, but to consider either of them the Good is not correct” (509a).  The 
Good then is fulfilled by the image of the sun in Plato’s analogy of the cave which illuminates 
the world beyond the cave. 
Ralkowski suggests that Heidegger’s reading of Plato’s cave analogy is precisely what 
would give rise to his own later distinction between Being as such and the Being of beings (75).  
To return once more to the terminology of “The Origin,” Being as such would be the equivalent 
of “earth,” the concealed source of unconcealment which gives being and truth, that which lies 
beyond all horizons of intelligibility, that which is truly other than being.  Heidegger describes 
the Good in this manner: 
We recall in clarifying the idea as such we already encountered superlative 
determinations: the idea is something highest, namely the most beingful being and 
the most unhidden being.  The ideas are the most beingful beings because they 
make being comprehensible, ‘in whose light’, as we still say today, a particular 
being is a being and is what it is.  The ideas are also the most unhidden, i.e. the 
primordially unhidden (in which unhiddenness arises) in so far as they are what 
first let beings show themselves.  But if there is a highest idea, which can become 
visible over all ideas, then it must exist out beyond being (which is already most 
beingful) and primordial unhiddenness (unhiddenness as such).  Yet the good, as 
that which exists out beyond the ideas, is also called idea.  What can this mean?  
It can mean only that the highest idea holds sway most primordially and 
authentically by allowing both the unhiddenness of beings to arise, and the being 
of beings to be understood (neither of these without the other).  The highest idea, 
although itself barely visible, is what makes possible both being and 
unhiddenness, i.e. it is what empowers being and unhiddenness as what they are.  
The highest idea, therefore, is this empowering, the empowering for being which 
as such gives itself simultaneously with the empowerment of unhiddenness as 





 Anyone familiar with the philosophy of the late Heidegger should recognize in this 
passage a clear reference to the “event of appropriation,” Ereignis.  This term, furthermore, is 
merely another way of expressing the concept of Sein selbst, Being itself, Being as such 
(Capobianco 34-50).  This evidence demonstrates that, despite his later protestations, Heidegger 
himself saw a great deal of commonality between his own later thought and his early 
interpretation of Plato.   
However, perhaps it can be maintained that Grassi did not share such insights into the 
“Heideggerian” nature of Platonic thought as those shown above.  We have seen in the previous 
chapter that, in his later writings on the Humanists, Grassi takes an extremely strong, negative 
stance towards Plato, identifying his philosophical enterprise with the Cartesian search for 
certainty grounded in logically deduced rational concepts.  Grassi possessed a long history of 
engagement with Plato preceding these statements, however, having composed his 
Habilitationsschrift on Plato’s Meno, Il problema della metafisica platonica, in 1932 around the 
same time as Heidegger’s lectures on “The Essence of Truth.” (Rubini 252).  Like Heidegger’s 
work on Plato at the same time, Grassi’s early work demonstrates a radically different evaluation 
of Plato’s goals, purpose and method.  Whereas we might characterize Grassi’s later analysis of 
Platonic thought—which, according to Grassi, encompasses both Plato himself and the tradition 
which follows him—as a radical form of the dogmatic interpretation, his works in the 1930s 
seems to take an approach much closer to that of Gonzalez and the dialectical or dialogical 
approach: 
First of all, if the process of reminiscence has no beginning [given the immortality 
of the soul], truth is in no way beyond the process of investigation but, rather, 
coterminous with it.  What we call truth, that which manifests itself, is contained 
in the philosophical event, or better, it identifies with the same event.  Socratic 
aporia, the doubt, the questioning of reality, is not a [sic] just a way to somehow 
forge ahead toward a truth that stands like an object or conclusion beyond 
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investigation.  Rather, to every step of the process, to every successive 
questioning, corresponds a given manifestation.  In this sense to know, to see 
truth, is truly to remember. … Thus, to “remember truth” means to doubt: that is, 
to question reality and by so doing to discover new horizons when others [i.e., the 
Sophists] had prematurely established a conclusion by asking a question that was 
not far-reaching enough.  This is what philosophy is about. (qtd. in Rubini 255) 
 
 Thus, it appears that Grassi’s later characterization of Plato’s philosophy has more in 
common with his earlier critique of the sophists rather than Plato.  Indeed, we shall see that 
Grassi has struck upon a core element of what differentiates a genuine philosopher from a sophist 
for Plato—the denial that stagnant verbal formulations can capture the essence of truth.  Having 
shown broadly that Grassi’s negative appraisal of Plato was not his universal position, let us 
move on to looking at Plato himself to see further conjunction between the positon of these two 
thinkers. 
 Grassi’s great esteem for the poets, expressed throughout his various works on 
Renaissance Humanism, raises a question:  how can one claim a continuity of thought between 
Grassi and Plato when Plato possessed a well-known and foundational hatred of poetry.  After 
all, in the discussion of the Republic he drives the poets out of the city (595a).  Plato further 
establishes the idea of an “ancient quarrel” between poetry and philosophy (607b).  How can this 
be reconciled with Grassi’s own belief that rhetorical-poetic language is the foundation of 
philosophical thinking? 
 Our first task should be to somewhat clarify Grassi’s position.  Does Grassi believe that 
all poets and all poetry are wonderful and revelatory?  Do all poets thematize beings and thereby 
open up new worlds before our eyes?  We saw already that Heidegger held art in a particularly 
high esteem, but there were some forms of art that were excluded as being inherently 
metaphysical.  Does Grassi share this perspective?  The answer is a resounding yes.  He states in 
The Primordial Metaphor: 
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What is the difference between persuasion (peitho) and ecstasy (ekstasis)?  
Persuasion presupposes a logical truth, rationally provable, which, because of its 
structure, does not arouse our passions.  Its metaphorical, illustrative, figurative 
nature concerns only passionateness.  Its role in making the meaning of reality 
manifest is secondary; it is simply a ‘means’ to realize the rational truth already 
attained.  ‘Ecstatic’ language, instead, is that which, in its originality, 
underivedness, and groundlessness—characteristics due to the fact that it is 
‘inexplicable’—does not have a demonstrative, but an indicative character. (64) 
 
 This is more or less the division which Heidegger has made between metaphysical art 
which expresses a pre-existing framework of thought and those great works of art that open 
historical eras of thought or thematize beings as beings.  Since both Grassi and Heidegger are 
reluctant to extend their praise of poetry and art to every expression of those activities, we should 
therefore not hold Plato to a higher standard in that respect.  Plato expressing a negative critique 
of art at one point should not ipso facto exclude him as a rationalist.  Indeed, we shall see the 
importance emerge of Plato’s statement at Republic 595a:  “τὸ μηδαμῇ παραδέχεσθαι αὐτῆς ὅση 
μιμητική//In nowhere receiving however much of it is mimetic.”  Plato does not offer a blanket 
condemnation of art.  Plato, rather, offers a critique of precisely that form of art which is 
condemned by Heidegger. 
 Plato’s Ion provides a deeper perspective on Plato’s thoughts about poetry.  In this 
dialogue, Socrates encounters a rhapsode—a master of poetic (in this case, Homeric) recitation—
by the name of Ion.  Ion informs Socrates that he has won first prize in a competition of 
rhapsodes.  Ion claims that he is able to not only perform the works of Homer perfectly, but also 
give an exposition upon their contents.  This claim draws Socrates into a discussion about the 
rhapsode’s craft.  Socrates inquires as to whether Ion’s mastery is restricted to Homer alone or 
extends to other poets also.  At first, Ion states that he only has knowledge of Homer.  When 
confronted with the situations in which Homer and some other poets speak of the same topics, 
however, he professes that he would speak the same about both poets in such a circumstance.  
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Socrates in turn challenges Ion that the poets generally talk about the same thing, even if they 
speak differently of it.  However, if Ion is able to expound upon Homer, who is said to speak 
better on these shared topics, he should be able to pick out the bad speech among the other poets.  
However, Ion denies this claim, stating that he is completely ignorant of other poets. 
 In response, Socrates offers wholehearted agreement and an explanation: Ion is able to 
expound upon Homer alone because his rhapsodic abilities are not derived from knowledge of 
the topics that Homer treats, but rather from a manner of divine inspiration (533d).  Socrates then 
goes on to present an analogy of a magnetic stone able to move iron rings through a descending 
chain of power.  According to the analogy, the power of the Muses is equivalent to a magnet 
which passes its effects to sequential iron rings which stand for poets, rhapsodes, and finally 
audiences.  At first, Ion is amenable to this suggestion, but he retreats somewhat when Socrates 
suggests that such a person is out of his mind.  In response, Socrates leads Ion to agree that there 
are different specialties which each treat their own particular subject matter (charioteering, 
medicine, etc.).  Furthermore, in those instances in which Homer touches upon those subjects in 
his poems, it is the masters of those professions, and not the rhapsodes, who are most qualified to 
judge whether Homer speaks properly about those fields of expertise.  Ion still avers, eventually 
claiming to be a general in order to avoid saying he possesses no expertise at all.  Finally, 
Socrates confronts him: either Ion is wronging Socrates by having an expertise which he refuses 
to speak or he has no expertise and operates under divine inspiration.  Given this choice of 
options, Ion agrees to be called divine. 
 At first glance, it would be easy enough to take this dialogue as yet another assault on 
poetry.  In this reading, Plato would be offering the explanation of “divine inspiration” as a joke 
which makes fun of the foolishness of Ion while really showing that he simply lacks all expertise 
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whatsoever.  Indeed, this dialogue is often read in modern times precisely as a contribution to 
Plato’s anti-artistic assault (Büttner 112).   
Büttner, however, offers good reasons to reject this analysis.  He cites two major lines of 
argumentation that Socrates’s assertions of poetic inspiration are to be taken seriously: internal 
and external evidence (112-114).  The internal evidence refers to many occasions in the Platonic 
corpus in which inspiration is attributed to individuals as the source of their apparent abilities.24  
While Büttner offers numerous examples, he is aware that one could always challenge any one of 
these instances on the basis of it, too, being ironic.  He maintains, however, that in some 
instances the idea of inspiration seems so integral to the context, that it is difficult to imagine it 
being intended ironically.  I would add that multiple references to a particular type of inspiration, 
found in various circumstances, reinforces a claim to seriousness.  Likewise, when other types of 
inspiration are linked into that same context, it increases the probability of that type of 
inspiration also being taken seriously.  For instance, Socrates often speaks of daimonic 
inspiration as the basis for his philosophical career (Apology 33c), but the idea of the inspired 
philosopher also appears in the Phaedrus (244a.ff).  In the Phaedrus, however, poets are also 
included among the inspired individuals mentioned.  Since it is highly unlikely that the mention 
of inspired philosophers is meant to be ironic, it casts extreme doubt over whether the inspiration 
of the poets in the same passage should be considered ironic.  This is especially true given 
Plato’s own repeated suggestion elsewhere that some poets are under divine inspiration.25  
Beyond this internal evidence, the aforementioned external evidence centers on the fact that none 
of Plato’s immediate successors seemed to have any question about Plato having considered 
inspiration a legitimate element of poetic expression.  Indeed, Speusippus, Xenocrates, and 
                                                 
24 For example: Republic II.366c-d, Apology 33c, Laws VII.811c, Laws IV.719c-d. 
25 See Büttner, “Inspiration and Inspired Poets in Plato’s Dialogues” in Plato and the Poets for more examples. 
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Aristotle number among those who seem to have taken Plato’s statements about poetic 
inspiration in a non-ironic fashion (Büttner 112). 
More damaging to the claim that divine inspiration is intended in an ironic fashion, 
however, is that, if it is indeed spoken ironically, then Socrates himself has now come under fire.  
After all, as Gonzalez points out, Socrates speaks on all the various diverse topics of life about 
which the poet and rhapsode speak (2011: 98).  Surely Socrates, after lambasting Ion, could not 
turn around and say that he speaks on all these topics with the “philosopher’s techne.”  Indeed, 
Socrates, in the beginning of the Ion, denies possessing techne, saying he is envious for it (530b).  
Yet, Socrates presents Ion with a dilemma—either you possess technical mastery or you are 
divinely inspired and out of your mind, even though Socrates does not appear to consider himself 
to be out of his mind.  This raises the question of whether the choice offered to Ion constitutes a 
necessary dilemma.  Is there a form of divine inspiration which does not entail this same kind of 
blind madness? (Gonzalez 2011: 99).   
 Such a form of inspiration is precisely what Plato puts on display in the Phaedrus.  The 
Phaedrus depicts both the philosopher and the poet as participating in a form of divine madness.  
Indeed, this dialogue explicitly commends the poet who composes under the influence of divine 
inspiration over a person who would write according to techne, thereby directly supporting the 
praise of Ion in the former dialogue as largely straightforward rather than ironic (245a).  
However, at the same time, poetic inspiration is depicted as occupying a lower level than 
philosophical inspiration (248d).  Socrates describes philosophical inspiration thus: 
δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον συνιέναι κατʼ εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὸν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν 
λογισμῷ συναιρούμενον· τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις ἐκείνων ἅ ποτʼ εἶδεν ἡμῶν ἡ 
ψυχὴ συμπορευθεῖσα θεῷ καὶ ὑπεριδοῦσα ἃ νῦν εἶναί φαμεν, καὶ ἀνακύψασα εἰς 
τὸ ὂν ὄντως. διὸ δὴ δικαίως μόνη πτεροῦται ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου διάνοια· πρὸς γὰρ 




δὴ τοιούτοις ἀνὴρ ὑπομνήμασιν ὀρθῶς χρώμενος, τελέους ἀεὶ τελετὰς 
τελούμενος, τέλεος ὄντως μόνος γίγνεται·  

For man it is necessary to understand a conception, gathered together from many 
perceptions into one account, according to a form, and this is the recollection of 
those things which our soul, journeying with god, saw at that time and overlooked 
that which we now say exists and raised up to the beingfully being.  Therefore 
surely the reason of a philosopher alone justly grows wings, for, by memory, 
according to its power, it is always with those things with which god is divine.  
And now a man correctly using reminders for such things, always completing the 
complete initiations, alone becomes truly complete. (249b-c) 
 
 It is clear from this passage that, while philosophy relies on inspiration just as poetry 
does, it does not remain in the state of mindlessness attributed to poetic inspiration.  While the 
philosopher, like the poet, sees things with the divine, he does not remain simple in the state of a 
passive receptacle, as in the case of the mimetic action of the poets or, even more so, the 
rhapsodes, as exemplified by Ion.  Rather, the philosopher continually calls to recollection the 
divine things by the application and use of his reason.  Nowhere in this passage does Socrates 
suggest an action like that proposed by Grassi’s analysis of Platonic thought in which, by rational 
inference, one arrives at logically deduced concepts as first principles.  On the contrary, rational 
philosophical activity is tied up with recollection of something above and beyond itself.  
Philosophical dialectic is the medium in which truth comes forth. 
 The testimony of both the Ion and the Phaedrus indicate that, ultimately, the poet and 
rhapsode are lacking in technical mastery of the type found among doctors, charioteers and 
diviners.  Socrates and the philosopher are likewise lacking this kind of knowledge.  However, 
Socrates is also not the unknowing, passive receptacle of inspiration as the poet is.  Gonzalez 
puts it this way: 
Socrates does indeed turn out to be unlike Ion in possessing a techne, but one 
quite different form that in terms of which he judges Ion.  Socrates’ techne is 
given and inspired by something higher than itself; furthermore, it is a techne of 
loving and striving, rather than a techne of mastery.  Neither self-possessed expert 
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nor mad poet, the philosopher is a hybrid of the two.  Yet this is not to say that in 
the philosopher reason and inspiration are simply juxtaposed in an external 
fashion.  Rather, the kind of reasoning or expertise that characterizes the 
philosopher is intrinsically unlike that of the doctor or the mathematician in that it 
is the recollection of a reality that, while inspiring and motivating it, is yet not 
fully grasped or clearly seen by it.  Philosophy is a constant and irresolvable 
tension between reason and inspiration and thus between self-control and 
madness.  The philosopher must be open to divine inspiration while resisting the 
danger of becoming a passive mouthpiece of the god and thus losing himself and 
his own reason. (2011: 104-105) 
 
  In this context, we may return to Socrates’s envy at the opening of the Ion.  Why should 
Socrates be envious of Ion?  After all, have we not seen that the rhapsode ultimately possesses no 
expertise at all?  This is certainly the case, but an important and recurrent theme in the dialogue 
is Ion’s constant insistence, against all reason, that he does possess a techne.  This is particularly 
on display when Ion comically refuses to acknowledge that he is out of his mind in his 
performances.  Socrates proceeds to demonstrate, by calling upon a number of examples, that 
people with expertise could judge passages from Homer with greater technical mastery than Ion.  
Socrates then wishes Ion to explain which passages are most subject to the technical expertise of 
the rhapsode, if the rhapsode does indeed possess a techne.  Ion immediately responds “all of 
them,” despite having conceded, immediately prior, that technical experts are more suitable to 
judging Homeric passages regarding their own expertise than a rhapsode (539e).  Indeed, Ion’s 
absurd insistence that, as a rhapsode, he is also a master general is an example of his desperate 
need to assert his possession of techne.  Ultimately, it is only the dilemma of being either a bad 
man or divinely inspired that allows Ion to concede “πολὺ γὰρ κάλλιον τὸ θεῖον νομίζεσθαι//for 
it is more beautiful by much to be considered divine” (542b).  Even here Ion still believes that he 
possesses technical mastery, but he is willing to be considered “merely” divinely inspired 




 Furthermore, Ion is persistent not only in his absurd claims to technical mastery, but he is 
unabashedly broad in his claims regarding the scope of that mastery.  Despite the contrary being 
demonstrated, he claims to have superior technical mastery over all things discussed by Homer.  
Given Homer’s incredibly broad range of episodes, this claim is shown to amount essentially to 
mastery of all areas of knowledge.  If that claim were not astounding in its own right, it is only 
further compounded by the fact that Plato elsewhere clearly insists that this is not a peculiar 
belief of Ion.  It is the standard belief among the people that the poets are the great teachers of 
mankind precisely because they possess this kind of knowledge (Republic 598d-599a).  This is 
reflected in the Ion’s discussion of the chain of divine inspiration which ultimately, through the 
medium of the poet and the rhapsode, enthralls the audience as well. 
 The poets are not an isolated case in Plato’s dialogues, however.  Noburu Notomi has 
demonstrated a great deal of parallel between the depiction of the poets and that of the sophists.26  
Some major shared characteristics are (1) they are both mimetic, producing images of wisdom 
and techne (Republic 595a-b, Sophist 268c), (2) they both claim mastery over “all things” 
(Republic 596c-e, Sophist 233d-234c), but in fact their mimetic art only deals with a small part of 
the topics they treat, rather than the whole (Republic 598b), and (3) they are both actually in a 
state of ignorance (Republic 600e-601c, Sophist 233a-c).  As we shall see, these are key issues 
for Plato. 
The Meno is another important dialogue for understanding Plato’s thought.  Gonzalez 
shows that it has a central role in the development of Plato’s dialectic through the introduction 
and exposition of the method of hypothesis.  It becomes doubly important in the context of this 
study since we have seen that this dialogue served as the basis of Grassi’s own habilitation.  In 
                                                 
26 For a detailed account, see Noburu Notomi, “Image-Making in Republic X and the Sophist: Plato’s Criticism of 
the Poet and the Sophist” in Plato and the Poets. 
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the Meno, the eponymous character raises the question for Socrates of whether or not virtue can 
be taught.  Relevant here is what kind of man Meno is.  He is described explicitly as being 
acquainted with the wisdom of Gorgias.  That is, he is trained by sophists.  Given the sophists’ 
penchant for displays of verbal and definitional acumen, his reaction is therefore somewhat 
unsurprising when, in the dialogue, Socrates insists that he does not even know what virtue is 
and so cannot answer Meno’s question on whether or not it can be taught.  In response to 
Socrates pleading for an answer, Meno, true to his training, provides a number of examples and 
definitions.  However, Socrates objects.  None of these answers are what virtue is.  They are 
merely examples or definitions that fall short because they do not properly and adequately apply 
to all instances of virtue.  That is, Meno offers images of what virtue is and presents them as 
being virtue itself.  Most importantly, at the beginning of the dialogue, Meno is shocked that 
Socrates claims to not know what virtue is (71b-c) but, after they discuss the topic, ultimately 
admits: “καίτοι μυριάκις γε περὶ ἀρετῆς παμπόλλους λόγους εἴρηκα καὶ πρὸς πολλούς, καὶ πάνυ 
εὖ, ὥς γε ἐμαυτῷ ἐδόκουν· νῦν δὲ οὐδʼ ὅτι ἐστὶν τὸ παράπαν ἔχω εἰπεῖν//And yet a thousand 
times I have proclaimed very many words about virtue and for many people, and very good ones, 
as they seemed to me, but now I am not able altogether to say what it is” (80b).   
This is a flaw this is constantly on display among the students of sophists in the 
dialogues—they have been taught clever turns of phrase and argument and mistake it for true 
knowledge.  That is, their so-called knowledge turns out to be empty words without any 
understanding.  Heidegger calls such words “idle chatter” (Gerede) in Being and Time.  They are 
a received tradition which really offers no window onto the reality they describe.  They are 




mistake those images for technical mastery.  The images of the poets, therefore, become another 
form of idle chatter. 
This is an important point in considering Ernesto Grassi’s views of the Ion and its 
meaning.  Earlier in his career, Grassi defended the idea that Plato was presenting an authentic 
image of inspired poetry.  In his 1946 work Verteidigung des individuellen Lebens, Grassi was 
“intent on proving that the Humanists’ attention to poetic metaphysics is the elaboration of ideas 
already present in antiquity, in Plato’s Ion in particular” (Rubini 264).  Grassi argued that the 
vision of poetic inspiration in the Ion stood against modern subjectivism by suggesting that 
poetic expressions were not projections of the self, but were rather a passionate response to 
transcendence in immanence: “the poet elevates himself over the sensual world and, what is of 
the essence, something new is shown to him” (qtd. in Rubini 265).  Grassi, however, does not 
seem to have conceived the negative consequences of divine inspiration, in its poetic form, as 
expressed in Plato’s dialogues, an issue to which I shall return at the conclusion of this chapter. 
 In contrast to the naïve poets, Plato does not confuse knowledge about something with 
knowledge of the thing itself.  Even in the Meno and the Republic, in which he introduces the 
hypothetical method, he is quite clear that the method “draws logical connections between 
different properties of a thing without any attempt to transcend these properties in an 
understanding of what the thing itself is” (Gonzalez 1998: 175).  What makes these claims 
hypothetical is that the terms which are used to describe them are not understood; they are vague 
and ambiguous and thus subject to refutation.  Even if they are believed to be true, they are not, 
in fact, understood.  For instance, if one were to make the claim that “virtue is good,” this claim  
might be held as quite true; however, we cannot truly have understanding (episteme) of the claim 
without understanding what virtue is and what good is. 
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 The obvious objection to this hypothetical method is that Socrates has already told Meno 
in the dialogue that he cannot speak about a thing (for instance, whether virtue is teachable) 
without knowing what the thing is.  When he introduces the hypothetical method he seems to be 
doing precisely this.  On this basis it is no surprise that the Meno features prominently the theory 
of recollection, as this theory, for Plato, suggests that we already possess a pre-reflective, 
intuitive grasp of the meanings of terms, an insight which has not been scientifically derived.  
Thus, according to Plato, we do know what the things we speak about are, but our knowledge of 
them is indistinct.  We do not see them clearly as they truly are, but rather, we see them cloaked 
in doxa, belief rather than understanding.  Gonzalez states: 
Before this knowledge is recollected to the point of becoming explicit, it remains 
implicit in our ordinary use of the word “virtue.”  This knowledge implicit in our 
everyday discourse can be likened to a kind of inspiration.  We have a sense of 
what we are talking about when we claim that virtue is good, and we also have a 
sense that this claim is true; we cannot, however, explain where this “sense” 
comes from.  We thus normally rely on this kind of inspiration to guide our words 
and actions.  The method of hypothesis too, as a method that avoids raising the 
What-is-x? question, needs to be grounded on nothing more than this kind of 
inspiration. (1998: 176). 
 
 As we saw in our earlier treatment of Plato’s Seventh Letter, the method of hypothesis 
itself never leads, by deduction, back to an non-hypothetical first principle as a discursive 
concept, but rather through the dialectical process of refutation itself, in undermining the 
hypotheses and definitions via exposing their limitations and ambiguities, manifests to those 
engaged in it ever greater insights into what the thing under discussion is, rather than how it is 
qualified. 
 This train of thought in Plato reaches its culmination in the Cratylus and the Republic where 
Socrates overturns the primacy of mimesis in conferring truth.  He had previously described the 
artisan and the artist as being, respectively, one and two steps removed from the truth, with the 
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artisan creating artifacts based on the forms and poets creating images based on the world.  
Regardless of whether or not the idea of divine inspiration for the poet should overthrow this 
particular hierarchy, there remains little doubt that the divinely inspired poet is still entirely 
mimetic.  He produces a semblance in words of simply what he receives and no more.  While there 
is certainly truth in such an expression, it does not truly thematize beings in the way Heidegger’s 
great artwork should because the expression of the artist simply becomes part of a background of 
inauthenticity which has not been appropriated for oneself.  In this context, Socrates introduces 
the fact that it is the user and not the maker who has deeper understanding.  In the Cratylus the 
user is directly identified with the dialectician (390c).  Whereas an etymologist might objectify 
words as a conventional group of sounds, it is the dialectician who, in entering into the use of those 
words in discourse, allows their true meaning to become manifest and thematized (Gonzalez 1998: 
89).   
Likewise, in the Republic, book X, Socrates devotes a lengthy discourse to the priority of 
the user’s knowledge (601c-602c).  I shall offer two brief excerpts from the passage to illustrate 
the point:  “πολλὴ ἄρα ἀνάγκη τὸν χρώμενον ἑκάστῳ ἐμπειρότατόν τε εἶναι καὶ ἄγγελον γίγνεσθαι 
τῷ ποιητῇ οἷα ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ ποιεῖ ἐν τῇ χρείᾳ ᾧ χρῆται//Therefore it is very necessary that the user 
for each thing is the most experienced, and he becomes a messenger to the maker on which things 
he makes are good or bad in the use for which they are used” (601d).  These statements lead 
directly into an assault on the act of mimesis which culminates in a direct assault on the knowledge 
of the poet.  Indeed, this passage from the Republic shows exactly the same reality reflected in the 
Ion and Phaedrus—the poet has no knowledge of that which he imitates: “ὁ δὲ μιμητὴς πότερον 
ἐκ τοῦ χρῆσθαι ἐπιστήμην ἕξει περὶ ὧν ἂν γράφῃ, εἴτε καλὰ καὶ ὀρθὰ εἴτε μή, ἢ δόξαν ὀρθὴν διὰ 
τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης συνεῖναι τῷ εἰδότι καὶ ἐπιτάττεσθαι οἷα χρὴ γράφειν; -- οὐδέτερα.//And does the 
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imitator have understanding, from having used them, about that which he writes, whether they are 
fine and correct or not, or correct belief through interaction, from necessity, with the one who 
knows and being told how it is necessary to write? – Neither” (602a). 
I now wish to return to the issue of Grassi’s positive evaluation of Plato’s stance towards 
poetry as recorded in the 1940s.  While Grassi successfully identified that Plato did indeed 
attribute a straightforward encounter with transcendence to the poets, he perhaps pushed the 
interpretation too far by suggesting that Plato’s depiction of the poets allows them to open up and 
thematize a world of intelligibility.  Indeed, in Plato’s account, the poet does not actually open 
up new worlds at all precisely because of this failure to recognize the true essence of poetry.  
Grassi should have taken into account that it was not the poets (as such) who possessed a poetic 
metaphysics, but rather the Humanists.  Indeed, for Grassi, as has been shown in the preceding 
chapter, the distinguishing characteristic of the Humanist movement is its self-conscious 
awareness of the role of philology, poetry and language in philosophy.  It is not merely that they 
wrote poetry, for we have already seen that Grassi envisions types of poetry that do not possess 
ecstatic power.  It is that, in composing poetry, the Humanists engage it as a philosophical, 
revelatory enterprise.  Thus, rather than becoming a manifestation of metaphysical or persuasive 
art, Humanist poetic enterprises maintain the dynamic between “earth” and “world” that allows 
the world to be encountered anew as a holy place.   
In Plato’s text it is the philosopher who takes on this role.  This chapter has demonstrated 
that Plato’s conception of the philosopher is a far cry from the rationalist and subjectivist 
philosophers following Descartes.  Rather, Plato envisions the philosopher as the supreme form 
of poet, who encounters the transcendent and then struggles and wrestles with it to bring forth a 
glimpse into the nature of being as given by the Good that surpasses being.  In doing so, he 
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moves beyond the uncritical shared conceptions of a people, expressed in ordinary language 
(sensus communis in Grassi, doxa in Plato) to an insight of being as given.  The philosopher is 
not a subjectivist for, indeed, Plato’s account of his nature is in direct response to a proto-
subjectivist and relativistic revolution in Greece bred from the work of the sophists for whom, as 
Protagoras said, “man is the measure of all things” (Pickstock 3).  The philosopher does not 
possess a mastery of reality by logical force—those who think they do are, indeed, sophists—but 
rather he possesses an insight into being and truth through language and within the historical 
circumstances in which he finds himself.  It is fitting, therefore, to refer to Plato as a Humanist, 
for in him is found the same insights into language and historicity, as well as the encounter of the 





















Neoplatonism Against Metaphysics 
 
 The last chapter demonstrated that Plato’s own philosophical positions do not commit 
him to the broad, rationalistic and onto-theological account criticized in the later writings of 
Heidegger and Grassi.  Instead, Plato himself had very many of the same concerns as the 
Renaissance Humanists.  However, this does little to resolve the general conflict between Grassi 
and Platonism.  Although Grassi associated the traits of so-called Platonism with Plato himself, 
presumably following Heidegger’s own later anti-Platonism, his main critique pertains to the 
inherited tradition and not primarily to Plato.  Indeed, a number of scholars in the modern 
Continental tradition have made attempts to separate Plato from the tradition precisely for the 
sake of liberating the founder of Western philosophy from these critiques.  Even advocates of 
Plato, however, are faced with what appears to be a considerably more difficult challenge when it 
comes to liberating the Neoplatonists.  After all, are not these later Platonists the epitome of 
metaphysical decadence with their ever expanding, intricate ontological systems?  Are these not 
precisely the kinds of philosophers who believe that they can give a rationalistic, atemporal 
account of the nature of reality, thereby eviscerating any concept of historical perspective and 
fundamentally cutting off the question of the givenness of being and truth within a closed system 
of rationality?  In order to begin answering these questions, I shall first briefly touch upon the 
history of the development of Platonic thought as well as describe what is generally taken to the 
standard account of the overall structure of Neoplatonic thought. 
 Following the death of Plato, the interpretation of his work passed through a number of 
stages, including an extended period of skepticism as well as a period of somewhat naïve 
dogmatism, based on interactions with the Stoics, during the period of Middle Platonism.  
However, I shall focus henceforth on those individuals largely subject to the form of Platonic 
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interpretation generally called by scholars “Neoplatonism.”  The reason for this selection is 
twofold.  First, earlier models of Platonic interpretation collapsed as independent narratives and 
those elements of their thought which were considered the most philosophically significant and 
convincing were incorporated into and unified by the Neoplatonists (Remes 4-5).  Therefore, 
Neoplatonism is the best attested and most fecund ground for delving into the complexity of 
Platonic thought after Plato.  Second, and perhaps more importantly, Neoplatonism arose and 
climbed to dominance among philosophical schools in the waning days of antiquity.  This made 
the school contemporaneous with the ascendency of Christianity.  As a result of a number of 
factors, Neoplatonism exerted a strong influence on the subsequent philosophical formulations of 
Christianity and thus secured for itself an enduring role from antiquity to the present.27  Most 
importantly, Neoplatonism is the form of Platonism which is at the forefront of Grassi’s mind in 
his critiques. 
 Neoplatonism itself is a distinctive interpretation of the Platonic tradition which arose in 
the third century CE out of the previous Middle Platonic tradition28 while also drawing on many 
other sources from other schools of ancient philosophy.  The founding figure of the movement is 
generally regarded to be the philosopher Plotinus, although Plotinus himself attributed his 
teachings to his master Ammonius Saccas, who left no written texts.  Plotinus was born in Egypt 
and began his philosophical training in Alexandria.  He eventually joined the military campaign 
of Emperor Gordian III against Persia in hopes of thereby gaining access to Persian and Indian 
philosophers.  When the campaign resulted in failure, Plotinus relocated to the capital city of 
Rome and established a circle of philosophy students (Remes 19).  Aside from Plato, Plotinus 
                                                 
27 For more information on the early union between Neoplatonism and fledgling Christian philosophy see George 
Karamanolis. 2013.  The Philosophy of Early Christianity. Durham: Acumen. 
28 See John Dillion, The Middle Platonists: A Study of Platonism, 80 B.C. to A.D. 220 for a comprehensive analysis 
of this period of Platonic interpretation. 
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has the distinction of being the only other philosopher of antiquity whose entire corpus of 
writings survives, edited and arranged by his student Porphyry into a massive work known as the 
Enneads.  Unfortunately for commentators, Harris points out that “the Enneads probably 
deserves to be called the world’s worst written book” because it presumes the reader to have 
comprehensive philosophical knowledge—of even Plotinus’s own thought—at every step (2).  
This effect most likely originates from the fact that the book seems to have arisen out of the 
context of living philosophical discourse in Plotinus’s academy. 
 The standard account of Plotinus’s thought is usually focused on the idea of a descending 
hierarchy of metaphysical principles marked by ever increasing levels of multiplicity.  In 
particular, this is grounded in Plotinus’s treatise on what his editor Porphyry termed the “three 
primary hypostases.”  The first of these is the single unifying principle of all reality—the One—
which was held to be beyond being, predication and thought and was the possibility for the 
existence of all things (Remes 7).  According to Gerson’s account, the One contains all reality 
“virtually” or “indistinctly” within itself (1994: 32-33).   
Emanating from this first principle is the Nous.  The Nous constitutes the entire 
intelligible structure of reality within a self-thinking intellect.  This could crudely be described as 
a combination of the Aristotelian notion of self-thinking intellect combined with Plato’s theory 
regarding intelligible forms.  In this manner, the Nous reflects ultimate reality in the structure of 
a one-many, insofar as it contains all intelligible within a single strucutre.  The Neoplatonists 
would distinguish this, therefore, as a one-many as opposed to the absolute unity of the One.  
The Nous is the first realm of being and the first realm attainable to thought, although such 
thought is distinct from normal thinking insofar as it is non-discursive and immediate (Remes 7-
8).  As the Nous came forth from the One, so the third hypostasis Psyche comes forth from the 
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Nous.  Here we find motion, time and discursivity (Wallis 53).  Following upon the Psyche is the 
material world in all its divisibility.  Ultimately, all things strive for a reversion back to the Nous 
and the One (Remes 8-9). 
For all the Neoplatonists, it is important to note that philosophy is never merely an 
abstract system of reasoning.  Rather, their philosophical endeavors are intimately tied to their 
pursuit of a certain way of life and a quest for mystical enlightenment (Wallis 85).  In light of the 
critiques of Heidegger and Grassi, it will be necessary to examine what precisely is the meaning 
of this “mystical enlightenment.”  After all, on the basis of this standard model, it seems quite 
easy to assume that the form of mysticism implied here is a flight from beings into the bossom of 
some supernatural higher being.  This, indeed, is precisely what Grassi envisions when he 
describes the Platonic type of philosophy in Heidegger and the Question of Renaissance 
Humanism: 
The first conception of philosophy, the one that Heidegger defines as the 
“metaphysics of beings,” asks only about the relationships between beings and 
grants supremacy to the search for truth.  This form of thought is determined for 
Heidegger by the forgetfulness of Being.  The truth that the metaphysics of things 
claims to possess holds forever and everywhere.  Hence, the only language which 
such a metaphysics can recognize is rational in nature, and, conversely, poetic 
language cannot have any scientific character in this view. (91-92) 
 
 We have seen in the previous chapter that, with regards to Plato himself, this criticism 
ultimately fell short.  Now it is time to see whether the Neoplatonists have likewise avoided the 
pitfall, or if, ultimately, there is good reason for the Heideggerian critique.  The following 
analysis will focus on the writings of Plotinus as the most influential author among the classical 
Neoplatonists.29 
                                                 
29 Later Neoplatonists, particularly Proclus, also contributed a great number of insights to the later Platonic tradition; 
however, in their core characteristics they share the same basic models as Plotinus and as such he is taken as 
representative.  However, see p. 157-158 for additional, relevant Proclean theories. 
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 The first question to examine is whether Plotinus possesses an awareness of the 
ontological difference.  If Plotinus is aware of this divide, the idea that he is locked in a concern 
for logically deducible truth will take an immediate blow, since Being or Ereignis is precisely 
that which gives truth and being.  The place to begin this inquiry is to examine the most exotic of 
Plotinus’s principles—the One.  Immediately we are confronted with the absolute limitation of 
any discourse about the One.  Referring to the One, Plotinus writes: 
ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ αἴτιον λέγειν οὐ κατηγορεῖν ἐστι συμβεβηκός τι αὐτῷ, ἀλλʹ ἡμῖν, ὅτι 
ἔχομέν τι παρʹ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου ὄντος ἐν αὑτῷ· δεῖ δὲ μηδὲ τὸ "ἐκείνου" μηδὲ 
"ὄντος" λέγειν ἀκριβῶς λέγοντα, ἀλλʹ ἡμᾶς οἷον ἔξωθεν περιθέοντας τὰ αὑτῶν 
ἑρμηνεύειν ἐθέλειν πάθη ὁτὲ μὲν ἐγγύς, ὁτὲ δὲ ἀποπίπτοντας ταῖς περὶ αὐτὸ 
ἀπορίαις. 
 
For to say that it is the cause is not to predicate something incidental of it but of 
us, because we have something from it while that One is in itself; but one who 
speaks precisely should not say “that” or “is”; but we run round it outside, in a 
way, and want to explain our experiences of it, sometimes near it and sometimes 
falling away in our perplexities about it. (VI.9.3.49-55)30 
 
 There may be a temptation to read this passage as though the One were to be taken as an 
ineffable object in itself, since Plotinus does say “ἐκείνου ὄντος ἐν αὑτῷ//that One being in 
itself.”  This, however, would be a grave error, an error which Plotinus explicitly enjoins his 
reader to avoid by immediately following it with a denial of both “this” and “being” as accurate 
statements regarding the One.  Indeed, the purpose of the passage is specifically to emphasize the 
inherent otherness of the One from being.  In this respect, I argue that John Deck is correct in 
maintaining that statements relating to the ineffability of the One ought to be regarded “as 
Plotinus [sic] most profound doctrine of the One” and “absolutely definitive” (1982: 35).  After 
all, if the only way we are able to gain information about Plotinus’s conception of the One stems 
from Plotinus’s words about it, we should afford a priority to a statement about statements about 
                                                 
30 Armstrong’s translation is used throughout, sometimes with my own personal alterations. 
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the One as the hermeneutical key to understanding all statements about the topic.  Indeed, even 
when Plotinus states that, rather than speaking of the One directly, we “run around it outside” he 
must qualify it with οἷον//as it were, as if.  This qualification is necessary for the simple reason 
that the One is not truly an “it,” there is not really an “outside” nor “inside” of the One.  Plotinus 
elsewhere affirms that The One is no-thing; even the otherness of being beyond being does not 
constitute a separate nature for it31: 
τὸ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι λαβεῖν ὡς τόδε· ἤδη γὰρ οὐκ ἀρχή, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο μόνον, ὃ τόδε 
εἴρηκας εἶναι.  εἰ οὖν τὰ πάντα ἐν τῷ γεγομένῳ, τί τῶν ἐν τούτῳ ἐκεῖνο ἐρεῖς; 
οὐδὲν δὲ τούτων ὂν μόνον ἂν λέγοιτο ἐπέκεινα τούτων.  ταῦτα δὲ τὰ ὄντα καὶ τὸ 
ὄν·  ἐπέκεινα ἄρα ὄντος.  τὸ γὰρ ἐπέκεινα ὄντος οὐ τόδε λέγει -- οὐ γὰρ τίθησιν -- 
οὐδὲ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ λέγει, ἀλλὰ φέρει μόνον τὸ οὐ τοῦτο.  τοῦτο δὲ ποιοῦν 
οὐδαμοῦ αὐτὸ περιλαμβάνει·  γελοῖον γὰρ ζητεῖν ἐκείνην τὴν ἄπλετον φύσιν 
περιλαμβάνειν. 
 
[I]t is impossible to apprehend the One as a particular thing: for then it would not 
be the principle, but only that particular thing which you said it was.  But if all 
things are in that which is generated [from the One], which of the things in it are 
you going to say that the One is?  Since it is none of them, it can only be said to 
be beyond them.  But these things are beings, and being: so it is “beyond being.”  
This phrase “beyond being” does not mean that it is a particular thing—for it 
makes no positive statement about it—and it does not say its name, but all it 
implies is that it is “not this.”  But if this is what the phrase does, it in no way 
comprehends the One: it would be absurd to seek to comprehend that boundless 
nature… (V.5.6.7-16) 
 
 This language is all too familiar.  It represents the same reality which Heidegger 
identified with das Nichts and Ab-grund.  Heidegger’s “earth”—another name for the same 
concept—was the concealed source of unconcealment.  It is that which is beyond being, which 
gives forth the appearance of intelligibility.  This, likewise, appears to be the sense in which the 
One is described, obliquely, as “cause.”  Plotinus says, “All beings are beings by the One, both 
                                                 
31 This view of the One makes language regarding it exceedingly difficult.  At times, due to the limitations of 
language, it must be asserted that the One possesses no otherness.  By this assertion is meant that the One is not a 
being distinct (i.e. other) from other beings.  However, this very fact does make the One utterly distinct and 
inherently other than the being of beings as a whole.  When otherness or distinction is attributed to the One, it is 
intended in this sense.    
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those which are primarily beings and those which are in any sense said to be among beings” 
(VI.9.1-2).  It is important to note that, for Plotinus, causality does not generally have the sense 
of production and still less so when it is indicated of the One.  Rather, as Costa says: “Plotinus 
emphasizes the difference between eidetic and efficient causality…. Plotinus contrasts the 
production of effects by means of an activity with the causality of the principles which act only 
through the immutability of their nature” (361).  That is, the certain sense in which being can 
relate to the One as cause is not by means of efficient, productive causality, but rather as a result 
of the One becoming manifest from itself in being, while still remaining entirely other than 
being.  Plotinus’s evaluation of the One, indicates that he has thought beyond the structures of 
onto-theology. 
 At the opposite end of the Neoplatonic spectrum lies what Plotinus says about the 
sensible cosmos.  It should be recalled at this point that Grassi posited, as a central difference 
between the thought of the Humanists and the Platonists, the relationship between res and verba.  
He argued that the Platonists claimed that logically established essences of objects held priority 
for which it was the duty of language to offer a description.  We saw in the last chapter that Plato 
himself did not, in fact, hold this position, with truth being manifested through ordinary language 
and interrogated through the user’s art of dialectic, rather than firmly established atemporally.  
Let us now turn to see whether Plotinus adopts an essentialist framework towards beings. 
 Plotinus, in fact, argues quite forcefully against a certain understanding of essentialism in 
the sixth Ennead.  Gerson uses the image from Aristotle’s theory of cognition to illustrate what 
he takes to be Plotinus’s view of the relationship between form and sensible particular—
synonymy in nature and homonymy in being: 
According to Aristotle’s account, knowledge is the identification of knower with 
the form of a knowable object.  The form in the intellect is synonymous with the 
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form in that which is known, but cognitive being is homonymous with the being 
of the knowable.  The concept of humanity is not a man.  That is what homonymy 
indicates.  But the form of humanity in the intellect really is that form.  It is not an 
approximation or arbitrary symbol of it.  That is what synonymy indicates.  The 
real and the cognitional are ordered as prior to posterior.  Plotinus’ point is that the 
Form of Man is related to the individual man analogous [sic] to the way the 
individual man is related to the form of man in intellect. (2002: 64). 
 
 Plotinus is thereby arguing for the paradigmatic nature of the relationship which obtains 
between the form and the sensible particulars.  Gerson notes “once homonymy is combined with 
synonymy, one is not obliged to say either that the Form of Man is a man or that Socrates is not a 
man because the essence of man is separate from him.  He participates in the essence and so he is 
a man, but he is not identical with the essence.”  However, Gerson frames this strongly in terms 
of the “separation” of the Forms and therefore as a relationship between an object and a copy of 
that object (2002: 64-65).  While there is some truth to this analogy, I shall argue that it can 
generate a false impression of the relationship between the intelligible and sensible realms in 
Plotinian thinking.  In particular, it can give the impression of a two world dualism as is often 
ascribed to Plato; however, we shall see that this is ultimately an inadequate way to formulate the 
Plotinian view of reality, just as it was shown to be inadequate in the case of Plato himself.   
However, first let us examine the further implications of the Plotinian position regarding 
the relationship between form and instantiation.  Because Plotinus has “separated” the Form 
from the particular instantiation, the qualified identity based on act and potency proposed by 
Aristotle which allows him to argue that sensible particulars are essentially their form, though 
they are not identical to that form as a result of material potency (i.e. Socrates is essentially a 
man, though what it means to be a man and the man Socrates are not identical), is no longer  
present.  As such, sensible particulars are no longer to be identified with their Forms.  This has 
the effect of destroying the pretense of essentialism: 
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ἀλλὰ ἀρά γε ἡ αἰσθητὴ οὐσία συμφόρησίς τις ποιοτήτων καὶ ὕλης, καὶ ὁμοῦ μὲν 
πάντα ταῦτα συμπαγέντα ἐπὶ ὕλης μιᾶς οὐσία, χωρὶς δὲ ἕκαστον λαμβανόμενον τὸ 
μὲν ποιόν, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἔσται, ἢ ποιὰ πολλά;... καὶ οὐ δυσχεραντέον, εἰ τὴν οὐσίαν 
τὴν αἰσθητὴν ἐξ οὐκ οὐσιῶν ποιοῦμεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ ὅλον ἀληθὴς οὐσία, ἀλλὰ 
μιμούμενον τὴν ἀληθῆ 
 
But then, is sensible substance a conglomeration of qualities and matter, and are 
all these compounded together on one matter substance, but when each is taken 
separately will one be quale and one a quantum, or will they be many qualia?... 
And there is no need to object if we make sensible substance out of non-
substances; for even the whole is not true substance but imitates [mimoumenon] 
the true substance (Enneads VI.3.8.19-23, 31-33) 
 
 Here we see that Plotinus has replaced the essentialist model with a model based on 
sensible things as composed of a nexus of instantiated forms and matter, none of which are 
considered to be “essential.”  This anti-essentialist impulse in Plotinus will have consequences 
for the status of discursive thought and its ability to offer what Grassi would consider the 
quintessential Platonic “rational concept” of beings.  In particular, it leads quite naturally to the 
collapse of the distinction between essential and accidental properties since now all properties 
have been rendered properly accidental (Rappe 2000: 39).  Undermining this relationship, of 
course, has a significant effect on the place of logic and discursive reasoning in Plotinus.  How 
does one provide necessary definitions related to beings if those beings fundamentally lack static 
essences?   
In fact, the ability of our discursive reason to offer comprehensive explanations of the 
sensible world of our everyday experience is precisely what is under attack by Plotinus.  
Interestingly, Plotinus does not refrain from the use of discursive reasoning, generally, to offer 
explanations of the world; however, he does suggest, due to the collapse of the distinction 
between essences and accidents, that the explanatory power of our discursive statements are 
destabilized.  Sara Rappe has treated this extensively in her work on what she terms Plotinus’s 
assertion of “coordinate arising.”  She describes it thus: 
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This doctrine presents a two-fold analysis of the phenomenal world, both parts of 
which are intended to break up any belief in an independently real or self-
subsistent eternal world.  The first theme is a description of the world as an 
interdependent nexus of beings.  Under this description, the familiar Stoic idea of 
cosmic harmony receives a more profound philosophical interpretation as a 
system of relationships which can be described as mutually reflective points of 
view.  The second theme treats the multiplicity of individuals more on the analogy 
of thoughts arising in the mind, each expressing the nature of the thinker who has 
them. (2002: 74) 
 
 The first part of coordinate arising is an extrapolation of an issue which we have already 
encountered.  The fact that Plotinus rejects Aristotelian substance theory as it applies to 
individuals means that what does constitute an individual is entirely relational.  This relationality 
can then, “from a certain point of view,” be represented in a variety of ways, rather than based on 
a strict, authoritative teleology (Rappe 2002: 74).  This is precisely why Plotinus says: 
ὅτι ἐχεις μὲν σὺ αἰτίαν εἰπεῖν διʹ ἣν ἐν μέσῳ ἡ γῆ καὶ διὰ τί στρογγύλη καὶ ὁ 
λοξὸς διότι ὡδί· ἐκεῖ δὲ σὔ, διότι οὕτως ἑχρῆν, διά τοῦτο οὕτω βεβούλευται, ἀλλʹ 
ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει ὡς ἔστι, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ταῦτα ἔχει καλῶς·  οἷον εἰ πρὸ τοῦ 
συλλογισμοῦ τῆς αἰτίας τὸ συμπέρασμα, οὐ παρὰ τῶν προτάσεων· οὐ γὰρ ἐξ 
ἀκολουθίας οὐδʹ ἐξ ἐπινοὶας, ἀλλὰ πρὸ ἀκολουθίας καὶ πρὸ ἐπινοίας· ὕστερα γὰρ 
πάντα ταῦτα, καὶ λόγος καὶ ἀπόδειξις καὶ πίστις. 
 
[Y]ou can explain the reason why the earth is in the middle, and round, and why 
the ecliptic slants as it does; but it is not because you can do this that things are so 
there; they were not planned like this because it was necessary for them to be like 
this, but because things There are disposed as they are, the things here are 
beautifully disposed: as if the conclusion was there before the syllogism which 
showed the cause, and did not follow from the premises; [the world-order] is not 
the result of following out a train of logical consequences and purposive thought: 
it is before consequential and purposive thinking; for all this comes later, 
reasoning and demonstration and the confidence [produced by them]. (V.8.7.37-
44) 
 
 Fundamentally, we are seeing a Plotinian reiteration of something which was already 
present in Plato’s account.  Our discursive analysis of reality describes how things are qualified 
rather than what they are.  In Plato, therefore, the method of hypothesis may report statements 
about reality, but they are conditioned by the inherent instability and ambiguity of discursive 
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analysis and therefore always subject to deconstruction.  At no point through such hypotheses 
can one deduce or infer the Being of the beings under discussion.    
The Neoplatonic view of causality centers upon an eidetic view in which effects are the 
result of the presence of the cause in the effect.  That is, the effects are manifestations of the 
causes, rather than an Aristotelian teleological or efficient approach to causality.  Since Plotinus 
views sensible particulars as failing to be substances in a true sense, they lack “horizontal 
causality.”  Thus, all usage of Aristotelian logic to explain causal relations among sensible 
particulars is not a statement of reality, but only a qualified reality (Rappe 2002: 76). 
 Now, let us return to the issue introduced by Gerson’s separation of intelligible reality 
from sensible reality in the manner of a copy to an original.  This kind of speech certainly has a 
long Platonic pedigree.  Indeed, it stretches all the way back to Plato’s descriptions of mimesis in 
the Republic.  Indeed, Plotinus uses this exact term “mimoumenon” to describe the way in which 
sensible particulars are not true substances but “imitate” true substances.  In this case the true 
substances being referred to are the intelligible Forms.  Have we then arrived at an onto-
theological conception of being in Plotinus, after all?  While Plotinus’s conception of sensibles 
clearly denies any form of essentialism, it seems to hang ultimately upon a higher form of 
essentialism of which beings are merely a copy or imitation. 
 In our analysis of the cave analogy, however, Plato’s intention was not to represent the 
Forms as separated substances of which sensible reality was merely a pale imitation.  Rather, the 
shadows on the wall of the cave were taken as true beings, but lost in everydayness and 
inauthenticity.  In that case, the objects which cast the shadows on the cave wall were not 
separated realities existing in and for themselves, but rather took on the characterization of the 
historically conditioned metaphysical paradigms through which beings become manifest, the 
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Being of beings.  The shadows on the cave wall stood for the things themselves, but seen in a 
confused and hazy manner.   
However, does this same principle apply to Plotinus or has he allowed himself to be 
consumed by metaphysical impulses?  Plotinus, in this respect, turns out to be a true and faithful 
disciple of his master.  He writes: “ὣστε εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις ταύτας ἀμυδράς νοήσεις, τὰς δὲ ἐκεῖ 
νοήσεις ἐναργεῖς αἰσθήσεις//so that these perceptions here are dim intellections, but the 
intellections there are clear perceptions” (VI.7.30-32).  This shows that the apprehension of the 
particulars is the intellection of the Forms, though in an unclear mode.  Even more importantly, 
intellection is said to be the clarity of sense perceptions.  This means seeing beings in their 
Being.  As a result of Plotinus’s conception of eidetic causality, the Intellect is manifest in the 
particular; it is the particular world seen clearly.  This should allow us to shed the conception of a 
duality in Plotinus’s thought, but still perhaps does not allow us to shed the specter of 
metaphysics completely, for perhaps we could imagine that when beings are understood 
according to their being, these results could be produced in the form of objectified facts.  After 
all, is something like this not implied by the comparison which Plotinus makes to Egyptian 
hieroglyphs: 
οὐ τοίνυν δεῖ νομίζειν ἐκεῖ ἀξιώματα ὁρᾶν τοὺς θεοὺς οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐκεῖ 
ὑπερευδαίμονας, ἀλλ' ἕκαστα τῶν λεγομένον ἐκεῖ καλὰ ἀγάλματα... Δοκοῦσι δέ 
μοι καὶ οἱ Αἰγυπτίων σοφοί, εἴτε ἀκριβεῖ ἐπισήμῃ λαβόντες εἴτε καὶ συμφύτῳ, 
περὶ ὧν ἐβούλοντο διὰ σοφίας δεικνύναι, μὴ τύποις γραμμάτων διεξοδεύουσι 
λόγους καὶ προτάσεις μηδὲ μιμουμένοις φωνὰς καὶ προφορὰς ἀξιωμάτων 
κεχρῆσθαι, ἀγάλματα δὲ γράψαντες καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον ἑκάστου πράγματος ἄγαλμα 
ἐντυπώσαντες ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς τὴν ἐκείνου <οὐ> διέξοδον ἐμφῆναι, ὡς ἄρα τις καὶ 
ἐιστήμη καὶ σοφία ἕκαστον ἐστιν ἄγαλμα καὶ ὑποκείμενον καὶ ἀθρόον καὶ οὐ 
διανόησις οὐδὲ βούλευσις. 
 
One must not then suppose that the gods or the “exceedingly blessed spectators” 
in the higher world contemplate propositions, but all the Forms we speak about 
are beautiful images in that world…. The wise men of Egypt, I think, also 
understood this, either by scientific or innate knowledge, and when they wished to 
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signify something wisely, did not use the forms of letters which follow the order 
of words and propositions and imitate sounds and the enunciations of 
philosophical statements, but by drawing images and inscribing in their temples 
one particular image of each particular thing, they manifested the non-
discursiveness of the intelligible world, that is, that every image is a kind of 
understanding and wisdom and is a subject of statements, all together in one, and 
not discourse or deliberation. (V.8.5.20-23, 6.1-9) 
 
 Does this passage not present intelligible knowledge as a form of static representation?  
Certainly it is different than the normal knowledge of discursive thought, but yet it seems present 
at hand and available for perfect cognition.  Certainly this must be a metaphysics of presence.  
The Form is a static image which language, as a tool, attempts to grasp, even though its attempts 
are individually insufficient.  It must certainly have been this model which Grassi had in mind 
when he complained that in Plato’s metaphysics, here extended to Plotinus, “the totality of 
beings and all the contents of thought (hence of all beings), form a well-ordered system” (1983: 
79).  After all, does not Plotinus himself state,  “intelligible realities are originated in so far as 
they have a beginning, but unoriginated because they have not a beginning in time; they always 
proceed from something else, not as always coming into being, like the universe, but as always 
existing” (II.4.5.24-28), and many other things like it?  This would seem to indicate the static, 
unchanging nature of the intelligible sphere for Plotinus. 
 However, this may not be as clear as it seems at first.  As Smith has pointed out, there are 
also references to “before” and “after” in the Intellect (Smith 211).  Armstrong has pointed out 
that there are passages “which seem to attribute process, change and history to Intellect” (1971: 
71).  Indeed, Plotinus does suggest: “since Intellect is a kind of sight, and a sight which is seeing, 
it will be a potency which has come into act” (III.8.11.1-3) and, furthermore: 
Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ ἴχνος αὐτοῦ τῷ νῷ ὁρῶντι ἔδωκεν ἔχειν· ὡστε ἐν μὲν τῷ νῷ 
ἡ ἔφεσις καὶ ἐφιέμενος ἀεὶ καὶ ἀεὶ τυγχάνων, ἐκεῖ<νος> δὲ οὔτε ἐφιέμενος -- τίνος 
γάρ; -- οὔτε τυγχάνων· οὐδε γὰρ ἐφίετο. Οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ νοῦς.  Ἔφεσις γὰρ καὶ ἐν 
τούτῳ καὶ σύννευσις πρὸς τὸ εἶδος αὐτοῦ. 
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The Good, therefore has given the trace of itself on Intellect to Intellect to have by 
seeing, so that in Intellect there is desire, and it is always desiring and always 
attaining, but the Good is not desiring—for what could it desire?—or attaining, 
for it did not desire [to attain anything].  So it is not even Intellect.  For in Intellect 
there is desire and movement to convergence with its form. (III.8.11.22-27) 
 
 It should become clear now that for Plotinus, Intellect is not a static presence at all.  On 
the contrary, the Intellect is an always striving, always desiring, ability to bring forth in itself the 
manifestation of the One beyond being.  It possesses a dynamism in that it is a constant process 
of non-discursive expression of the utter transcendence of the One.  Life and movement, far from 
being excluded from the Intellect, are central to its existence and nature: 
εἰ γὰρ μηδεμίαν ἔχει ἐξαλλαγὴν μηδέ τις ἐξεγείρει αὐτὸ εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἑτερότης, οὐδ' 
ἂν ἐνέργεια εἴη· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἡ τοιαύτη κατάστασις μὴ ἐνεργείας διαφέροι...οὐκ 
ἔστιν ἄρα τὰ ὄντα εἶνα μή νοῦ ἐνεργήσαντος, ἐνεργήσαντος δ ὲ ἀεὶ ἄλλο μετ' 
ἄλλο καὶ οἷον πλανηθέντος πᾶσαν πλάνην καὶ ἐν αὑτῷ πλανηθέντος, οἷα νοῦς ἐν 
αὑτῷ ὁ ἀληθινὸς πέφυκε πλανᾶσθαι· πέφυκε δ' ἑν οὐσίαις πλανᾶσθαι συνθεουσῶν 
τῶν οὐσιῶν ταῖς αὐτοῦ πλάναις. 
 
For if it has no change in it, and no otherness wakes it to life, it would not even be 
an active actuality: for such a state would be undistinguishable from non-actual 
inactivity….  It is not then possible for the real beings to exist if Intellect is not 
actively at work, forever working one thing after another and, we may say, 
wandering down every way and wandering in itself, as it is natural for the true 
Intellect to wander in itself; and it is natural for it to wander among substances 
while the substances run along with its wanderings. (VI.7.13.11-13, 29-33) 
 
 Here we see that “substances” [ousiai] run along with the movement of the Intellect in its 
wanderings.  Likewise we should recall that the basis of the movement is the Intellect’s 
irrepressible desire to express the Good which is manifest within itself.  We should be reminded 
of Heidegger.  We have seen that, for Plotinus, the One or the Good stands beyond being and 
gives itself into manifestation, unconcealment and being.  Thus, the One is the equivalent of 
Heidegger’s Ereignis or Sein selbst.  Following upon that, Plotinus also possesses a conception 




precisely as beings, which he calls the Intellect.  Furthermore, the Intellect cannot be static and 
still remain what it is—the paradigmatic unfolding of reality of the One.  Why should this be?  
 Eric Perl notes that since the sensible world and the Intellect are merely degrees of the 
same reality, we should come to recognize that the real matter for thought in Plotinus is the One 
in distinction from Being as a whole, including both the Intellect and the sensible (2002: 147).  
This seems to me the proper conclusion.  Furthermore, it is this very distinction which makes the 
“wandering” of the Intellect necessary.  To speak of the One is, strictly speaking, impossible.  
Even to say “the One” is to mischaracterize its reality.  This is because intelligibility is grounded 
in our ability to comprehend and make distinctions between things.  In order for something to be 
understood, it must be some-thing.  This fundamental convertibility between being and 
intelligibility is found throughout the corpus of Greek philosophy; its ultimate origin is in the 
identification of thought and being in Parmenides (Stamatellos 74-75).  This means that a thing 
must be one, that is itself, but also other, that is distinct from other beings.  However, the One is 
lacking in all otherness.  As lacking in all otherness, it is impossible for the One to be any sort of 
being.  It is no-thing, as we have seen.  Perl says, 
Intelligibility, and therefore being, is constituted only in and by the differences of 
one form from another within the system of being.  Being itself is a text, an 
interweaving of forms constituting one another through their mutual 
differentiation…. Only within the system of differentiation can anything be 
thought, and therefore no object of thought, no being, can be isolated outside this 
system and encountered as pure presence.  Intelligibility and therefore being is 
constituted by the play of differences within the system of intelligible beings.  
Differentiation is not prior to being, since there can be no difference without 
beings which differ (from each other) but neither is being prior to differentiation, 
since there can be no being without determination and therefore difference. (2002: 
131-132) 
 
 As a result of this play of differences, the wandering of the Intellect, not only is the 
sensible realm which lacks true substances constituted by the failure of discursive thought, but 
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even the Intellect as the Being of beings is constituted by an historically fluctuating nexus of 
interrelations.  Armstrong states: 
The inner life of Intellect has a history, the history of a mind endlessly exploring 
the rich and varied world which is itself, a world of which the content is indeed all 
continually present to it, ever fresh and new and intimately its own, so that its 
exploration is an unwearying joy, never staying into uncongenial territory and 
leaving no room for boredom (V, 8, 4, 26-31); but a world which is explored 
successively, part by part, and in which, it would seem, there is always room for 
further discoveries. (1971: 73) 
 
 At this point we have seen the radical distinction between the One and Being exposed by 
the utter lack of otherness which distinguishes the One, and that the Intellect, rather than being a 
static presence, is in fact a dynamic history of the unfolding of unconcealment and being, given 
by the One.  The priority of res according to the interpretation of Platonism offered by Grassi has 
been thoroughly undermined.  The structure of being is not a well-ordered system after all, but a 
dynamically living nexus of interrelation and meaning arising from the Intellect’s wanderings. 
 However, what about the other side of Grassi’s equation, the centrality of the verba in the 
determination of the historical appearance of res?  Does discursive expression play a central role 
in the historical conception of being for Plotinus?  In his work The Primordial Metaphor, Grassi 
quotes a passage from Nicholas of Cusa which he takes to demonstrate a cognizance of “the 
thesis of the orginary character of the ‘word,’ with its dominance and urgency, which are 
independent of any prior rational determination of beings” (56-67).  In the passage, Cusanus 
states:  
In fact, if I question you on the substance of what you think you know, you will 
reply that you can’t express the truth as such about man and stones.  But if you 
know that man is not a stone, you know it not by virtue of a science which 
presumably taught you about man, stones, and the difference between them, but 
by accident, by virtue of their diversity of shapes and actions.  Having discerned 
these, you established names for them.  Names, in fact, are determined by an act 




 This act of “discerning reason//ratio particularis” refers to the apprehension and 
understanding of things according to the outward appearance of their accidental qualities as 
opposed to understanding their causes and natures.  Hence, one is able to distinguish, for 
example, between men and stones because of the distinctions in their outward appearances.  
Grassi here is making the point that the encounter with the world through the outward 
appearances of accidents in various existential contexts and not a pre-determined scientific 
definition is the origin of human naming.  Now recall precisely what we saw earlier in Plotinus’s 
description of anti-essentialism in sensible reality.  It is precisely because substances are a nexus 
of qualities, all in interrelation with each other, that no definitive analysis can yield a static 
nature of the thing under discussion.  No rationalistic explanation suffices as though the reality 
followed from the syllogism.  Compare the words of Gerson about Plotinus to the words quoted 
by Grassi above: 
A classification of conglomerates is a classification of homonymous images.  
Take a drawing of a conical shape.  Is it a tepee or an ice-cream cone?  The 
answer is purely contextual or pragmatic because what the drawing is of is not 
entailed by the shape.  The conical shape, however, is or contains a synonymous 
image of the Form.  The classification of homonymous images, like sensible 
composites, in terms of synonymous images, like the instances of Forms, is 
interdicted because sensible composites are bodies that contain matter.  There is 
no more of a necessary connection between these two types of images than there 
is between the proportions of a drawing and the medium in which the drawing is 
rendered. (Gerson 2002: 68) 
 
In both accounts we see that the interpretation of sensible perception is the subject of 
interpretation based on the immediate context, not on a previously established, rational scientific 
analysis.  That which we encounter in the world, neither for Grassi nor for Plotinus, is a pre-
established essence.  However, is the “immediate context” for Plotinus simply whatever a 




hint of subjectivism here?  After all, for Grassi, the world being interpreted in sensus communis 
is not an object.  Rather he describes it in this way: 
We must now identify the phenomena by virtue of which our world is revealed to 
us so that we may disclose the realm and the meaning of primordial passion.  No 
phone, no sensory perception hovers isolated in mid-air, in abstract, rarefied 
space.  On the contrary, it becomes crystallized in various situation, in the 
signification of individual beings which appear within an order system in 
accordance with principles of measure.  There arises a kosmos that is in no way a 
human creation, but which dawns and sets in a temporal phyein to the rhythm of 
the warning signs of an underivable absolute…. The elements of language are not 
metaphors merely in the sense that a certain meaning is transferred onto 
meaningless phenomena that are mechanically explained…. Originary emotion is 
passionately experienced through the indicative signs of the sense within the 
limits of pleasure and pain.  We exist and function in a passionately experienced 
world granted to us by signs that direct us and caution us.  The act of appearance 
of these signs, which bind us and compel us, marks the beginning of the game that 
discloses our possibilities.  The confrontation with the reality of such originary 
experience constitutes the act that generates our world. (1994: 134, 135, 137) 
 
 Is this an accurate representation of how Plotinus too believes we come to encounter the 
sensible world in our pre-dialectical experience?  Sara Rappe speaks of the Neoplatonic position 
in this way: “Plotinus suggests that anytime the mind simply looks at another thing, it is 
necessarily either enthralled by that object or subject to it.  Thus to be aware of an external object 
is to be subject to passion, in the sense that a pathos is an adventitious event” (2000: 60).  
Plotinus, like Grassi, does not envision the encounter with the external world to be a mind simply 
projecting subjective ideas onto a standing object, but rather an encounter with a thing as a 
passionate call of being in an existential context, a call that then manifests itself in the 
formulations of discursive language.  This discursive language exemplifies what we have seen in 
Plato as doxa, common opinion, the sensus communis, which expresses a generally received 
tradition of pre-reflective interpretation for discursive reality. 
 Through what mechanism does Plotinus suggest that human beings formulate this 
interpretation of discursive reality?  It cannot be through logical deduction because no discursive 
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science can accurately capture the structure and purpose of reality.  Cusanus called this, “an act 
of discerning reason” or “ratio particularis” as opposed to scientific rationality because it 
distinguished between the sensible presentations of the particular objects.  Plotinus calls this 
aptitude the imagination (φανταστικόν). 
 For Plotinus, the imagination is a two-fold faculty—sometimes posited as “two image-
making powers” (Gerson 2009: 147)—which is “the terminus ad quem of all properly human 
conscious experience… the faculty of man without which there can be no conscious experience” 
(Warren 277).  The first aspect of this two fold faculty is the sensible imagination.  This is the 
aspect of the imaginative faculty which allows the individual to gather up the data of sense 
organs into a single, sensible image in the mind (Warren 278).  Plotinus generally considers this 
to be the passive facet of imaginative activity (Warren 285).  On the other hand, Plotinus 
envisions the second facet of this faculty as the conceptual imagination.  This conceptual 
imagination receives a framework of understanding from the Intellect, “rules” by which the 
images of the sensible imagination can be comprehended by the mind.  That is, the conceptual 
imagination provides a pre-critical interpretation of the information which is being encountered 
(Gerson 2009: 147).  Together, this union of the two facets of imagination in putting together 
intellections and the images of sense perception is how Plotinus understands the Platonic 
teaching on “anamnesis”: 
As for the things which come to it from Intellect, it observes what one might call 
their imprints, and has the same power also in dealing with these; and it continues 
to acquire understanding as if by recognizing the new and recently arrived  
impressions and fitting them to those which have long been within it: this process 
is what we should call the “recollections” [anamneseis] of the soul.  (V.3.2.9-14) 
 
 Plato suggested that humans possess a pre-critical understanding of things before they 
begin to think about them, which is what allows ordinary language and everyday interpretation 
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(doxa or sensus communis) to operate, and he associated this precisely with the myth of 
recollection.  Essentially what Plotinus is suggesting here is that the imaginative faculty of the 
soul finds an interpretation of sense images which form the basis of this background 
understanding.  From this background understanding proceeds the articulations of discursive 
reasoning.  Is this not precisely the role of the imagination envisioned by Grassi? 
Topics is the doctrine of “finding” [invenire] arguments.  The aim of dialectic32 
does not consist in the provision of truth, but in providing that which can appear 
to be true in a specific “situation” in time and space, the “probable” 
[verisimile]…. Only ingenium33 is able to grasp [coligere] the relationship 
between things in a concrete situation in order to determine their meaning.  This 
capacity has an “inventive” character, since it attains an insight without merely 
bringing out what is present in the premises as reason does in a logical derivation.  
Ingenium reveals something “new” [ingenio… ad res novas proclives], something 
“unexpected” and “astonishing” by uncovering the “similar in the unsimilar,” i.e., 
what cannot be deduced rationally. (2001: 89, 91-92) 
 
 For Grassi, following upon this activity, the Humanists then engage in the art of 
interpretation, which pulls out and exposes the vitality and importance of the historicity of the 
word for determining the meaning and founding an historical world.  They show through the 
interpretation of the poetic words the underlying philosophical significance of the poets.  
Plotinus shows the same determination to undermine the conception of fixed meanings.  
Following upon the techniques laid out by Plato, Plotinus seeks to expose the limits of 
discursivity.  He does this by employing discursive speech to undermine the stability of the 
worldview proposed by that speech to allow us to remember the question of Being, to remember 
the holy.  As Kevin Corrigan writes about the techniques of Plato and Plotinus: 
Plato, for example, makes story, example, prayer, myth, and argument 
fundamental parts of philosophical dialectic.  This may be a controversial view of 
Plato’s dialectic, but for Plotinus there is simply no question: mythos and logos 
                                                 
32 The surrounding discussion in Rhetoric as Philosophy shows that Grassi intended dialectic here to be “understood 
in Aristotle’s sense” (92) or “as Aristotle defined it” (90), rather than in the Platonic sense which has generally 
been conveyed by “dialectic” in this study.  
33 “Grassi, citing Vico, characterized imagination as the ‘eyes of ingenium’” (Hall 12). 
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are both essential to dialectical thinking…. These new representative languages 
finally will be inadequate also, but their very strangeness—their ability to provoke 
under-thought (hyponoia, cf. 10, 28: shall we under-think it to be the nothing?)— 
may by that very token be more appropriate to the question at issue than more 
linear forms of representative enquiry. (172) 
 
 And likewise, in the same vein, Frederic Schroeder writes: 
   
Speech can never exhaust its subject as interpretation is for Plotinus never 
definitive and belongs to a hermeneutical circle encompassing intelligible and 
sensible reality.  A declarative statement will cry out for further discursive 
analysis.  A statement belonging to discussion and discursive analysis will leave 
us feeling that there is something more not embraced by the narrow confines of 
the statement.  Necessarily, because what is discussed is not some thing, Plotinian 
conversation will always resemble an attempt to recapture with frustrating 
partiality a seamless discourse that we have known but forgotten.  Yet language, 
ever mantic, is transparent to reveal the One in and through the discursive 
operations of the mind. (352) 
 
 In the discussion of Plotinus’s work in this chapter I have attempted to establish two 
overarching points.  The first point is that the general thrust of Plotinus’s thought is in continuity 
with Plato’s own thinking.  Plotinus continually maintained that he was merely an interpreter of 
the Platonic tradition, simply a “Platonist.”  However, as we have seen, in the modern parlance 
of Continental philosophy it is often felt that Plato must be separated from the Platonists to save 
him form their perceived errors.  Such a rescue attempt is utterly unnecessary.   
The second point which I have tried to illustrate is that underlying the structure of 
Plotinus’s thought is not a logical metaphysician run amok, but an insightful, poetic philosopher 
whose basic world view appears to conform very closely to Grassi’s own views.  This point is a 
response to the other great trend in the Continental treatment of the Platonic tradition, a trend to 
which the later Heidegger and Grassi both belong: the attempt to turn Plato and the Platonists 
both into something which really resembles neither of them so that they may serve as the 
opposition to postmodern insights.  Such a move should be considered unacceptable.  However, 
Platonism has passed through various stages in its history, most prominently its integration into 
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Christian thought.  As such, next we shall turn our attention to ancient and medieval 
interpretation of this body of knowledge within Christianity to see whether the essential core of 





























Christian Neoplatonism and the Oblivion of Being 
 
 In the last chapter, we saw that continuity with Plato’s thought was maintained by his 
most famous ancient interpreter, Plotinus, the founder of Neoplatonism.  Within a few centuries, 
this philosophy had taken root in an entirely new context as it was assimilated into the arguments 
and theology of early Christian thinkers.  Did this union between Athens and Jerusalem 
fundamentally alter the inherent structures of Neoplatonism?  More importantly, did it rob the 
movement of those fundamental aspects which allowed it to preserve the mystery of Being?  To 
answer this question, I shall turn my attention to three figures in the history of Christian thought: 
Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, Thomas Aquinas and, to a lesser extent, Gregory Palamas. 
 The figure known as Pseudo-Dionysius is generally regarded by contemporary 
scholarship to have been a Syrian Christian living in the late fifth and early sixth century.  This 
date is generally derived from the presence of a substantial similarity of ideas and images 
between this author and the late Neoplatonic philosopher Proclus (Saffrey 64).  However, prior to 
critical studies in modernity, it was widely believed that the author was none other than the first 
century disciple of Paul mentioned in the biblical book of Acts (17:34).  As a result of this 
identification, his writings carried a vast currency among Christian theologians throughout the 
medieval period.  Indeed, Thomas Aquinas quotes from Dionysius over 1700 times (Doherty 
189).  Likewise, in the east, Dionysius exerted a powerful influence which culminated in the 
mystical theology of Gregory Palamas in the fourteenth century (Meyendorff  1964: 133) 
 While it is rather uncontroversial that the Areopagite and Palamas were under the 
influence of Platonism—though to what extent they moved beyond or disregarded their 
Platonism is something of an open question—Thomas Aquinas is distinct in this regard.  Indeed, 
the thinker is much more often associated with the school of Aristotelianism.  After all, Aquinas 
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wrote copious commentaries on the works of Aristotle and called him “the Philosopher” when he 
referenced him in his massive body of work.  Indeed, there are contemporary schools of 
interpreting Aquinas which are heavily focused on drawing out the depths of his Aristotelianism 
(Ashley 3).  The waters are only made muddier when we consider the massive amount of 
scholarly commentary on Aquinas which originated from the “Leonine” movement, which was 
spurred on by Pope Leo XIII’s 1879 encyclical Aeterni Patris calling for the reinvigoration of 
the study of St. Thomas’s philosophy.  A large part of the difficulty arose from the movement’s 
heavy reliance on the tradition of the commentators of the Second Scholastic, particularly 
Francisco Suarez.  However, Suarez and his confreres introduced a number of distorting 
influences which are completely at odds with the authentic teaching of Aquinas on a variety of 
issues.  In particular, Suarez introduced a novel conception of Being, which we shall see in the 
course of this chapter.  In general, the fact that the philosophers in the School of Salamanca, like 
Suarez, were of a thoroughly modern philosophical disposition led to the deployment of Aquinas 
among the Leonine Thomists of an anti-Cartesian project rooted fundamentally in the burgeoning 
modernism of these later scholastics, rather than in Thomas himself (Kerr 17-19).  
 Other contemporary thinkers, however, have been much more open to the idea of a 
primarily or significantly Platonic interpretation of Aquinas.  Indeed, Hankey has pointed out 
that in response to the challenges raised by Heidegger there has been something of a renaissance 
in looking at the Platonic and Dionysian elements of Aquinas’s thought as a means to defend him 
against the charges of onto-theology and the oblivion of Being (Hankey 2006: 190-191).  
However, it would be erroneous to attribute all such shifts in emphasis as simply grounded in a 
reactionary stance towards post-modern philosophy.  In particular, Josef Pieper and Alasdair 
MacIntyre both recognize a strong Platonic strain in the thought of Aquinas and, while being 
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aware of Heidegger and the issues which he raises, should not be construed as interpreting 
Aquinas in a way which is fundamentally in reaction to Heidegger.  Notably, according to Kerr: 
For MacIntyre, the importance of Thomas, as exemplar resides in the way that he 
integrated the contending traditions in his day… Aristotelianism and 
Augustinianism—into a new dialectical synthesis with the capacity to direct 
enquiry still further beyond itself… He is engaged in integrating the various 
relevant considerations advanced by his predecessors in the rival Augustinian and 
Aristotelian traditions—two different understandings of truth, indeed, two 
different epistemologies, one might say—but not a work of integration that 
amounts to ‘epistemological justification’ in the modern sense. (17-18) 
 
 This insight that St. Thomas’s dialectical method points beyond itself and is not intended 
to synthesize the previous tradition as a final reflection on the intelligible structure of the 
universe is also found in the works of Pieper: 
A Thomism which limits itself to the consideration of the material substance of 
the explicitly said necessarily proves itself inadequate in a time which confronts 
man with wholly new problems and brings him into contact with realities 
previously barely glimpsed.  In times such as these it is imperative to call to mind 
that qualities which made Thomas what he was: the all-inclusive, fearless strength 
of his affirmation, his generous acceptance of the whole of reality, the trustful 
magnanimity of his thought.  And we find occasion, also, to remember: The 
formal and theoretical justification for this attitude is found precisely in Thomas’s 
doctrine of the infinitely many-sided truth of things.  Truth cannot be exhausted 
by any (human) knowledge; it remains therefore always open to new formulation. 
(Pieper 1957: 102-103) 
 
 These insights into the fundamental method of Thomism will become relevant as we 
proceed through the course of the chapter.  In particular, we shall see the connection between 
these insights and a Platonic core which undergirds much of Thomistic thinking, not as a body of 
discursive knowledge taken as an immovable statement about reality—for we have seen 
repeatedly that this itself is contrary to Platonic thought—but as a basic stance towards existence.  
For now, having established that Aquinas certainly possesses some form of Platonic pedigree 
through his associations with Augustinian and Dionysian thought, it is appropriate to inquire into 
the core questions of Grassian Humanism in the context of these Christian Platonists. 
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 Let us first turn our examination to the thought of the Areopagite.  Given his undisputed 
Platonic credentials, we should be unsurprised to find immediately that Dionysius’s formulation 
of the structure of existence bears a striking resemblance to the basic insights present in Plotinus.  
The fundamental understanding of reality for the Areopagite is grounded in the primordial Greek 
insight that there is a convertibility between intelligibility and being.  That is, whatever exists is 
available for thought; whatever is available for thought is an existent entity (Perl 2007: 5).  As 
with Plotinus, the Platonic tradition holds that this very fact necessitates that difference be a 
constituent factor of being.  However, since difference is granted by a prior oneness, there must 
“be” the One beyond being who gives every being its determination and thus its being and 
intelligibility.  This is precisely the sentiment adopted by the Areopagite in his treatise on the 
Divine Names: 
Ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄληπτα καὶ ἀθεώρητα τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐστι τὰ νοητὰ καὶ τοῖς ἐν πλάσει 
καὶ τυπῳ τὰ ἁπλᾶ καὶ ἀτύπωτα, τοῖς τε κατὰ σωμάτων σχήματα μεμορφωμένοις ἡ 
τῶν ἀναφὴς καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος ἀμορφία, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τῆς ἀληθείας λόγον 
ὑπέρκειται τῶν οὐσιῶν ἡ ὑπερούσιος ἀπειρία και τῶν νοῶν ἡ ὑπερ νοῦν ἑνότης.  
Καὶ πάσαις διανοίαις ἀδιανόητόν ἐστι τό ὑπέρ διάνοιαν ἕν... Καὶ γὰρ ὡς αὐτὴ περὶ 
ἑαυτῆς ἐν τοῖς λογίοις ἀγαθοπρεπῶς παραδέδωκεν, ἡ μὲν αὐτῆς, ὅ τι ποτέ ἐστιν, 
ἐπιστήμη καὶ θεωρία πᾶσιν ἄβατός ἐστι τοῖς οὖσιν ὡς πάντων ὑπερουσίως 
ἐξῃρημένη.  Καὶ πολλοὺς τῶν θεολόγων εὑρήσεις οὐ μόνον ὡς ἀόρατον αὐτήν 
καὶ ἀπερίληπτον ὑμνηκότας, ἀλλα καὶ ἀνεξερεύνητον ἅμα καὶ ἀνεξιχνίαστον ὡς 
οὐκ ὄντος ἴχνους οὐδενὸς τῶν ἐπὶ τὴν κρυφίαν αὐτῆς ἀπειρίαν διεληλυθότων. 
 
Just as the senses can neither grasp nor perceive the things of the mind, just as 
representation and shape cannot take in the simple and the shapeless, just as 
corporeal form cannot lay hold of the intangible and incorporeal, by the same 
standard of truth beings are surpassed by the infinity beyond being, intelligences 
by that oneness which is beyond intelligence.  Indeed, the inscrutable One is out 
of the reach of every rational process…. In the scriptures, the Deity has 
benevolently taught us that understanding and direct contemplation of itself is 
inaccessible to beings, since it actually surpasses being.  Many scripture writers 
will tell you that the divinity is not only invisible and incomprehensible, but also 
“unsearchable and inscrutable,” since there is not a trace for anyone who would 
reach through into the hidden depths of this infinity. (588b-588c)34 
 
                                                 
34 Translations of Dionysius by Colm Luibheid are used throughout. 
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 In this passage, we see the repeated affirmation that God for Dionysius is unknowable 
and surpassing all comprehension.  Furthermore, he is also described as surpassing all being.  
That these assertions rest on the Neoplatonic position of the convertibility of being and 
intelligibility is apparent from the move of representational thought being unable to grasp 
intelligible realities to beings being surpassed by the “infinity beyond being.”  This passage thus 
demonstrates the identity between being and intelligibility for Dionysius.  There are, of course, 
important implications of this claim.  Describing God in this fashion negates any kind of being in 
God.  God, as beyond being, is immediately rendered no-thing. 
 Although already attested in Plotinus, it becomes necessary to recall this claim, because 
Grassi actually makes a move to differentiate negative theology as a “third way,” opposed to 
both traditional metaphysical thought and Heideggerian thought.  In particular, Grassi takes the 
major distinction between Heideggerian thought and negative theology to be that negative 
theology is, ultimately, like metaphysics, grounded in an ahistorical nature.  In order to support 
this claim, he brings up the discussion of Dionysius’s treatise on Mystical Theology in which is 
said: 
Ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα ηὔχθω· σὺ δέ τῇ περὶ τὰ μυστικὰ θεάματα συντόνῳ διατριβῇ 
και τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἀπόλειπε καὶ τὰς νοερὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ πάντα αἰσθητὰ καὶ 
νοητὰ καὶ πάντα οὐκ ὄντα καί ὄντα καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἕνωσιν, ὡς ἐφικτόν, ἀγνώστως 
ἀνατάθητι τοῦ ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν οὐσίαν και γνῶσιν· 
 
My advice to you as you look for a sight of the mysterious things, is to leave 
behind you everything perceived and understood, everything perceptible and 
understandable, all that is not and all that is, and, with your understanding laid 
aside, to strive upward as much as you can toward union with him who is beyond 
all being and knowledge. (997B) 
 
 For Grassi, two related implications follow from passages such as these found within the 
Dionysian corpus: the denigration of beings and the vision of divinity as a being by and for itself.  
Grassi phrases it in this way: 
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The essential difference between Heidegger’s philosophy of unhiddenness and 
negative theology as found in Dionysius and John of the Cross consists in their 
completely different starting points.  They understand divine Being as a Being in 
and for itself, outside of history, so that it emerges primarily through the 
theophany of a mystic.  Heidegger, however, claims that Being emerges through 
the “clearing” of different, purely historical spaces in which particular gods, 
institutions and arts appear historically.  For negative theology, as well as for 
Heidegger, Being (God) is “sublime,” but in a fundamentally different sense.  In 
negative theology the sublime and elevated nature of God is defined in the sense 
that it finally can be made visible only by relinquishing those capacities (rational 
knowledge, memory and will) that make possible the “day” of rational life. (1983: 
91) 
 
 From this argument, Grassi goes on to propose that, likewise, for Heidegger “Being is not 
exhausted by beings.”  However, for Heidegger “beings belong to the revelation of Being and 
must be ‘held to’ in their particular historical form” (91).  Essentially what Grassi argues here is 
that, although Heidegger’s Being surpasses any expression by beings, this does not entail that it 
has a distinct essence above and apart from beings.  Being, for Heidegger, is expressed in beings 
within their own historical expression, with the “opening of Being” being remembered precisely 
through the realization that this expression of beings does not exhaust the possibility of beings.  
That is, the opening to Being is expressed through the realization of the historical nature of the 
distinction between beings and the metaphysical paradigm of their particular historical 
interpretation at this moment (91). 
 In reading Dionysius against Heidegger in this way, Grassi is making an error both in his 
own simplification of Heidegger and in his reading of Dionysius.  It seems that the purpose of 
what he says here about Heidegger is to make perfectly clear that Heidegger does not conceive of 
Being, that is Sein selbst, as a concealed presence or, in Derrida’s terminology, a “transcendental 
signified.”  Rather he wants to maintain the Heideggerian sense of Being as “the temporal-
spatial, finite and negatived, appearing of beings in their beingness, which calls forth and even 
compels from the human being (Dasein) a correspondence in language that allows both what 
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appears—and appearing itself—to be made manifest meaningfully” (Capobianco 4).  However, 
what Grassi has overlooked—or, at least, failed to express adequately—is precisely what it is 
that allows the openness to Being to appear within the context of entities.  Let us return 
momentarily to Heidegger’s meditations on modern art.  Heidegger describes the earth jutting up 
through world as revealed in the work of art.  This could be interpreted in the way which Grassi 
speaks here—that Sein selbst is encountered in the beings themselves—but, in fact, if we look at 
the way Heidegger speaks in his interpretation of van Gogh’s painting of the pair of shoes, he is 
confronted with the nichts weiter.  He speaks of the world of peasant woman appearing out of the 
“dark opening.”  Likewise, in his examination of the semi-abstractions of Cezanne and especially 
of Klee, the images barely peer out of the empty chaos.  My point is not to say that Heidegger 
thinks of Sein selbst as some form of presence beside beings, but rather that Heidegger often 
describes the manner in which it is encountered as the beings put to one side for the appearance 
of the nothing.  Likewise, Angst suspends beings, puts them into question, and allows the 
appearance of the Ab-grund.   
Heidegger speaks in all of these ways which suggest the suspension of beings for the 
confrontation with the nothing, even though the encounter happens through beings.  We take 
these statements for what they are, suggestive hints, images that point towards the reality of an 
encounter which cannot be contained by the instantiation of particular beings because of its raw 
sublimity.  It would be an injustice to Heidegger’s thought to turn around and pronounce, 
because of such images, that Sein selbst is a static presence which transcends beings.  This is the 
same injustice which is applied to Dionysius’s thought by ignoring the implications of his 
Platonic presuppositions.  It seems likely that onto-theological prejudices regarding any 
formulation of Christian theology are more to thank for this distortion than the texts of Dionysius 
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himself.  In fact, to read Dionysius in this fashion would be to do nothing other than completely 
undermine the entire philosophical foundation on which his view of reality rests.   
If one were to propose that God for Dionysius were other than being in the sense of some 
form of presence over and against being, this would suggest that God would properly contain 
“otherness.”  He would be some kind of being “other than” the kind of beings that we encounter 
in our ordinary experience.  However, we have already seen that Dionysius follows Plotinus on 
this issue.  It is precisely the fact that God is lacking in all otherness that allows him to be the 
foundation which gives forth being.  For it is by every entity being determinate, that is, by each 
entity being one, that difference is able to arise.  If difference and otherness were present in God, 
the entire ontological order would collapse and God, too, would be a being, different from other 
beings.  This is, in fact, precisely what Grassi suggests, but precisely what Dionysius denies. 
 Despite the a priori absurdity of Grassi’s assertion, given Dionysius’s basic assumptions, 
it should also be noted the Dionysius explicitly denies that there can be some form of primordial 
vision of God which operates outside the context of beings, stating: “the divine ray can enlighten 
us only by being upliftingly concealed in a variety of sacred veils” (Celestial Hierarchy 121B-
C).  He also speaks of the same issue several times in his Ninth Letter saying:  
Διὸ καὶ ἀπιστοῦμεν οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς περὶ τῶν θείων μυστηρίων λόγοις· θεώμετα 
γὰρ μόνον αὐτὰ διὰ τῶν προσπεφυκότων αὐτοῖς αἰσθητῶν συμβόλων... Ἄλλως τε 
καὶ τοῦτο ἐννοῆσαι χρή, τὸ διττὴν εἶναι τὴν τῶν τἑολόγων παράδοσιν, τὴν μὲν 
ἀπόρρητον και μυστικὴν, τὴν δὲ ἐμφανῆ καὶ γνωριμωτέραν, καὶ τὴν μὲν 
συμβολικὴν καὶ τελεστικήν, τὴν δὲ φιλόσοφον και ἀποδεικτικήν· καὶ 
συμπέπλεκται τῷ ῥητῷ τὸ ἄρρητον. 
 
“That is why so many continue to be unbelieving in the presence of the 
explanations of the divine mysteries, for we contemplate them solely by way of 
the perceptible symbols attached to them…. But there is a further point to 
understand.  Theological tradition has a dual aspect, the ineffable and mysterious 
on the one hand, the open and more evident on the other.  The one resorts to 




method of demonstration.  (Further, the inexpressible is bound up with what can 
be articulated.) (1104B, 1105D) 
 
 These statements from Dionysius should make it clear that he closely links the 
apprehension of the sublime to the encounter with the symbols.  It should also be remembered 
that, while Dionysius does discuss cultic symbols such as liturgy and scriptural metaphors, he is 
committed by his ontological assumptions to the position that, in fact, all reality constitutes a 
sign and a symbol.  While Grassi tries to make an issue of the fact that Dionysius seems to 
suggest few people will encounter the apprehension of God by stating “although for him divine 
Being is both revealed and hidden in every being, God’s Being is visible only for a few, that is, 
the object of a Theophany” (1983: 90), for Heidegger too most people live lives of inauthenticity 
in which the encounter with Being may never occur.  There is no significant difference between 
the position of Dionysius and Heidegger on this issue. 
 Eric Perl has pointed out that Derrida, in a line of reasoning much like Grassi’s own, has 
tried to make it seem as though Dionysius’s philosophy hints towards a hidden presence (2002: 
142).  In doing so, he has tried to draw upon the imagery of Dionysius’s Ninth Letter (1105c) to 
present the idea that the divine symbols are “shields” which conceal this ineffable presence from 
common view.  However, both Grassi and Derrida believe that ultimately these images may be 
stripped away and reveal what they conceal in its own stark presence, via mystical union.  Perl 
has argued very convincingly against this position by pointing out that within the span of a single 
passage the word προβάλλω is employed in an ambiguous sense.  Derrida has latched onto the 
usage that indicates that symbols “shield” (προβεβλῆσθαι) a hidden truth to indicate that behind 
all of Dionysius’s words lies a hidden presence.  However, Perl has pointed out that earlier in the 




presentation of the hidden (προσβεβλημένα) (2002: 142).  The “throwing forth” of beings both 
conceals and reveals the mystery, like the iconostasis of a Byzantine church. 
 Dionysius teaches that God can only enlighten human beings by the very act of being 
concealed in veils.  This is precisely what is in mind in this instance.  There is no way to reveal 
God apart from the use of symbols whose very mode of use is to reveal something in concealing 
it, for God is not a being.  To strip away all the symbolic veils which conceal his existence would 
ultimately be to expose him precisely as he is: as no-thing.  Nothing lies behind the symbolic 
veils.  Dionysius himself suggests as much when he says:  “We have therefore to run counter to 
mass prejudice and we must make the holy journey to the heart of the sacred symbols.  And we 
must certainly not disdain them, for they are the descendants and bear the mark of the divine 
stamps.  They are the manifest images of unspeakable and marvelous sights” (Ninth Epistle 
1108C). 
 Wear and Dillion, attempting to codify Dionysius treatment of symbols, appeal to the late 
Neoplatonic concept of theurgical symbols, a not unreasonable approach given Dionysius’s 
apparent indebtedness to Proclus (86).  Furthermore, the description of the divine symbols as 
thematizing that which is unknowable seems to have deep Proclean roots.  In Proclus’s 
description of the work of the poet, in fact, the poet participates in the creation of ordered reality 
because the words of the poet make manifest the highest principles in visible forms.  Thus the 
later Platonic school emphasizes the ontological signification of creative words (Struck 243). An 
important distinction should be made in this regard—in this later Platonic theory of symbolic 
expression the images employed are not mimetic.  The poet does not imitate some higher being 
through the use of symbols.  Rather there exists a “sympathy” between the higher principle and 
the material substrate of its expression (247).  The fundamental result of this is that the poetic 
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symbols are not taken to represent any kind of higher, established truth, but rather contain in 
themselves the power to make manifest in some way the ineffable presence of the gods, God or 
the One, due to some trace of the divine present in beings35 (250).  Perl’s exposition of the place 
of symbols for Dionysius demonstrates the connection between this Neoplatonic theory and 
Dionysius’s own quite clearly: 
The ascent from symbols is the penetration into them.  To rise to unknowing, to 
remove all the veils, to take away all things, is most fully to enter into the 
symbols, or beings.  At the peak, therefore, we find the perfect union of knowing 
and unknowing, in which all beings are most perfectly known in being wholly 
unknown just as a word is most perfectly known in being ignored, because all 
beings are nothing but symbols of God.  The mystical union is not a non-symbolic 
encounter with God as an object other than all things.  It is rather a penetration 
into all things to God who, as “all things in all things and nothing in any,” is at 
once revealed and concealed by all things.  To ascend to unknowing is to see the 
darkness hidden and revealed by all light, to hear all things “announce the divine 
silence.” (2007: 108) 
 
 It should be apparent from this examination of the function of symbols in Dionysius that 
Grassi’s distinction between Dionysian negative theology and Heideggerian thought collapses.  
The very distinctions which Grassi attempted to establish between Heidegger and Dionysius are 
precisely those places where commonality arises.  For Dionysius, as for Heidegger, that which is 
beyond the sphere of beings appears in and through beings.  Dionysius does not conceive of 
beings as “a basic hindrance to the experience of ‘God’” or as “obstructions to the soul that is 
trying to get a view of God,” as Grassi says (1983: 92), but on the contrary, are precisely the 
place of encounter with the divine. 
 Before turning to Thomas Aquinas, a brief aside into the thinking of Gregory Palamas is 
warranted.  Palamas was a fourteenth century monk who lived in one of the monasteries of 
                                                 
35 Proclus’s own cosmological hierarchy, in which the traditional gods of the Greeks are entertained as ineffable 
“henads” standing as the mediating factor between the One and Intellect allows him to incorporate elements of 
pagan religiosity into his ontological schema, but truthfully adds little to the main point, especially with respect 
to the Dionysian formulation. 
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Mount Athos, in Greece.  He is generally regarded, among the Orthodox, as offering the 
definitive formulation of Dionysian doctrine regarding the relationship between God and beings.  
In particular, I wish to show that the eastern Christrian tradition accepted and viewed Dionysius 
in a way that did not regard God as a transcendent object or hidden presence.  Specifically, 
Palamas directly attacks the idea which is proposed by Grassi as belonging to the Areopagite—
that the negation of beings is a means to obtaining an encounter with a transcendent and hidden 
presence:  “It is not only a God who surpasses beings, but more-than-God; the excellence of him 
who surpasses all things is not only above all affirmation, but also above all negation; it 
surpasses all excellence which could enter into the mind” (qtd in Meyendorff 206-207).  This 
corresponds to the Dionysian principle that God is functionally equivalent to the Neoplatonic 
One, insofar as, technically speaking, the One is beyond both affirmation and negation because it 
is present in all things and yet distinct from all things.  This is because its absolute Oneness does 
not permit distinctions, as are found in negations and affirmations, properly speaking.  Indeed, 
Palamas offers an interpretation of mystical union alluded to by Dionysius, to which Grassi 
objected, the discovery of an even greater mystery than that revealed by symbols and by negation 
(208).  There is no presence here for a seeing beyond sight, only the absolutely unfathomable 
mystery of that which stands outside being.   
However, Palamas wishes to offer a true explanation of the relationship between God and 
the world.  After all, if God is so transcendent, how can he be regarded as acting in the human 
person, according to the teachings of the Christian religion?  In response to this necessity, 
Palamas draws upon a concept expressed in Dionysius’s Second Letter.  Dionysius says: 
Πῶς ὁ πάντων ἐπέκεινα καὶ ὑπὲρ θεαρχίαν ἐστὶ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἀγαθαρχίαν; Εἰ θεότητα 





How could it be that he who surpasses everything also transcends the source of 
divinity, transcends the source of all goodness?  This is possible if by divinity and 
goodness you mean the substance of that gift which makes [us] good and divine 
and if you mean the inimitable imitation of him which is beyond divinity and 
beyond goodness, by means of which we are made divine and made good. 
(1068A-1069A) 
 
 From this idea—the divinity who exceeds the divine—Palamas derives his most 
significant theological contribution, the essence-energies distinction.  The primary function of 
this distinction is to provide for the ability of God to be unfolded symbolically in the order of the 
world, while still recognizing his fundamentally absolute transcendence (Lossky 70).  Indeed, 
Palamas asserts that the divine energies are truly God and thus God is truly present in the world, 
but at the same time maintains that “this unknowable Essence remains ‘transcendental’ with 
respect to them and the energies are ‘inferior’ in relation to the essence; the same God reveals 
himself and remains transcendent to his own revelation” (Meyendorff 218).  This idea has 
massive implications for the nature of the created order, Meyendorff writes: 
The creative act is a mystery perfectly inaccessible to human reason, and could 
only take place in as much as the divine Being was not totally identified with his 
inaccessible essence, but 'came out from it’ to act outside himself: ‘it is in fact his 
will’—not his essence—‘which is the origin of beings.’  Therefore God is Creator 
in an absolutely unique fashion, for the creation leaves his essence unchanged in 
the sense that he had no need of the creation and does not suffer (oude paschei) 
any limit in his power, for such a need and such a limit would be both weakness 
and ‘complexity’ in the Being of God. (223) 
 
 One may wonder why I have highlighted this particular idea from Palamas, except to 
demonstrate that the eastern tradition of Christianity has maintained that Dionysius observed the 
ontological difference.  The purpose of this illustration will become clear as we move forward to 
looking at Thomas Aquinas.  Due to the way in which Thomas chose to frame his discussion of 
being, particularly insofar as he identifies God as esse ipsum subsistens, some have suggested 
that he has capitulated to metaphysical thinking.  I intend to suggest that precisely this form of 
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division is implicit in Aquinas’s account of God, allowing him to maintain the utter 
transcendence of the deity. 
 Moving on to Aquinas, I would like to first present a preliminary argument that Aquinas 
is not subject to what Heidegger generally interprets as being the foundational content of onto-
theology.  First, God for Aquinas most definitely does not meet the criterion that would reduce 
God to an entity.  In the commentary on the Liber De causis he states:  “But the truth of the 
matter is that the first cause is beyond being [supra ens] inasmuch as He is infinite esse itself.  
But ens means that which participates in esse to a finite degree…” (qtd. in Caputo 1982: 144).  In 
mentioning that ens participates in esse after God has been designated as esse might, 
furthermore, create the confusion that God himself is the being of all entities.  Such an assertion 
would most definitely affirm a metaphysical reliance between God and entities which would 
support the claim of onto-theology (to say nothing of collapsing into a simple pantheism).  
Hence, Aquinas says in the Summa Contra Gentiles:  “Now the divine being is not attached to 
another nature, but is the nature itself, as shown above. If, therefore, the divine being were the 
formal being of all things, it would follow that all things are simply one” (1.26). 
 The most comprehensive treatment of the relationship between the thought of Heidegger 
and that of Aquinas is found in John Caputo’s magisterial work Heidegger and Aquinas: An 
Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics.  Caputo agrees to all the claims which I have just made 
above (140-145); however, he still does not acknowledge that Aquinas’s philosophical work 
allows him to transcend Heidegger’s oblivion of Being.  The reason for his reluctance is that he 
believes that, while Thomas has laid out the distinction between esse, being itself, and ens, 
entities, and therefore observed the ontological difference, he has failed to think the very nature 
of that difference.  Caputo phrases the complaint in this way: 
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The one point in Heidegger’s notion of “onto-theo-logic” which does befit St. 
Thomas’ metaphysics, however, is that the doctrine of esse is a “-logic,” a science 
of Being in the causal sense.  Thomas consented to enclose his experience of esse 
within the broders of a scientia, a Wissenschaft.  Though he knows there are 
matters higher than scientia, such as faith itself, mystical and finally beatific 
union, he is nonetheless content to confine his experience within the concepts and 
propositions of a science, without insisting that the meaning of esse is destroyed 
by the very scientific mode of expression. (1982: 157) 
 
 Furthermore, Caputo insists that the distinctly linguistic nature of the difference for 
Heidegger also separates Aquinas from thinking in this manner because, he insists, Aquinas 
possesses a traditional metaphysical understanding of language.  In its place is precisely the 
theory of language which we have seen throughout this study, the idea that language gives birth 
to and shapes the experience of meaning and being.  Essentially, Caputo holds that Aquinas has 
failed to recognize what Grassi would call the reversal of res and verba (1982: 158).  Caputo 
explains his view of Aquinas’s relationship to language: 
I must say that Thomas thinks in the Latin language without thinking that which 
bestows the language.  He does not see the particular ontology which is embedded 
in Latin to be just that, a particular way in which “language itself speaks,” a 
particular way in which Being sends itself and indeed, more importantly, 
withdraws under the guise of “making” …. For St. Thomas, language is especially 
a tool which is to be hewed to the demands of scientia, as is evident in his 
attempts to purge his own language of all metaphor and poetic license, of 
unnecessary imagery, and of everything subjective.  That idea never entered St. 
Thomas’ mind that language opens up the field of presence in which we dwell, 
that language shapes and structures the whole understanding of Being which is at 
work in a given age.  He lacked an historical consciousness in general and thus he 
lacked as well a consciousness of the historicality of language.  He did not 
thematize the medieval Latin spoken in the thirteenth-century universities, and so 
he never understood it to be a stage in the history of the address of language to 
man. (1982: 164) 
 
 Essentially, the concern comes down to something which we have encountered before in 
the Platonic tradition.  According to Caputo, Aquinas believes that he has fundamentally grasped 
the structure of reality by means of a discursive formulation because he thinks, fundamentally, 
that rational natures exist as static presences and that the goal of language is to act as a tool to 
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describe them, rather than language being something historically conditioned and given over by 
Being to allow it to come to presence in a particular age.   
In fairness, Caputo does not actually believe this, exactly, for he mentions that Aquinas is 
aware of things higher than conceptual science.  Indeed, in the final chapter of his study, he 
suggests that Aquinas ultimately does overcome metaphysics, but not in and through his 
philosophical work, but only by its abandonment (1982: 255-256).  Ultimately, the position of 
Caputo becomes identical and merges with Grassi’s distinction between negative theology and 
Heideggerian thought.  After discussing his view of Aquinas’s mysticism, he raises the question 
of what, then, is the difference between Heidegger and the mystical Thomas?  Caputo answers: 
In Heidegger, the hiddenness of Being, the withdrawn depths from which beings 
emerge into presence, is something final.  There is no further dimension which 
can be anticipated in which it would be possible to shed light on this darkness.  
Gelassenheit, the openness of thought to these mysterious depths, is the ultimate 
attitude which one can adopt.  But in religious mysticism such as is implicit in 
Thomas and explicit in Eckhart, this is not the case…. Religious Gelassenheit is 
openness to the mystery, but the mystery is not concealed from itself.  It is, and 
this is the believer’s faith, a sphere of self-openness, self-presence…. But the 
simple unity of esse and intellectus which stands at the summit of St. Thomas’ 
doctrine is essentially found beyond time and history.  This unio takes place most 
perfectly in eternity, in patria, in the homeland of the soul outside of time. (1982: 
280, 282) 
 
We see here exactly those same issues raised by Grassi.  For Caputo, religious mysticism 
is characterized intrinsically by the idea of a hidden, transcendent presence and, further, by an 
eternality which denies beings as a hindrance to the encounter with the divine.  This is not at all 
the case for Dionysius, however, for whom the equation of being and intelligibility firmly 
determine that that which gives being must itself be no-thing and, further, that it is only 
knowable insofar as it is concealed in beings as in symbols.  Likewise, we have seen that 
Palamas, following Dionysius, contributed a theological formulation specifically designed to 
maintain the utter transcendence of God from Being.  I shall now argue that Caputo is correct to 
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claim that Aquinas considered his “metaphysical” project conditional and aimed to overcome it.  
However, rather than this being attained by its utter abandonment for a higher form of presence, 
necessitated on Caputo’s view (it seems to me) by Aquinas’s alleged inability to think 
historically, I shall suggest that Aquinas here actually follows a traditional Platonic 
methodology.  I shall demonstrate that Aquinas was fully aware of the implications of language 
for the determination of meaning and, as such, his metaphysical “system” is a self-conscious 
exercise in Platonic dialectic, a form of the method of hypotheses.  For Aquinas, it is in and 
through discursive formulations that one is led to the mystery which juts up through an historical 
construct. 
First, I would like to engage the idea that Aquinas’s esse remains locked within the 
framework of a “-logic” which is inherently closed off to the transcendence of metaphysics.  This 
same question was asked by Jean-Luc Marion in his article “Thomas Aquinas and Onto-theo-
logy”: 
Yet Thomas Aquinas does not take away all the ambiguities implied by two 
features of the onto-theo-logic constitution of metaphysics.  First, is the 
nonreciprocity between God and created entities enough to get away with a 
metaphysical interpretation of creation?  Second, and in particular, would not the 
causal grounds of entities as well as that of the being of entities (as created esse 
commune) by God identify themselves with the metaphysical causation of entities 
by the supreme entity in metaphysics?  One immediately recognizes that the 
answer to these two questions depends on knowing, first, to what extent God 
remains tangentially ens supremum and, then, to what extent the act of being 
relies on being itself. (65) 
 
 Note here that Marion raises the exact same issue which caused Caputo to declare that 
Thomas did not think the difference between Being and beings.  Caputo stated his object in this 
way: 
What else is the “participational” structure of Being in St. Thomas but the 
“circling around one another” of esse in ens and ens in esse…. The being (ens) 
comes into Being (esse) in the coming-over of esse to the ens.  Esse, on the other 
137 
 
hand, comes over to the being (ens) by communicating itself to the ens.  Now, this 
articulation of the esse-ens relationship has to do with esse understood as esse 
commune, and this, as we have seen, is for St. Thomas a merely logical 
relationship.  But the same kind of circling holds true when esse means God.  
Then the circle becomes similitudo-process, the process of exitus and reditus.  In 
the first movement, God communicates, not His own esse, but the likeness of His 
esse, so that there is, as St. Thomas says, a kind of “diffusion” of the divine 
Being, not in the sense that it is broken up and spread around, but in the sense that 
its likeness is reproduced everywhere.  This is the exitus of God into the world, of 
esse subsistens into the ens creatum.  In the second movement, creatures arrive in 
the likeness of God; they come into Being as analogical, participated likenesses of 
Being itself.  Their very being is to be analogically like God. (1982: 154-155) 
 
 We see here that Caputo had proposed that the participation of all things in the likeness of 
God, by his presence to them as cause, is a foundational concept of the scientific, causal 
understanding of reality which leaves Aquinas’s thought locked in the frame of “-logic.”  
 In order to address this concern adequately, we must turn our attention to what Aquinas 
himself says about God as esse.  First, as we have already seen, within God, there is an identity 
between existence and essence according to Aquinas in the Summa Theologica (I q.3 a.4).  
Furthermore, Aquinas asserts: 
licet per revelationem gratiae in hac vita non cognoscamus de Deo, quid est, et sic 
ei quasi ignoto conjungamur; tamen plenius ipsum cognoscimus, inquantum 
plures, et excellentiores effectus ejus nobis demonstrantur, et inquantum ei aliqua 
attribuimus ex revelatione divina, ad quae ratio naturalis non pertingit: ut Deum 
esse trinum, et unum. 
 
Although through the revelation of grace in this life we are not able to know about 
God what he is and thus we are joined to him as if to an unknown; nevertheless 
we know him more fully inasmuch as more and more excellent of his effects are 
demonstrated to us, and inasmuch as we attribute other things to him from divine 
revelation to which natural reason does not obtain, such as that God is three and 
one. (I q.12 a.13 ad 1) 
 
 So we see here that God, as esse ipsum subsistens, is unknown and unknowable 
according to natural concepts.  Aquinas speaks here of that knowledge we do have being derived 
from God’s effects and from revelation.  However, despite the fact that Aquinas does lay out 
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these options for our coming to a certain kind of knowledge of God, it should be remembered 
that, like Plotinus, Thomas qualifies all his speech about God in advance, stating that: 
quod hujusmodi quidem nomina significant substantiam divinam, et praedicantur 
de Deo substantialiter, sed deficiunt a repraesentatione ipsius. Quod sic patet. 
Significant enim sic nomina Deum, secundum quod intellectus noster cognoscit 
ipsum. Intellectus autem noster, cum cognoscat Deum ex creaturis, sic cognoscit 
ipsum, secundum quod creaturae ipsum repraesentant. 
 
That names of this type indeed signify the divine substance and are predicated 
substantially about God, but they fall short from the representation of him.  Which 
is thusly proved.  For thus the names signify God, according to how our intellect 
knows him.  Morever, our intellect, since it knows God from creatures, thus 
knows him according to how creatures represent him. (I q.13 a.2 resp.) 
 
 Here Aquinas says quite clearly that God cannot be known in himself, but only through 
the medium of creatures.  This is vital because it adds a radical contingency to every statement, 
affirmation and denial, made of the divine.  It is important to note, however, that in the same 
article, Aquinas states: 
quod de nominibus, quae de Deo dicuntur negative, vel quae relationem ipsius ad 
creaturam significant, manifestum est, quod substantiam ejus nullo modo 
significant, sed remotionem alicujus ab ipso, vel relationem ejus ad alium, vel 
potius alicujus ad ipsum. 
 
That about the names which are said about God negatively or which signify his 
relation to creatures, it is manifest that they signify his substance in no way, but 
the remoteness of something from him or his relation to something or rather of 
something to him. 
 
Since it is already established that, within God, existence and essence are identical 
realities and, furthermore, that existence as such has no positive conceptual content, insofar as 
creatures are disbarred from knowing the essence of God which is just existence, esse, the 
question is raised: according to the principles established in the Summa Theologica regarding the 
proper efficacy of names with respect to God, should esse ipsum be considered a positive name 
or a negative name?  Given its lack of content, it seems necessary to conclude its position as a 
139 
 
negative name.  However, this releases God, from within the context of Thomas’s metaphysical 
arguments, from the ties of the “participational structure.”  It posits an essence of a “God without 
being,” beyond the dimensions of esse.  How then is the world said to be properly related to 
God? 
This is precisely where Aquinas could benefit from the more positive formulation of the 
distinction between essence and energies posited by Gregory Palamas.  It is precisely through his 
manifestation that the world bears relationship to God, but God is transcendent to that 
manifestation.  Thus, rather than participating in the divine esse in such a way that it terminates 
the question of Being as the actus essendi in the form of an extrinsic causal effect, rather the 
transcendent nature of God is just what radiates Being from himself.  God, being beyond esse, 
would be properly restored to his position as no-thing, as attested by the tradition.  If this is so, 
we would be returned to the structure of the revelatory power of being which we saw expressed 
in Dionysius.  If it could then be demonstrated that Aquinas has any conception of the revelatory 
power of language as manifest in history, we have now returned to the Platonic-Humanist 
formulation of reality which we have seen emerging across the scope of this study.  Indeed, even 
Caputo admits that if God can be liberated from his causal relation and seen to bear a relation of 
manifestation, then Aquinas will have broken through the barrier of onto-theo-logic (1982: 241). 
 Aquinas, however, does touch upon this issue.  Caputo’s argumentation relies heavily on 
the relationship of extrinsic efficient causality in order to function.  That is, Caputo follows 
Heidegger in conceiving of the relationship of God’s presence to creatures as a matter of 
production.  However, Aquinas’s own conception of God’s presence in creatures is significantly 
more complex than this for a number of reasons, and proper distinctions must be borne in mind.  
It is necessary to note the basic distinction between the talk of efficient causality related to God 
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and the normal meaning of efficient causality.  Efficient causality ordinarily implies causing an 
object’s act of becoming.  Aquinas, on the other hand, following Avicenna, argues for a distinct 
causality related to the act of being (De Potentia V.I).  However, while Avicenna permits the 
mediation of existential causality extrinsically through created effects, Aquinas holds this to be 
an impossibility (De Potentia III.IV).  However, this alone still does not allow Aquinas to meet 
Caputo’s criterion of a theophanic and manifestational understanding of the world’s relationship 
towards God.  It merely indicates that creatures reflect God in their being as his extrinsic effect. 
 This is not, however, Aquinas’s final word on the issue.  Aquinas maintains that creatures 
possess no proper potentiality for the act of being, as such, this diffusion of divine power must 
always be retained in beings as beings (De Potentia V.II).  However, Aquinas holds to the 
Aristotelian contact principle regarding the necessity of the presence of an agent to its patient.  
Aquinas furthermore extends this principle of Aristotelian physics to incorporeal acts.  As such, 
incorporeal agents must be considered spatially present to their patients, despite lacking intrinsic 
spatiality, in their entirety and not by parts.  Additionally, immaterial spatial presence does not 
exclude the presence of a body.  On the contrary, the closeness of an immaterial agent occupying 
the space of a body is a form of closeness beyond that of touching bodies, although the body 
does not reciprocally influence the immaterial agent (Goris 44).  Goris importantly notes that the 
spatial presence of the immaterial agent is only analogically related to that of a body by failing to 
be circumscribed, but that its spatial presence in the material world is not merely by its power 
nor by its intention.  The immaterial agent has a real spatial presence of its whole substance (43).  
Created spiritual agents can only be present in a single place due to the limitations of their own 
particular individuality.  God, by contrast, due to the fact that he is not any kind of being, but 
rather esse ipsum subsistens, is substantially present to all things at once as the source of their 
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individual esse proprium (47-48).  Due to the incommunicability of the act of being, indeed, 
God’s spatio-temporal, substantial presence in and to the creatures is an inextricable and intrinsic 
part of being a creature (49-50). 
 When the full implications of Aquinas’s notion of the omnipresence of God are combined 
with the insights stemming from Marion regarding the meaning of divine esse, in its negative 
aspect, a whole new conception of “causal” presence is brought to light.  When Aquinas says that 
God is the being of creatures non essentiale sed causale (In I Sent, d.8, q.1, a2, qtd in Goris 50 n. 
54) we should bear both these insights.  Together they signify that God is properly conceived as 
no-thing in itself, a God without being, who is substantially manifest intrinsically—rather than 
through extrinsic production—only in the spatio-temporal presence of creatures.  Aquinas’s 
vision of the relationship between God and the world is, like Dionysius’s, theophanic.  Here we 
see that Aquinas, like Plato, while using the language of metaphysical hypothesis transcends the 
normal limitations of that mode of expression from within.  While Caputo asserts that Aquinas is 
content to confine himself to the expression of scientia, he fails to see that Aquinas’s basic 
presuppositions about language and divine transcendence cause that very language to open into a 
mystery beyond itself.  Aquinas does not strive to free himself from metaphysics through a form 
of iconoclasm; he passes beyond and through metaphysics as through an icon.  
Another important topic is Thomas’s relationship to language.  Caputo has presented a 
view of an Aquinas who is focused on the acquisition of technical precision in language in order 
to overcome all possible forms of poetic ambiguity in order that language may be purged and 
purified for the sake of scientia.  Furthermore, he presents Thomas as oblivious to the shaping 
effect of language on the conception of Being possessed by those who use it, for instance, in 




Latin tongue, and that, moreover, Aquinas is oblivious to this fact.  Aquinas, so to speak, thinks 
within a tradition, but cannot think the tradition itself. 
In fact, contrary to this claim, a detailed survey of Thomas’s language, “Sur la langue 
technique de Saint Thomas d’Aquin” by F. A. Blanche, has revealed the exact opposite.  Rather 
than employing a sophisticated technical vocabulary tailored especially for scientia, Thomas 
employs a fluid, living approach to his language use.  As Pieper remarks: 
Thomas did not establish any definite, fixed terms which he planned to use in a 
consistent manner.  On the contrary, he was fond of employing several 
synonymous expressions side by side.  We find that he employs no less than ten 
different phrases to express the concept of relation.  Contrariwise, the word forma 
has ten different meanings as Thomas used it.  Causa efficiens is at one time 
causa effective, another time causa agens or active or movens.  It was, as Blanche 
says, not a mere chance matter of temperament, but the product of definite, clearly 
formulated principles.  Thomas was careful to avoid making exact, “precise” 
definitions of such fundamental concepts as “cognition” and “truth.”  For Thomas 
was convinced that an absolutely adequate name, completely and exhaustively 
defining a given subject or situation so that all alternatives are excluded and that 
name alone can be employed, simply cannot exist. (1991: 112-113). 
 
 In an over-emphasis on “systematic treatises” like the Summa Theologica, it can become 
easy to forget that the core of Scholastic instruction centered on the Quaestiones, and the above 
mentioned openness, ambiguity and play are present in these texts of St. Thomas.  Indeed, one 
could describe Thomistic quaestiones as often ending in the openness of Platonic aporia.36  This 
should come as no surprise since Aquinas, like Plato, was devoted to the user’s art with respect 
to language, stating: “nominibus utendum est ut plures utuntur//names must be used as the many 
use them” (qtd in Pieper 1991: 114). 
 
                                                 
36 This is not to imply something fundamentally unique about Thomas’s approach.  Thomas is here taken to be 
representative, not exceptional. 
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 Furthermore, Thomas was repeatedly insistent that, although he formulated discursive 
argumentation on the basis of Aristotelian essentialism, “formae substantiales per se ipsas sunt 
ignota//substantial forms are unknown through themselves” and “differentiae essentiales sunt 
nobis ignotae//essential differences are unknown to us” (qtd. in Pieper 1957: 65).  This is 
because we do not have access to essences except through their accidental qualities which 
Aquinas takes to reflect the essences like an effect reflects its cause (De Ente IV.94).  As a result 
of this, the names which express sensible particulars arise from their attendant circumstances 
since natures are only hypothetical constructs of our intellect (Pieper 1957: 65).  This has strong 
parallels to the indeterminacy of language and essence that is reflected in the writings of 
Plotinus.  Finally, belying Caputo’s claim that Aquinas was unaware of the determining power of 
linguistic constructions, we have Aquinas’s own testimony from the introduction of his 
polemical tract against the Greek attesting to just this form of sensitivity.  As Pieper elaborates: 
Nevertheless, St. Thomas’ small essay Against the Errors of the Greeks (1263) is 
important for several reasons.  In it, for instance, he formulates and advocates the 
principle of “benevolent interpretation,” that is to say, an interpretation which 
endeavors, as far as possible, to regard the text in question as understandable and 
acceptable.  He also expounds the impossibility of intelligently translating an idea 
from one language to another by translating “word for word.”  In spite of his 
inadequate knowledge of Greek, it appears that Thomas had learned by personal 
experience that translation, strictly speaking, is something altogether 
impossible… (1991: 90) 
 
 Here we see clearly that Thomas had an understanding that different linguistic 
circumstances give rise to fundamentally different apprehensions of being.  This is not to say 
there cannot be some communication across linguistic lines, but fundamentally translation is 
impossible.  If it were merely a matter of language acting as a neutral tool for describing an 
objectified rational concept, this impossibility could not arise.  This combined with Thomas’s 
view that linguistic expressions of sensible objects arise from their immediate context rather than 
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from a scientific comprehension of their essence militate against an understanding of his work 
according to the guidelines established by Grassi for what constitutes a Platonic, metaphysical 
philosopher. 
 Perhaps it will be objected, however, that Thomas expresses a negative view about the 
poets.  After all, he does describe poetry as defectum veritatis (Murray 64).  However, we should 
not rush too quickly to a conclusion on this matter.  Despite his characterization of the poets in 
this way, he acknowledges in his Commentary on the Sentences that there is a commonality of 
method between theology and poetry.  Specifically, both arts make use of metaphor to express 
that which reason is unable to grasp.  There is, of course, the contrast that poetry attends to that 
which is below reason and theology attends to that which exceeds our reason’s ability to grasp, 
such as mysteries of the faith (Murray 68).  However, it seems that we should not rush from a 
statement such as this to the conclusion that Thomas therefore has a negative view of all poetry.  
In looking at Thomas, we will find instead a keen similarity between himself and Plato on this 
point.   
As we have seen, Plato had many negative words about the poets; these disparaging 
remarks, however, largely result from his defining the limits of the poet to the mimetic imitator 
without techne nor love of wisdom.  That is to say, it was not by looking at the characteristics of 
artistry that a negative conclusion was reached about the artists.  Rather it was the very fact of 
their negative characteristics that caused them to be distinguished into the category of “poet.”  
On the other hand, those who were subject to the same divine inspiration, who likewise spoke 
with metaphors, but who, enflamed with love of the divine, turned their minds towards their 
revelations in the act of dialectic, were not called “poets” but rather “philosophers.”  It seems 
likely that something very similar is at work within the Thomistic corpus. 
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Indeed, Thomas refers to “theological poets” in his Commentary on the Metaphysics 
without intending to indicate the authors of scripture, but rather the illustrious artists among the 
Greeks (Murray 66).  He spoke of them there as “Isti autem potae quibusdam aenigmatibus 
fabularum aliquid de rerum natura tractaverunt//Moreover, those poets discoursed about the 
nature of things with certain riddles of fables” (1.4.83).  Furthermore, he accepted the idea that 
there had been divine revelation in general among the Gentiles, spoken through their prophets in 
myths and images (Pieper 1991: 146).  Let us remember, however, that Aquinas has already 
spoken in such a way as to privilege such theological discourse above the pursuit of reason.  
Now such statements apply not only to sacred scriptures, but also to the true poets among the 
nations.  We should not be dismayed, therefore, that some poets are depicted as of poor stock, for 
this opinion was found not only in Plato, but likewise in Heidegger in their joint criticisms of 
mimetic art. 
Compare Grassi’s claims about the view of poetry in the medieval context to what is 
actually found within the writings of Aquinas.  Grassi states that:  
From the traditional view point, the essential function of poetry was to express the 
ontologically established truth.  For Mussato [a Humanist], however, it 
represented the original and eternal manifestation of divine power, such as it is 
revealed in history, where things are constantly re-discovered and assume a new 
significance. (1988: 12) 
 
 Likewise, he draws on Salutati’s radicalizing of the ideas found in Mussato and 
Boccaccio: 
The poets, whether they create fables in rhyme or report the pure truth about 
historic deeds… have as their inmost desire to point to something that goes 
beyond nature, customs, or actual deeds…. These authors [the Theologians] 
therefore tell us of the secret of the true God form behind the veil of poetic 
language.  Under the force of necessity, they discovered that manner of speaking 
that made use of the poetic… And if for this reason we change the words, objects, 




and in manner he wishes—we then speak and act with regard to what cannot be 
spoken. (qtd. in Grassi 1983: 66-67) 
 
 When Grassi describes what he takes to be the medieval view of poetry, he intends a 
situation in which an already determined rational proposition is covered over with imagery in 
order to make it more appealing or easier to understand.  By contrast, the Humanists view poetry 
as being subject to a divine inspiration which helps to pull up an originary understanding of 
reality in their current circumstances.  This latter view more closely corresponds to Thomas’s 
assessment of the theological poets.  They are spoken of explicitly as having God speak through 
them, and he makes perfectly clear that poetic metaphor, in theology, attests to things above and 
beyond reason, which makes understanding the theological message of the poets as a rationally 
deduced concept utterly untenable.  Rather, we should take these assertions as indicating the 
manner in which God wished to reveal himself among the nations at a particular time and place.  
This view coheres with the continuum of Aquinas’s other ontological and linguistic insights. 
 Overall, far from being a metaphysician inscribed within the sphere of rational discourse, 
Aquinas has revealed himself to have a deeply mystical insight into the nature of Being, derived 
from his Platonic influences, which manifests itself within the dialectical relationship to 
discursive reality which has been characteristic of all the Platonists we have encountered.  
Thomas is vividly aware of the insufficiency of rational, discursive discourse to capture and 
contain the utterly transcendent God who manifests himself in all of created reality as a series of 
symbols.  I shall conclude this chapter with a quote from Josef Pieper which illustrates this fact 
in a vivid fashion: 
The act of falling silent, however, was only the most superficial existential 
embodiment of an attitude which Thomas had already expounded, and whose 
theoretical basis he made clearer and clearer with the passing of the years.  This 
attitude is revealed not only in the fragmentary character of his work; not only in 
what is missing, but also in what he explicitly says.  For he explicitly says that all 
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our knowledge, including the knowledge of theologians, is fragmentary in 
character.  The clarity of St. Thomas’s diction is deceptive.  Chenu speaks of 
argumentation “within the mystery.”  Thomas was so little a classicist of 
systematic thought that, on the contrary, we become aware that he cherished “an 
extreme suspicious of systems.” (Pieper 1991: 158-159) 
 
From here, I shall move on to the final chapter of this study, in which I shall compare the 
Humanists to that Platonist who is depicted as their most direct adversary as he is their 
immediate contemporary.  We shall see whether Marsilio Ficino indeed takes the school of 
Platonic philosophy away from the shared insights of Plato, Plotinus, Dionysius, Palamas and 
Thomas and into the depths of metaphysical and rationalistic thinking or whether he continues as 



















Marsilio Ficino, the Humanists and Proceeding Orphically 
 
 In the first chapter of this study, I gave a general overview of a number of scholarly 
approaches to the definition of Renaissance Humanism.  I would like to return to that subject, but 
with an eye to how these different scholarly interpretations relate to the place of Marsilio Ficino 
with respect to the movement.  After this initial overview, I will return to the question of the 
thought of Ficino himself and how he compares to the rest of the figures we have looked at so far 
in this study. 
 In Chapter One, I discussed Paul Oskar Kristeller who saw a conceptual divide between 
the various fields of Renaissance scholarly activity.  Ficino was without a doubt the greatest 
representative of the emerging Platonic philosophical movement of the Renaissance and was 
heavily influenced by the Humanists.  His literary style and his copious supply of formal letters 
for publication both reflect his Humanist education.  Additionally, his strong attraction to 
Platonism and his assiduous attention to classical texts are all characteristics shared by many 
Humanists (Kristeller 1943: 12-13). 
 However, Kristeller is unwilling to consider the contributions of Ficino—or Renaissance 
Platonism in general—as an authentically Humanist endeavor.  Several factors play into this 
separation.  The first is the strong continuity which Kristeller observes between the Platonic 
tradition under Ficino and the preceding Augustinian and Aristotelian traditions of the medieval 
period (Kristeller 1990: 58).  Indeed, he notes that Ficino quoted entire pages from Augustine in 
support of his adaptation of Platonism to Christianity.  He also notes that Ficino was influenced 
heavily in certain elements of metaphysics by Thomas Aquinas’s work Summa Contra Gentiles 
(Kristeller 1943: 14-15).  Indeed, it has been noted by Ardis Collins that it is not only Augustine 
from whom Ficino quotes entire pages—Thomas also enjoys a similar privilege within Ficino’s 
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magnum opus, the Platonic Theology (x).  Additionally, other works, such as his unfinished 
commentary on St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, appear to have been formed with massive 
borrowing.  Both in form and content, Ficino’s commentary mimics Thomas’s own (Lauster 47). 
 However, these influences alone are not the main reason for the exclusion of Ficino from 
the Humanist canon.  Rather, it is his subject matter which causes him to be excluded.  As I 
showed in Chapter One, Kristeller considered Humanism to be a movement primarily concerned 
with literature and education.  Indeed, he explicitly banishes metaphysical speculation form the 
realm proper to Humanist thought.  Ficino, however, he considers to have been a profoundly 
metaphysical thinker, stating of his work: 
There was at the time a profound intellectual gap between dogmatic theology 
which had its basis in faith, and Aristotelian scholasticism which was then largely 
limited to logic and physics.  This gap could not be bridged by a purely literary or 
scholarly Humanism but rather by a metaphysical Platonism based on reason and 
on the most respected ancient authorities besides Aristotle.  This Platonism did 
not oppose the Christian religion or the Aristotelian science of the time, and it did 
not attempt to replace them.  It rather tended to supplement them in an area of 
thought that been neglected up to that moment but now had become increasingly 
important for a large number of writers, scholars and thinkers. (Kristeller 1990: 
90-91)  
 
 From Kristeller’s perspective, Ficino was not merely influenced by the traditions of 
Augustine and Thomas, but rather his primary aim was deeply involved with them.  In this way, 
while possessing a certain Humanist style and being influenced by them in the selection of his 
subject matter, Ficino for Kristeller is a profoundly scholastic figure.  His concern with 
metaphysics, Thomism and reason in the form of syllogistic argumentation all seem to guarantee 
that he be excluded from Humanism, properly speaking.  Thus, while Kristeller regards 
Humanism as being exclusively the provenance of certain literary experts and scholars, the 
Humanists’ broad interest in the revival of elements of classical antiquity and close attention to 
texts allowed them to acquire “fellow travelers” in their cultural program, even if those 
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individuals were not Humanists, properly speaking.  Ficino, who according to Kristeller was 
primarily concerned with the philosophy of Platonism in its metaphysical form, appears to fall 
into this category of thinker. 
 Another prominent scholar of Marsilio Ficino, Michael J. B. Allen, appears to 
fundamentally agree with Kristeller’s basic project.  In his work The Platonism of Marsilio 
Ficino he goes so far as to link his work explicitly as subsidiary to the work of Kristeller.  He 
suggests that while Kristeller, in his magisterial monograph The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino, 
had focused on developing Ficino’s themes in his Platonic Theology in a systematic fashion, 
Allen himself would be making a small supplement to that work by explicating the themes 
explored by Ficino in his commentary on the Phaedrus (Allen 1984: xii).  Although Allen is 
more apt than Kristeller to recognize elements of esotericism, mysticism and demonology in the 
works of Ficino (Allen 1984: 24), he still feels that fundamentally the rational philosophical 
content of Ficino’s Platonism must be abstracted from his other contributions—or even his 
methodologies—as the pinnacle of his intellectual achievement (Allen 2006: 5-6).  As a result of 
this view, Allen—like Kristeller—has devoted all of his scholarly attention to works which are 
explicitly philosophical, the Platonic Theology and his Platonic commentaries, without paying 
due attention to their place in the totality of his corpus.  This decision is not merely one of 
necessity in approaching a large body of mostly unedited primary sources, but one which hangs 
upon a hermeneutical presupposition that the true treasures of Ficino’s thought are to be found in 
his Platonic works alone and that his other works are merely popular or apologetic (Allen 1998: 
42). 
 As opposed to Kristeller (and, of course, Grassi), Amos Edelheit positively includes 
Ficino within the context of Renaissance Humanism.  Indeed, Edelheit responds directly to 
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Kristeller in the introduction of his work.  While Kristeller presents Humanism as an exclusively 
cultural phenomenon and wishes to draw a distinction between the movement and scholasticism, 
Edelheit points out that Kristeller has this compartmentalization on display in his work on 
Ficino’s philosophy.  In this work Kristeller offers a criticism of the use of the term “mysticism” 
because he wishes to maintain a sharp distinction between philosophical speculation and 
religious thought.  This distinction, however, is completely alien to a writer like Ficino who 
named his primary philosophical work the Platonic Theology (Edelheit 12).  Essentially, 
Kristeller wishes to extract and rarify the philosophical components of Ficino as an abstract, 
rationalistic and primarily secular system of thought, completely divorced from his humanistic 
context.  According to Edelheit, this characterization results in a profound misunderstanding of 
both Ficino’s place in intellectual history and Humanism itself (12). 
 One may be left to wonder, however, if this is simply a matter of terminology.  Is there a 
substantial difference between calling Ficino a Humanist, as Edelheit does, and calling him a 
philosopher who was influenced by Humanism, as Kristeller does?  Does the content of his 
thought remain the same in either case?  Edelheit clearly believes that the labeling is important 
and his primary motivation for this belief rests upon the idea that, by isolating Ficino as a 
philosopher with Humanist influences, the true dynamic interplay of those influences within the 
body of his thought is substantially wounded.  Edelheit’s assertion is borne out in Kristeller’s 
treatment of Ficino as a rationalistic philosopher in a way which is almost completely detached 
from other fields of inquiry.  If there is, in fact, more to Ficino than that, then this has clearly 
been detrimental to a proper understanding of Ficino’s place in Humanism.  Indeed, this kind of 




certainly the reading of all Humanism by Heidegger, which Grassi asserts arose from Kristeller’s 
treatment of Renaissance philosophy by way of his interpretation of Ficino. 
 Edelheit set forth to demonstrate his claim by examining Ficino’s theological works in 
order to expose the radically different theoretical orientation from medieval scholasticism 
therein.  Edelheit notes that, in his Praedicationes, Ficino does not employ the normal 
methodology of scholastic philosophy in the form of syllogisms, demonstrations and refutations, 
but rather relies on the informal rhetorical style championed by the Humanists in their rejection 
of scholastic jargon (Edelheit 15).  He further notes that, while Ficino sometimes draws upon 
Aristotelian categories, he also blends them with new sources grounded in the Humanist 
rediscovery of the sources of Platonism (Edelheit 149-150). 
 Furthermore, in a move which is particularly important due to Kristeller’s 
characterization of Ficino as a largely secular, rationalist philosopher, Edelheit notes that when it 
comes to the question of what differentiates man from other entities, Ficino does not fall back on 
the Aristotelian trope of mankind’s reason being his distinguishing factor.  Instead, he expresses 
the view that man’s religiosity is what distinguishes him (Edelheit 150).  This could perhaps be 
regarded as a relatively minor modification, except for the view that Ficino holds regarding the 
nature of religion as expressed in his theological work, De Christiana religion.  In particular, he 
asserts that religious truth is an historical encounter.  Ficino quite clearly holds that the content 
of religious truth arises from its specific historical context through what he calls the prisca 
religio, the ancient religion.  In this way he is able to successfully incorporate the pre-Christian 
religions not only of Judaism, but of pagan antiquity, into a providential schema which 




unfolding of Hermetic, Zoroastrian, Orphic and Platonic wisdom as instance of the truth of 
religion in history (Edelheit 209). 
 It is particularly important to note that the prisca theologia for Ficino is not the same 
thing as natural religion.  That is, in the formation of lines of transmission, the power of the 
human intellect does not attain throughout history to atemporal truths.  Instead, there is an 
historical clearing to make way for the meaning of being to come forth.  That is, the prisca 
theologia arises in history by a kind of divine revelation, manifest in particular historical 
circumstances (Idel 148).  This is vitally important when looking at Grassi’s thesis regarding 
Ficino’s Platonism as starting from a point of concern with ontology and then moving into 
rational deductions from that being.  For, in his theological works, Ficino expresses a view very 
similar to one of which Grassi speaks positively as an example of the power of the poetic word in 
the new Humanist model of thought.  Grassi states: 
In the unhiddenness which the poetic statement reveals to us, gods, things, and 
creatures appear with their original meaning.  But here we must ask, if we are to 
speak of gods, with what gods are we concerned?  Are we concerned with just 
those of the ancients or with those of the Old and New Testaments as well?  
Salutati’s answer is that there is a single invisible God, revealed differently in 
different historical forms in different places and times. (1983: 25) 
 
 Grassi then proceeds to quote from Salutati at length, in a statement which deserves to be 
reproduced because of its proximity to Ficino’s own view of the development of religious 
thought throughout history: 
But since they [the poets] saw that God, the architect of the whole world, 
completed everything in wisdom… and yet wisdom is nothing other than God 
himself, they called God by different names although they felt that it was one and 
the same…. So it should not seem doubtful to anyone that even with such a large 
number of gods, the poets did not think of many, but of just one.  But they 
variously named this God because of the divergent variety of his tasks, times and 





Additionally, despite his view of the culmination of the ancient religion in Christianity, 
Ficino does not view the historical transformation of religion to be yet concluded.  Indeed, he 
notes that Christianity has declined into a mere formalism in his own day and that miracles now 
rarely occur.  This seems to be the motivating factor behind his own Christian Platonism.  It is 
intended to serve as a point of renewal to rejuvenate Christianity in the historical unfolding of 
religion (Edelheit 213).  This combination of historical consciousness and the avoidance of the 
typical scholastic modes of argumentation in favor of an informal, rhetorical style are both 
characteristics of the Humanist movement, and thus contributing factors in Edelheit’s 
characterization of Ficino as an authentically humanistic theologian. 
 Edelheit’s position on the matter is strengthened by the input of James Hankins, who 
points out that, in contrast to traditional scholastic methodology, Ficino appears to reject 
philosophical foundationalism (Hankins 2008: 110-111).  Hankins describes Ficino as a 
theological coherentist whose standard methodology is grounded not in providing a chain of 
logical demonstrations, culminating in a systematic treatise, but rather by bringing his reader to 
see the beauty of the correspondence of the parts to the whole.  That is, Ficino seeks to show his 
reader how various independent philosophical arguments cohere as an interrelated network, 
rather than a chain of syllogisms derived from first principles (Hankins 2008: 111).  This is 
considerably more consonant with the method described by Edelheit in Ficino’s theological 
works, a method grounded in rhetorical persuasion rather than strict logical force. 
 Having now provided an overview of some of the competing interpretations of Ficino’s 
place with respect to Humanism, to which we shall return, I would like to establish that Ficino, 
like those Platonists before him, has a conception of the ontological difference.  While it is true 
that in his largest work, the Platonic Theology, he attempts to downplay the significance of the 
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One beyond Being, the fact that he does indeed still hold this position is most manifest in his 
debates with Pico della Mirandola about the highest principle of reality (Dillon 2011: 14-15).   
Pico asserted that Plato’s Parmenides did not contain any information that might give 
hints at the structure of reality, but rather that it was an example of a logical exercise.  Pico 
proposed this idea in service of a larger philosophical project, the reconciliation of Platonic and 
Aristotelian thought.  By designating the Parmenides as concerned purely with logical 
disputation, Pico hoped to eradicate the necessity of dealing with the apparent conflict between 
Aristotle’s vision of being as the highest principle of reality and the more traditional Platonic 
notion that the One stands beyond, over and above beings (Allen 1986: 421). 
Ficino, however, could not see any way to reconcile such a reading of the dialogue with 
either the testimony of the ancient pagan Platonists or, more importantly, with the testimony of 
Dionysius the Areopagite as to the utter transcendence of God or the One over all being (Allen 
1986: 451).  Thus, in his commentary on the Parmenides, we find Ficino insistent on the 
transcendent One beyond Being:  
Quoniam vero suppositio prima colit ipsum simpliciter unum ente superius, ideo 
omnes ab eo entium conditiones negat.  Est enim ab omnibus absolutum, 
tamquam principium finale, praecipue et emineneter efficiens. 
 
The first hypothesis concerns the absolute One that is superior to being.  
Therefore, it denies of it all the conditions of beings.  For the One transcends all 
things, so to speak, the final principle and first and eminently efficient cause.37 
(LII.1) 
 
 Note that in the above passage, Vanhaelen translated tamquam principium finale et 
eminenter efficiens as simply “as the final principle and eminently efficient cause.”  I have 
instead rendered tamquam as “so to speak.”  I do this on the basis of imitating the sense offered 
by Plotinus’s mode of speech about the One, in which he often couched any positive declarations 
                                                 
37 Translation is Vanhaelen’s with some emendations. 
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about it in similar terms.  This movement is justified further by Ficino’s own words in Chapter 
Fifty-Four of the same commentary: 
Affirmationes circa summum deum fallaces admodum periculosaeque sunt.  
Solemus enim in quotidianis affirmationibus nostris certam quondam speciem 
proprietatemque concipere et applicare aliquid alteri atque definire. 
 
Assertions about the highest God are utterly false and dangerous.  For we are 
accustomed in our everyday assertions to designate some particular species and 
property, to attribute something to something else, and to establish a definition. 
(LIV.1) 
 
 We may recall a similar admonition from Plotinus.  Everything that is said about the 
highest principle is automatically a distortion of its nature because it surpasses all things and is, 
therefore, no-thing.  This constitutes an affirmation of the principle that we have seen shared by 
Platonists: that there is a fundamental ontological chasm between beings and that which is other 
than beings. 
 As with other instances of the presentation of being beyond being, in the case of Ficino, 
this argument entails that the One has no definitive, concrete nature that can be grasped by 
thought.  He specifically denies this, even going so far as to call affirmations about the One 
“dangerous” because such affirmations make the mistake of confusing this first principle with a 
being and therefore definere, define or delimit, it.  
 This unlimited nature of the One is important to the discussion of the omnipresence of 
God.  In the Platonic Theology, Ficino writes: 
Difficile reperitur ubi sit deus, quia nusquam est quod nullius vel subiecti vel loci 
limite cohibetur.  Difficilius reperitur ubi non sit, quis in omnibus est illud in quo 
sunt, per quod fiunt, per quod servantur quaelibet ‘ubique.’  Deus ideo est in 
omnibus, quia Omnia in eo sunt.  Quae nisi essent in eo, essent nusquam et 
omnino non essent.  Per deum hoc ipsum ‘ubi’ est diciturque ‘ubique.’ 
 
It is difficult to find where God is because nowhere is that which is not confined 
by the limit of either substrate or place.  It is more difficult to find where he is not.  
For present in all things is that in which things everywhere exist, by which they 
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are made, through which they are preserved.  God is in all things, therefore, 
because all things are in Him.  If they were not in him, they would be nowhere 
and completely non-existent.  Through God “where” itself exists and is said to be 
“everywhere.” (II.6.4) 
 
 Statements like these recall the teachings of Dionysius the Areopagite.  For Dionysius, 
because God is beyond being, he is not determinate, whereas everything which has being is of a 
determinate character.  In turn, all beings are constituted by the limitation and difference from 
one another (Allen 1989: 62-63).  In order to be anything at all, however, they rely on the 
oneness of God to make them one.  As a result of this, God is present to and in all beings, even 
though he is nowhere and no being (Ficino 1985: 47).  It likewise recalls the teaching of the 
omnipresence of God in Aquinas wherein it was demonstrated that precisely insofar as God is 
absent, he manifests himself through his presence to and in all created realities. 
 As a result of this ineffable presence of God permeating all reality, the world for Ficino is 
pervaded by divine “sympathy” (Celenza 89).  This understanding originated with Iamblichus; it 
had a long pedigree by the time it reached Ficino, however, having been a principle accepted by 
both Proclus and Dionysius.  The sympathetic relationship between the transcendent divinity of 
God and the world allows the material world to appear precisely as symbol, as an analogy for 
transcendence.  The sympathetic relationships are not mimetic.  The transcendent is not an 
object, a presence or a concept that can be imitated, as God is not a being of any kind.  Struck 
describes symbolic poetry in this fashion: 
According to Proclus, the symbols are usually jarring, corporeal, sometimes even 
vulgar depictions of divine natures involved in the material world.  The 
“symbolic” category of poetry seems clearly to have been developed in a 
defensive context.  Those things that will count as symbols in Proclus’s thinking 
are those that most offended the poets’ traditional critics, including Plato: the 
castration of Ouranos, the binding of Zeus, Ares’ tryst with Aphrodite, the 
expulsion of Hephaestus from Heaven.  Proclus consistently invokes these 
infamous scenes as examples of the poets’ greatest achievements.  They are proofs 
of their inspired, hyperrational wisdom.  Symbolic poetry arises from a divine 
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madness that is higher than reason; it emanates from the Muses, possesses the 
poet, and then radiates out to the poet’s readers.  The parallels to the Ion are clear.  
When writing “symbolic” poetry, the poet is no longer an imitator of mere 
appearances, rather he acts according to a higher principle.  The poet produces 
base images, just as the demiurge of nature takes the unified world of the higher 
principles and stamps them into inert matter, and, precisely like the theurgist, 
fashions statues that carry a trace of divine presence. (242-243) 
 
 Thus, through poetic expression, new ways of encountering reality can appear by virtue 
of the divine transcendence jutting up through them.  There are alternative ways of talking about 
poetry, however.  Grassi brings up the imagery employed by Cristoforo Landino.  He begins by 
saying:  
It was, as Landino explains, not the philosophers but the poets who proclaimed 
the laws by means of which human society was first constituted…. The poets are 
rightly termed Vates, from vi mentis, in Latin because all of them are 
characterized by great agitation and intellectual effort.  The Greeks called them 
poetae, a derivation from the verb poieo which means to create. (1983: 93-94). 
 
 In this, Grassi recognizes a conformity with what he considers to be the authentic 
Humanist tradition.  However, he quickly reverses that view and designates Landino a Platonic 
pretender: 
For Landino’s further remarks the influence of Platonic thought becomes more 
and more apparent.  Poetry has its primacy only to the extent that it leads man, 
who always lives in a concrete historical situation, to a reality that lies “outside of 
time and history.”  Poetry serves for Landino only to transport us back “to our 
original fatherland” (“rivolare all’ antica patria”).  As our souls dwelling in 
heaven they participated in that harmony in which the eternal spirit of God 
consists and from which the movement and order of the heavens come.  But they 
then dove into the earthly slime (“nel terreno limo sommersi”) and can only now 
hear the musical relationships that are our basis.”  Poetry leads to a necessary 
liberation from our earthly ties, because the soul is hindered by the senses from 
exercising its original activity (“e dai terreni legami retardato l’animo”). (1983: 
94) 
 
 It is certainly the case that Ficino, too, speaks about poetry in the manner described here 




Thus when the soul has received through the physical senses those images which 
are within material objects, we remember what we knew before when we existed 
outside the prison of the body… The whole soul then kindles with desire to fly 
back to its rightful home, so that it may enjoy that true music again.  It realizes 
that as long as it is enclosed in the dark abode of the body it can in no way reach 
that music. (1975: 46-48). 
 
However, questions immediately arise.  First, in the passage, Ficino seems to claim that 
the soul has previously enjoyed heavenly music in a state of pre-existence.  However, this claim 
seems entirely unlikely to be meant in a literal sense, for in Book XVII of the Platonic Theology 
he spends a considerable amount of time discussing the views of the various ancient Platonic 
academies about the nature of the soul.  In XVII.4.2, he explicitly states: “Sed non putamus ob 
hoc necessarium esse eam sursum atque deorsum vices innumerabiles agere//But we do not think 
on account of this that it is necessary that it [the soul] travel up and down innumerable times” 
and “numquam tamen fiat vera de specie in speciem transmigratio//nevertheless a true 
transmigration from species into species never happens.”  That is to say, that when Ficino speaks 
in this fashion we should emulate his treatment of Plato on this matter: “sed multa, quae de 
circuitu eius ab ipso tractantur, tamquam poetica, aliter intellegimus quam verba videantur 
significare//but much which they say about its circuit from itself, as poetic, we understand 
otherwise than the words seem to signify” (XVII.4.1).   
However, to explain what he takes to be the true faculties of the soul in that same chapter, 
Ficino makes a reference to the soul being “pregnant with the seeds of every kind of life.”  This 
statement itself is a reference to the Ficino’s conception of the human soul as being a microcosm 
of the universe for the purposes of reinforcing its demiurgic ability, for as Ficino says elsewhere: 
“Est utique deus in terris” (Platonic Theology XVI.6.7).  If Ficino’s description of the nature of 
the divine furor of poetics is itself a poetic embellishment, what should it mean other than the 
abandonment of the body and our temporal circumstances?  It should be taken for the recognition 
160 
 
of the transcendent working through the material signs and thereby destroying our lives of idle 
chatter and opening up the possibility of new worlds, in the here and now.  The poetry carries 
one beyond their own world so that the world can be made anew.   
Such a thing, if not explicit, is at least implicit in other accounts of divine inspiration, 
such as that of Salutati, which are found among the Humanists that Grassi favors.  Indeed, Grassi 
himself emphasizes that Salutati holds that “through poetry, men are ‘diverted from that which 
their senses present to them’” (1983: 24).  This explanation has the added strength that it unites 
the two statements of Landino rather than producing a schizophrenic image of the artist as one 
who grounds culture while fleeing from the world.  Furthermore, Landino did not receive one 
image (flight from the world) from the Platonists and the other (culture creator) from some other 
source, rather both originated in his Platonic instruction (Tigerstedt 1968: 473-474).  Entering 
into the divine fury did not mean the abandonment of the world and the temporal for some 
reified intellectualized state.  Angela Voss describes the general idea in this manner: 
Thus ‘to proceed Orphically’ meant adopting a poetic vision, a vision rich in 
mythology, symbol, allegory, metaphor.  Indeed Michael Allen has pointed out 
that ‘to proceed Orphically was the only way of accommodating polytheistic 
structures to the deep grammar of monotheism.’  And the only way to ‘proceed 
Orphically’ was to transcend logical thinking and abandon oneself to Eros... (Voss 
236) 
 
 This is not the abandonment of the world; this is the use of metaphors and images from 
the experience of artistic reality in order to help structure and shape the intelligibility of the 
world.  In short, this constitutes the standard activity of the Humanists as understood by Grassi. 
 This view is manifest in the account of Ficino’s views on dialectic.  Allen points out that 
Ficino’s resuscitation of Platonic dialectic (pace Kristeller) aims directly at overturning the 
syllogistic logic predominant among his contemporary scholastic Aristotelian colleagues (1998: 
190-191).  However, Allen, while preserving keen insights into Ficino’s appropriation of Platonic 
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dialectic, makes errors regarding the implications of those insights because he relies on an 
account of Platonic and Neoplatonic dialectic developed by Guthrie in his A History of Greek 
Philosophy which rests upon a quintessentially modern way of reading Plato.  As a result, he 
conceives of the Forms as hypostasized static essences, in conformity with the view espoused by 
the later Heidegger, and the Good as a “first principle” identified with a “premiss” (Allen 1998: 
151).   
However, this view is erroneous in its reading of Plato and likewise not reflected in the 
development of the tradition by Plotinus.  Furthermore, since in Christian reformulations—
including those of Dionysius, Aquinas and Ficino—the Forms are included within the effable 
essence of the God beyond being, it becomes untenable to render them as static presences.  On 
the contrary, since Dionysius the Forms as “divine names” have stood as the conduit in which 
God shines forth in creatures as a theophany while remaining himself unparticipated—a 
conception seen reflected in Ficino’s comments on divine omnipresence (Boland: 142).  As such, 
I shall draw upon Allen’s account of Ficino’s dialectic, but offer a correction according to the 
more properly Platonic understanding of intelligible reality established in Plato and found 
reflected in Ficino.  Furthermore, I shall show how this Platonic conception of dialectic takes 
Ficino even further away from being a rationalistic philosopher than even Hankins’s coherentist 
view of his thought. 
 First, Ficino’s conception of dialectic shares the perspective with Plato that dialectic, like 
poetry, is an inspired activity.  Indeed, just as in the Orphic ecstasies described above, the 
encounter with the transcendent is a fundamental aspect of the entire activity (Allen 1998: 190).  
This separates dialectic from Aristotelian logic which is concerned with “tautological 
predication” (155) and “mundane, circumscribed and technical” issues (191).  Ficinian dialectic, 
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rather, is concerned with the “transcendent art of non-tautalogical predication” (155).  Within 
Aristotelian logic, the primary element of the task is concerned with demonstration, operating 
within the system to produce a syllogism which allegedly corresponds to the objective reality of 
the situations and thereby establishes its truth (161).   
By contrast, in his commentary on the Parmenides, Ficino mentions that, in engaging in 
Platonic dialectic, the master “exercitaturo videlicet ingenium//for surely training the ingenium” 
(Proem).  This corresponds to what Grassi had established as a major aspect of the Humanist 
program.  Being calls within concrete historical circumstances and human beings respond by the 
exercise and training of their ingenium as the faculty of gathering together into likenesses 
through topological philosophy and thereby introducing new grounds for encountering the world 
in its intelligibility.  Likewise, Plato emphasized that knowledge of things arose and manifested 
itself in concrete historical circumstances through the exercises of the “user’s art” of dialectic.  
Dialectic thereby becomes the privileged place where everydayness and idle chatter are 
destroyed, and, thereby, beings are able to come forward in their truth.  
 So far, everything that has been said has been in line with the understanding of dialectic 
which has been developed throughout the body of this study.  Allen’s analysis, however, has 
picked up a few elements from modern understandings of Plato which undermine the essence of 
Platonic dialectic. Indeed, whereas I have argued that Plato’s thought bears similarity to Grassi’s 
idea about the essence of Humanism, Allen argues that Ficinian dialectic differs markedly from 
both Aristotelian logic and the more “logocentric,” rhetorical analyses of the rise of meaning 
offered by, for example, Lorzeno Valla, for which Grassi is a partisan (Allen 1998: 191).  He 
draws this distinction precisely because he has fallen under contemporary ideas regarding Plato’s 
own vision of reality and, therefore, how that is expressed and manifest in later Platonists such as 
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Ficino.  For instance, Allen asserts that Plato’s dialectic is concerned with attaining “certainty,” 
and that the fundamental distinction between the mathematician’s dianoia and the noesis of the 
dialectician is this attainment of certainty (151).  Allen thinks, therefore, that the Platonic Forms 
should be identified with objects, static presences, standing ready for perception, and, 
furthermore, following Guthrie, that those objects should be identified with “general concepts” 
(153-154).  This conception allows Allen to say of the experienced dialectician:  “Whereas his 
earlier hypotheses had begun as provisional, non-deductive and subject to elenchoi, his later 
definitions end up as ‘examined,’ truly deduced from ‘the certainty of the first principle’ and 
therefore irrefutable” (151). 
 This analysis does not correspond to what we have seen of Platonic dialectic, however.  
In the Seventh Letter, the identification of real knowledge with a “concept” is an unsustainable 
claim because Plato identifies concepts as among those things subject to refutation and 
destruction within the dialectical method.38  If concepts must be destroyed, then how are they, in 
fact, to be taken as the ultimate ground of reality?  Furthermore, the distinction which Guthrie 
draws between dianoia and noesis is far from clear.  He seems to imply that it is merely a 
difference of degree—the mathematicians offer a collection of postulates, but the dialectician 
moves beyond them by adding one more proper postulate, the account of the first principle.  
However, if this is the case, the strong distinction which Plato established between dianoia and 
noesis seems to collapse.  In fact, dialectic does not aim at the accumulation of objective data, 
but rather at establishing a depth of intuitive understanding which helps to refine one’s ability to  
 
                                                 
38 The acceptance of the Seventh Letter is purely methodological, as stated in the Introduction of this study, and does 
not imply an argument for or against its actual authenticity.  The basic concept cited here, found in summary in 
the Seventh Letter, has been established as Platonic through an examination of the dialogues in Chapter Two. 
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properly make assertions because the assertions themselves are better understood.  This is a 
difference in kind, not of degree. 
This seems, however, to be impossible.  First, Ficino has not established a “world of 
ideas,” standing concretely, waiting for perception.  Instead, he has followed Dionysius the 
Areopagite in asserting the utter transcendence of God and joining the intelligible paradigms, the 
divine names, to that ineffable reality as what is thrown forth into beings.  That is, he has 
established being as a fundamentally theophanic manifestation of that which is beyond being.  
However, as with Dionysius, what lies beyond the symbolic nature of beings is no-thing, not a 
static presence for clear viewing.  Second, Allen himself makes statements about Ficino’s own 
conception of dialectic that stand in contrast with Guthrie’s idea, but which are in perfect 
conformity with Plato’s own views of dialectic.   
Allen, for instance, recognizes that for Ficino the knowledge gained in the noetic insight 
produced by dialectic is non-discursive (1998: 170).  Furthermore, Allen asserts that Ficino “was 
reluctant to think of human souls ever abandoning discursiveness altogether” (1998: 171).  That 
is to say, Ficino adopts the position which is manifest in Plato—noetic insight is obtained by the 
continual engagement with the destabilization of hypotheses in dialectical activity.  However, in 
what way is an additional postulate in a chain of deductive reasoning rendered non-discursive?  
This seems to be an incomprehensible claim if the Forms are to be identified with “general 
concepts” and that dialectic aims for “certainty” in Guthrie’s fashion.  After all, one does not 
need to continually engage in dialect in order to grasp the Platonic version of Descartes’s cogito, 
whereas Plato and Ficino both present this as the way in which dialectic is practiced.   
These similarities between Plato’s own conception of dialectic and Ficino’s reception of 
it also render Hankins’s coherentist assessment of Ficino dubious at best, although he was right 
165 
 
to challenge the idea of Ficino as a foundationalist.  In order to explore this issue more fully, it is 
important to map out more closely what Hankins takes coherentism to mean and what is 
emblematic of coherentism in Ficino’s case in particular.  Coherentism, in general, Hankins 
describes as the idea that “a belief is justified if an only if it is part of a coherent system of 
beliefs” and “what creates belief is the way that the whole web of beliefs make sense of nature, 
history and our lives as rational and moral beings” (2008: 110).  Under coherentism the 
justification for beliefs is found within the interconnection of the entire web of beliefs, in how 
well an entire system of belief explains our lived experienced, rather than proceeding from a 
select few “indubitable” first principles by successive deduction.   
In the case of Ficino, Hankins states that “all religious beliefs justify themselves in terms 
of other religious beliefs and not in terms of foundational truths of unaided natural reason” 
(2008: 111).  He thereby draws a distinction between Ficino’s methodology and that to which 
Grassi links him, namely the Cartesian school of rationalism, specifically stating that, unlike 
Descartes, Ficino does not “want to reason outward more geometrico from truths of reason to 
truths of religion” (15).  A similar fact is noted by Allen, although he does not draw out its 
significance, when he observes that in some argumentation of the Platonic Theology the 
existence of the soul formed the basis of arguments for the existence of angels and elsewhere the 
existence of angels formed the basis of argumentation for the existence of the soul (1975: 223).  
While this seems to be circular reasoning according to foundationalist principles, for the 
coherentist this would be an expression of the mutual interdependence of the various postulates.   
However, despite these suggestions that Ficino is a coherentist, the position ultimately 
suffers from the same problems as the foundationalist arguments.  In particular, a coherentist 
account of Ficino’s thought fails to account for the sharp divide between dianoia and noesis, 
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between ratio and intellectus.  It would seem on a coherentist account that the practice of 
dialectic could serve only to expand the field of postulates which demonstrate mutual 
interdependence to enlarge the scope of the coherent paradigm.  However, this is, once again, an 
addition only of degree and not of kind.  No matter how many additional discursive postulates 
are added within a paradigm, this does not account for the paradigm itself, whereas Ficino’s 
“proceeding Orphically” specifically involves surpassing ratio. 
 Hankins unwittingly raises interesting points on this issue when he discusses the method 
of refutation employed by Ficino in the Platonic Theology.  He points out that Ficino does not 
seek to establish a common set of first principles with opponents and then indicate where they 
have failed to reason adequately from those principles (2008: 112).  Rather: 
In each case he does not offer arguments against the inferior philosophies but tries 
to show that they are incomplete: that there are realms of psychic and noetic 
experience that are left unexplained by atomism or Stoic materialism or 
Aristotelian metaphysics.  He repeats the same move at the beginning of Book VI.  
When dealing in more detail with the arguments of Lucretius against immortality, 
Ficino (using a skeptical method) shows that there could be alternative 
explanations for the evidence of mortality advanced by Lucretius, and that there 
are other phenomena not covered by his theory.  He takes his counterarguments 
from Aristotle, Thomas, the Stoics and Arab philosophers indifferently so long as 
they can be used to shake confidence in Lucretius’ arguments…. In short, his 
arguments are overwhelmingly dialectic rather than formally demonstrative or 
apodictic.  He often appeals to the beauty and goodness of the doctrines taught by 
Christian Platonists and the ugliness and ill consequences of the doctrines he 
opposes in a way that would utterly discredit him with an Anglo-American 
analytic philosophers.  Yet Ficino, surprisingly to our ears, identifies his method 
as peculiarly Platonic and vastly superior to the logic-chopping argumentation of 
scholastic Aristotelians. (2008:112-113)  
 
 Whereas it may strike Hankins as peculiar to think of this method as Platonic, it should 
not.  These statements recall Plato’s method of hypothesis.  Plato’s dialectical methodology 
holds that all discursive postulates are inherently ambiguous, incomplete and subject to 
refutation because they are only capable of speaking about something and not speaking the thing 
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itself.  At the same time, only in proposing and destroying these hypotheses in continual 
dialectical activity—the user’s art—do beings come forward in their truth.  No discursive 
analysis of reality holds an eternal, demonstrable validity.  Thus, Plato often refutes a claim to 
knowledge by his interlocutors by calling upon the ambiguity of word or by pointing out a 
concrete example in which their theoretical construct cannot account for the entire issue at hand 
and is therefore insufficient.  This is the same method Ficino employs when he seeks to show 
that different philosophical schools fail to account for the totality of our lived experience.  
Ultimately, therefore, the same stance as from the time of Plato is found in Ficino—
discursive reality and discursive expression are a necessary means for the manifestation of the 
holy and transcendent, but no discursive expression is able to provide one with a direct and 
stable vision of that reality.  For Ficino, dialectic and inspired poetry provide a conduit to 
“proceeding Orphically.”  That is, through language, to allow beings to shine forth, not in their 
everydayness, trapped in a logical prison, but as a theophany of the ineffable divine no-thingness. 
 It is important to note that “proceeding Orphically” was described above as “the only way 
of accommodating polytheistic structures to the deep grammar of monotheism,” a concern which 
also occupied other Humanists, like Salutati.  Ficino’s own impulses in this area led him to 
transform and expand something which was already an existing trope among the Humanists, 
namely the idea of a prisca theologia, mentioned at the beginning of this chapter.  The idea, in 
fact, possesses roots that stretch back to antiquity and were alive and well in the medieval period.  
It originally emerged in the form of theologia poetica or prisci poetae.  That is, it originated in 
the allegorical appropriation of pagan poets as displaying insights into the deep structures of 
reality.  In this way we could say that Aquinas was a precursor to this idea, but it grew to its true 
heights of prominence with the emergence of the Renaissance (Trinkaus 1995: 688-689).  
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Petrarch offered a defense of poetry and the Humanists, for example, by calling on the idea of 
prisci poetae: 
You belch forth imprecations against the poets as though they were enemies of the 
true faith to be avoided by the faithful and driven away by the Church; what do 
you think of Ambrose, Augustine and Jerome, what of Cyprian, Victorinus the 
martyr, what of Lactantius and the other catholic writers among whom almost 
nothing is written without the traces of the poets, while on the contrary almost 
none of the heretics has inserted something poetic in his little works either 
because of his ignorance or because there was nothing in harmony with his errors 
among the poets.  For although many mention the names of the gods (which it 
must be believed they did on account of the nature of the times and the culture of 
those peoples rather than because they followed their own judgements, and which 
the very philosophers also did who, as we may read in the rhetorical books, did 
not think the gods existed), nevertheless the very greatest of the poets have 
declared in their works that they believed in one omnipotent God, the creator, 
ruler and maker of everything. (qtd. in Trinkaus 1995: 691) 
 
 Trinkaus solidly places Petrarch, Boccaccio and Salutati within the tradition that regarded 
the pagan poets as possessing and concealing a hidden tradition of wisdom which lay behind and 
underneath their apparent words.  Indeed Boccaccio was to offer an explanation of the origins of 
poetry on the basis of this conception.  He imagined individuals, inspired by wonder at the 
observation of nature coming to believe in one power that dwelt behind the visible cosmos whom 
they then praised by sacral verse (1995: 694).  Salutati goes so far as to suggest that, in the 
interpretation of pagan poetry, it may be the case that God has worked to include meanings 
within the text, unintended by the human author.  Such a move, obviously, gives great license to 
the assimilation of the pagan poets to the general teaching and culture of Christianity (700).  
Salutati observed in the pagan poets the ability to reflect the infinite potential of divine power in 
various different concrete historical manifestations, stating: 
For as they [the Greeks] called one and the same divinity in the heavens Luna, in 
the forests Diana, and in the underworld Proserpina, they also presupposed this 
whole complex of gods as a single essence of them all and named it according to 
the plurality of its possibilities and with the different names of their activities. 
(qtd. in Grassi 1983: 68) 
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 This form of appropriation of the ancient poets was, therefore, a common trope among 
the Humanists.  If this sort of teaching was inherently inimical to the view of the Platonic 
tradition, then why do we find that it possesses a central role in the teaching of Ficino?  For 
without a doubt, Ficino took up, modified and developed this idea for his own sake.  Idel notes 
that Ficino played with different conceptions of what he termed the “prisca theologia,” varying 
between the idea that the pagan authors had been directly influenced by the revelation to the 
Hebrews (unilinear) and the idea that they were subject to independent manifestations of divine 
inspiration (mulitlinear).  Ultimately, however, he concludes that the idea of multilinear, 
independent historical manifestations of the divine is the more prevalent idea held by Ficino 
(147).  For Ficino, among the Gentiles, there existed a chain of great inspired teachers beginning 
with Zoroaster descending through the poet-theologian Orpheus and finally culminating in the 
teachings of Plato (151).   
The most important thing to note about this development of the prisca theologia in Ficino 
is the meaning and purpose that it plays.  We have seen previously that Grassi holds that the 
poets have a special role in making manifest the truth of Being in particular historical 
circumstances and thereby serving as the founders and rejuvenators of human institutions and 
culture.  I propose, following Edelheit, that, in fact, for Ficino, his adoption of the idea of a great 
chain of prisci theologi is intended to serve as a great founding myth by which society is to be 
reordered, and therefore is deeply aligned with the Humanist project as envisioned by  
Grassi.  The purpose of the myth was nothing less than the overthrow of Aristotelian late 
Scholasticism in order to re-found society and religious devotion (Edelheit 206). 
Ficino seems to have believed that Christendom in his day was in the midst of a full scale 
crisis.  Whereas he believed that, in the age of the apostles, the Christian faith had been vivified 
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and engaged by its direct connection to living prophecy and miracles, that by his own time it had 
dissolved into an empty formalism (Edelheit 245).  In Heideggerian terms, the Christian epoch 
could be said, in Ficino’s view, to be suffering from “world decay,” in which the traditions of 
Christian civilization have devolved into idle chatter, detached from the force which originally 
allowed them to lay the groundwork of Christendom. 
Ficino believed that the appropriate way to correct this problem was to encourage the 
unification of the spiritual, intellectual and political life (Edelheit 253).  Indeed, he forcefully 
bemoaned that this was not the case in his day, stating in his De Christiana religione: 
Quanta denique et quam vera doctrina in priscis Christanorum episcopis, 
presbyterisque quis nesciat?  O Felicia secula, quae divinam hanc sapientiae 
religionisque copulam, praesertim apud Hebraeos Christianosque integram 
servavistis.  O secula tandem nimium infelicia, quando Palladis, Themidisque (id 
est, sapientiae et honestatis) et separatio divortium miserabile contigit.  Proh 
nephas, sic datum est sanctum canibus lacerandum. 
 
Who does not know how great and how true the doctrine was among the ancient 
bishops and priests of the Christians.  O you happy age which preserved this 
divine union of wisdom and religion, especially intact among the Hebrews and 
Christians.  O at last exceedingly miserable age when the separation and divorce 
of Pallas and Themis (that is, of wisdom and integrity) miserably obtains.  Alas, 
thus was holiness given to the dogs to be lacerated. 
 
 For Ficino, the myth of the prisci theologi allows him to offer a mythical, primordial 
model by which to understand the proper and appropriate manner in which civilization should 
exist.  The union of Platonic dialectic with religious piety is meant to restore a sense of the 
immediacy of holiness and thereby rejuvenate true religion apart from simple ceremonial 
repetition.  In this way, we can see that in the myth of the prisca theologia, Ficino affirms what 
was seen in the Humanists of whom Grassi offers approval, as well as Landino, that poetry and 




 Overall, we have seen that Ficino does not, after all, embrace a rationalistic and 
reductionist view of reality in the manner of Descartes.  Rather, Ficino envisions a philosophical 
and religious program specifically aimed at overcoming the rationalism of late Scholasticism 
which would eventually culminate in the works of Descartes.  He pursues this program within 
the context of the traditional Platonic observation of a principle which stands beyond beings and 
therefore destabilizes all attempts to contain and delimit the nature of reality within the static 
establishment of a logically deduced system of beings.  Following from this fact, in a way 
directly parallel to Heidegger and Grassi, he envisions a poetic foundation to society, sensitive to 





















Platonism, Humanism and the Overcoming of Technological Thinking 
 
In the Introduction to this study I raised the issue of modern criticism of technological 
culture taken to its extremes through its manifestations in figures such as Kaczynski, Zerzan and 
Heidegger.  In particular, I focused attention on how Heidegger unfolds the ontological basis for 
technological thinking which causes all of reality to be interpreted as a standing reserve for 
manipulation and exploitation.  I hold this to be a particularly pressing issue of concern in a time 
like our own in which the physical sciences are held in such universal esteem and there appears 
to be an increasing assault on the legitimacy, usefulness and purpose of the study of the 
humanities. 
In Chapter One, I pursued the question of how Heidegger thought this problem could be 
addressed in a time of “destitution” like our own.  Heidegger appeared to believe that an 
immediate encounter within the scope of the work of art could renew in the mind of the modern 
individual a sense of the holy and thereby lay the ground for future poets to break through the 
technological framework of modern thinking and cause Being to once again appear manifest in 
its mystery and power in the founding of an entirely new historical period, beyond the Gestell of 
modern technology.  Furthermore, in this chapter, I introduced the issue of Humanism explored 
by Heidegger’s student.  Whereas Heidegger had been uniformly critical of Humanism, Grassi 
showed that the Humanist dedication to the primacy of the revelatory power of the word made 
them kindred spirits with Heidegger’s own philosophical project.  Just as Heidegger envisioned 
modern artists like van Gogh, Cezanne and Klee using their art to pull forth a direct vision of the 
mystery behind beings, Grassi held that the Renaissance Humanists had a similar dedication.  In 
their case, the power of poetry and the word would overcome the empty destitution of an overly 
rationalistic late form of Scholasticism. 
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Grassi makes some unique contributions to this agenda which are worth note and 
admiration.  While the basic framework of his thought is grounded in Heideggerian philosophy, 
he did not limit himself to the thinking of his master.  First, by demonstrating the the Humanists 
did not fit into Heidegger’s “history of Being,” he opened up the possibility for a general 
questioning about the integrity of Heideggerian mythology.  While he failed to see that the 
Platonic tradition, likewise, defied Heidegger’s vision of a universal forgetfulness of Being, the 
insight is the key to opening up future critiques (including this one).  Furthermore, he did not 
leave Heidegger’s theoretical models untouched.  Drawing upon his knowledge of Renaissance 
Humanism, he was able to show the way that earlier historical figures had approached the same 
sort of issues that appeared in Heidegger’s thought.  In doing so, however, he was able to make 
use of and adat their tool, including their conception of the ingenium and their system of topical 
philosophy.  These are, in my opinion, invaluable for the expansion and strengthening of any 
practical means towards overcoming modern nihilism.  If Heidegger has provided a certain 
general structure for thinking, Grassi has drawn upon his historical resources to help develop 
tools towards achieving the goal of breaking free of enframing. 
Importantly, however, neither Heidegger nor Grassi, in their later works at least, had 
much respect for the Platonic tradition, viewing it as a form of—if not the essential form of—the 
rationalistic, reductionistic, technological thinking to which they were so powerfully opposed.  In 
Chapter Two, I sought to demonstrate that Heidegger and Grassi had misrepresented Plato in 
their later works.  That Plato, far from being dedicated to a conception of reality which is 
reducible to rational conceptions, Plato’s entire dialectical philosophy is directed towards the 
destabilization of any and all discursive claims to have captured the structure of reality.  This was 
captured through the use of Francisco Gonzalez’s paradigm of a dialogic/dialectical approach to 
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the dialogues over against insufficient dogmatic and skeptical approaches which predominate in 
the modern period. 
In Chapter Three, I showed how this powerful essence of Platonism was not lost with the 
transition to the tradition of the late antique founder of Neoplatonism, Plotinus.  Indeed, the 
transcendence of that which is beyond being and how it gives itself forth in contingent 
manifestations of human thought lies at the very center of the insights of the Neoplatonic 
philosophers.  Even more significantly, as shown in Chapter Four, the marriage of Platonism and 
Christianity did not undermine this core element of Plato’s tradition.  On the contrary, the 
powerful apophaticism and theophanic foundations of Christian conceptions of reality only 
served to reinforce and rejuvenate this insight that had always lain at the heart of the Platonic 
tradition.  Finally, I showed in Chapter Five that Marsilio Ficino, despite his demonization by 
Grassi, still steadfastly maintained the ontological difference and through it the power of Platonic 
dialectic as an initiatory method into deep insights into the nature of reality. 
The question might arise, however, as to why this should matter.  Surely this is a matter 
of purely historical interest—were Heidegger and Grassi wrong about Platonism?  However, if it 
is merely an historical question, with no important implications for lived experience, does it truly 
have any significance at all?  I mentioned briefly in Chapter One that Plato’s philosophical 
methodology appeared in response to the Sophistic movement.  The sophists were a movement 
which strongly paralleled elements of modern thought.  In particular, they combined the dual 
qualities of extreme subjectivism and intense ratio-centrism.  They held that man himself was the 
measure of all things and that, likewise, reality could therefore be grasped and manipulated via 
his own discursive formulations and propositions about it.  This belief then became manifest in 
their horrifying displays of eristic argumentation.  In pursuing these various activities and lines 
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of thinking, the sophists posed a significant threat to the traditional manner of Greek life.  This is 
fully on display, ironically, in the trial of Socrates when, under suspicion of being a sophist, he is 
charged with the corruption of the youth of the city.39 
All of this largely amounts to the idea that Plato was confronting, in his own day, very 
similar, though not entirely identical, threats to those which Heidegger and Grassi saw as 
haunting out modern technological society.  Much of the background of Plato’s own thinking on 
the underlying issues regarding this problem are paralleled in Heidegger and Grassi, including 
his affirmation of the ontological difference and thus the contingency of human thought and 
traditions.  Heidegger and Grassi both seem preoccupied with the idea that technological 
thinking can be overcome by a direct vision, in a work of art.  That, for instance, reading 
Boccaccio or standing before a painting of Klee will open up the holy for the viewer.  This seems 
to be unlikely, however, especially in a time of utter destitution, as in the modern period.  
Heidegger himself has indicated, for example, that the aesthetic reduction of artwork to a 
commodity of the art industry is part of the power of enframing, as much as the encounter with a 
beautiful river is reduced to thoughts of generating hydro-electric power. 
Although Heidegger, outside his philosophy of art, also gives an affirmation of creative 
engagement with the history of thinking in order to overcome its limitation, he is notoriously 
dogmatic, mythological and erroneous in his evaluations and engagements with those traditions 
(as his reading of Platonism shows).  This is why the resuscitation of Plato is far from a matter of 
                                                 
39 In giving this account, it is important to distinguish to whom this terminology of “sophist” is referring.  In 
particular, these statements do not mean to convey information about the group of philosophers which were 
known by that name and sometimes dramatically depicted in the dialogues of Plato, such as Gorgias and 
Protagoras.  Rather, “sophist” is being used to refer to those types of individuals against whom Plato is often 
seen reacting in the dialogues, that is, his own contemporaries.  This is true despite the fact that at times Plato has 
sometimes put the thought of these contemporaries into the mouth of a previously generation of eminent 
thinkers.  See G. B. Kerferd. 1981. The Sophistic Movement. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981 for 
more details on the historical sophists. 
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mere historical interest.  Platonic methodology does not simply replace ratiocentric thinking with 
a counter mythology or an attempt at a direct vision, in the Heideggerian manner.  Rather, Plato’s 
methodology is truly to encounter the frameworks which it is challenging and to demonstrate by 
their own criteria their radical insufficiency at confronting the depth of reality.  That is, 
Platonism is truly a maieutic technique which contributes to the collapse of totalizing pretensions 
from within that which it encounters.  Plato repeatedly demonstrated this fact by his depiction of 
Socrates’s confrontations with sophists throughout the dialogues. 
Therefore, in rejecting the Platonists, Heidegger and Grassi were, in fact, rejecting their 
strongest allies in the struggle against the domination of technological thinking.  At the same 
time, the adoption of a Platonic methodology allows for the greatest preservation of the positive 
elements within scientific thinking, precisely because Platonism challenges the totalization of 
paradigms in and through dialogue with metaphysics, rather than merely steeping back from it.  
It is my contention, therefore, that properly evaluating the true essence of Platonism opens up 
greater possibilities for breaking down the barriers of Gestell and truly laying the groundwork for 
the re-emergence of great works of world-historical art after the modern period.  In this 
endeavor, I believe that going forward, the task will be to integrate the fundamental tools which 
Grassi has provided (the centrality of metaphor in conceptuality, topic philosophy, the ingenium, 
etc.) into a general Platonic approach which could be used to great effect in overcoming our 
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